Name:_______________________
Economics 854 Final
Prof. Bryan
Caplan
Spring, 2014
Instructions:
· You have 120 minutes to complete this exam.
· Write all answers directly on the exam.
· You may use any books, notes, or other materials that you wish, but avoid spending too much time on any one question.
· Partial credit may be awarded on all questions.
· The maximum possible number of points is 120.
· You should have five pages, counting this one.
Part 1: True,
False, and Explain
(10 points each - 2
for the right answer, and 8 for the explanation)
State whether each of the following six propositions is true
or false. In 2-3 sentences (and
clearly-labeled diagrams,
when helpful), explain why.
1. Suppose that politicians earn $1000 when they vote for a program in the public interest, but earn $10,000 when they vote for a program that benefits only a special interest. Half of all programs are public-interested and benefit each voter by $1000; the rest are special interested and hurt each voter by $2000. Voters know how many “yes” votes their representatives cast, but only have a 5% chance of discovering whether a piece of legislation was public- or special-interested. Politicians are risk-neutral.
T, F, and Explain: If
a “cruel and unusual punishment” clause caps voters’ maximum
punishment of politicians at $50,000, rational voters will prefer to vote against
candidates who cast a higher fraction of “yes” votes.
2. Suppose voters in a Meltzer-Richards framework are purely group-interested; they vote for whichever candidate promises the tax rate that maximizes the average income of their group.
T, F, and Explain: The equilibrium tax rate will
equalize group incomes if less than half of voters belong to the richest
group.
3. “But, obviously, citizens
will react to the costs they bear only insofar as they are aware of them. The
possibility of driving a wedge between actual and publicly perceived costs
creates an irresistible temptation for governments pursuing high-cost policies
in times of national emergency. Except perhaps where lives are being lost, no
costs are so easily counted as pecuniary costs... It therefore behooves any
government wishing to sustain a policy that entails suddenly heightened costs
to adopt devices to substitute nonpecuniary for pecuniary costs. (Higgs,
“Crisis, Bigger Government, and Ideological Change”)”
T, F, and Explain: Wittman would accuse Higgs of
assuming “a serious lack of competition” under democracy.
4.
T, F, and Explain: Buchanan’s appeal to the “veil of
ignorance” at the constitutional level of politics is consistent with his
belief in the SIVH.
Part 2: Short
Essays
(20 points each)
In 6-8 sentences, answer all of the following questions.
1. Environmental
regulators usually adopt “command-and-control” remedies for
pollution instead of pollution taxes or tradeable permits. If you were Donald Wittman, how would
you explain this fact?
2. “Whether
a political or religious teaching is to win wide acceptance depends almost
exclusively on three factors.” (Mosca, The Ruling Class) Use
Mosca’s analysis to explain the “wide acceptance” of either
liberalism or conservatism in the modern United States.
3.
Suppose Communist China switched to democracy. Using everything you have learned,
predict what major policy changes would be adopted during the first five
years of Chinese democracy.
Carefully explain your answer.
4. Say something new and insightful about the economics of anarchy.