Economics 854
Midterm
Prof. Bryan
Caplan
Spring, 2013
Part 1: True,
False, and Explain
(10 points each - 2
for the right answer, and 8 for the explanation)
State whether each of the following six propositions is true
or false. In 2-3 sentences (and
clearly-labeled diagrams,
when helpful), explain why.
1. Suppose the government uses lump-sum taxation to equalize initial endowments, and the outcome that emerges is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
T, F, and Explain: The
outcome will automatically maximize average happiness, too.
FALSE. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and maximum
happiness are not the same.
Kaldor-Hicks ignores distribution, so at minimum happiness maximization
requires an adjustment for diminishing marginal utility of
consumption/wealth. You should also
probably adjust for personality (some people’s happiness is more
responsive to consumption/wealth than others’) and other disconnects
between willingness-to-pay and happiness (i.e. true love, which causes great
happiness even though people won’t pay you to love them).
2. T, F, and
Explain: According to the Median
Voter Model, fringe parties are invariably counter-productive from their own
point of view.
FALSE. Irrevocably
switching to a fringe party is indeed counter-productive, because it moves the
equilibrium platform in the opposite of the desired direction. But provisionally
switching until “your” party becomes more radical can indeed lead
to more radical policies. The
catch: Provisionally switching is risky.
It increases the radicalism of its policies conditional on winning, but
reduces “your” party’s probability of electoral victory.
3. Suppose you are trying to predict ideology in the GSS.
T, F, and Explain: Univariate regressions of ideology on education and income tend to overstate the effect of both education and income on ideology.
FALSE. As explained in the notes, education and
income mask each others’
effects on ideology. Since education
and income are highly correlated, univariate regressions show that education
makes you slightly more liberal, and income makes you slightly more
conservative. A bivariate
regression of liberalism on education AND income shows a larger positive effect
of education and a larger negative effect of income.
4. Suppose you test the Median Voter Model using questions of the form, “AGREE or DISAGREE: Spending on X should be increased.” Assume that the distribution of voter bliss points is continuous.
T, F, and Explain: On real-world data, you will almost always reject the Median Voter
Model.
TRUE. If there are just two response options,
the ONLY observation consistent with the Median Voter Model is if the
population splits exactly 50/50. Otherwise, the median respondent wants
something different from the status quo, contrary to the MVM. The lesson is that two-response
questions are an unfair test of the MVM: Respondents should at minimum also be offered
the third option of supporting the status quo.
I gave partial credit to
responses that cited Bartels. The
evidence was definitely relevant, but it overlooked the more fundamental point
that two-response questions stack the deck against the MVM.
Part 2: Short
Essays
(20 points each)
In 6-8 sentences, answer all of the following questions.
1. People often illustrate the Tiebout model by discussing the effect of public school quality on locational choices and real estate prices. Are the observed patterns really what the Tiebout model predicts? Why or why not?
The Tiebout model correctly
predicts that, ceteris paribus, better schools lead to higher real estate
prices and higher property taxes lead to lower real estate prices. It also correctly predicts that people
sort into localities that offer subjectively attractive school/tax
combinations. Wealthy parents often
deliberately move to areas with excellent public schools, and low-income
retirees often deliberately move to areas with low property taxes. However, these patterns are far weaker
than the Tiebout model implies. In
particular, the Tiebout model implies that (a) localities that offer a
relatively bad school/tax package
will completely depopulate, and (b) some localities will cater to childless
residents (or families that prefer private schools) by offering no public
schooling whatsoever. Both (a) and
(b) are false.
2. In the GSS, the question LETIN1 asks:
Do you think the number of
immigrants to America nowadays should be... increased a lot (=1), increased a
little (=2), remain the same as it is (=3), reduced a little (=4), or reduced a
lot (=5)?
Here are the results if you regress LETIN1 on years of education (EDUC), age, dummy variables for race (BLACK, OTHRACE), ideology (POLVIEWS, 1=”extremely liberal”, 7=”extremely conservative”), being born in the U.S. (yes=1, no=2), church attendance (0=”never”, 8=”more than once a week”), and Biblical literalism (1=”word of God”, 2=”inspired word”, 3=”book of fables”).
Note: The coefficient on the log of respondent income
(omitted) was approximately zero.
How well do these results fit what we have learned about the determinants of public opinion? Be careful to point out any anomalies, and discuss magnitudes as well as statistical significance.
Overall, the results fit our
class lessons well: the SIVH does poorly, and the ideological and especially
group-interest models do well.
Since previous immigrants
compete most closely with new immigrants in the labor market, self-interest
predicts that the sign on BORN would be positive. In fact, the sign is strongly negative, consistent
with the group-interest story that previous immigrants identify with and care
about new immigrants. Blacks and
members of “other races” (primarily Hispanics) are also relatively
pro-immigrant – contrary to their economic interests, but consistent with
the idea that non-whites identify to some degree with immigrants. Also note that older people are more
anti-immigrant – contrary to their self-interest as consumers of old-age
care, but consistent with a less multicultural identity.
The lectures also correctly
predict that education and liberalism both make respondents more
pro-immigration.
The main anomaly: Church attendance leads to more pro-immigration views, but Biblical literalism leads to more anti-immigration views. This might reflect church-going Catholics’ tendency to be pro-immigrant while opposing a literal reading of the Bible.
3. “The centers of national
journalistic activity are relatively rich states including New York,
California, Maryland, and Virginia. Once again, the journalists — and,
for that matter, academics — avoid the first-order availability bias:
they are not surprised that the country as a whole votes differently from the
residents of big cities. But they make the second-order error of too quickly
generalizing from the correlations in
their states.” (Gelman et al, “Rich State, Poor State, Red State,
Blue State”)
Carefully explain what Gelman et al are saying. Are they right?
Gelman et al find that the
state-level party/income correlation gets smaller as average state income
rises. In the rich states where
national journalists generally reside, the party/income correlation is
near-zero. Upshot: When national
journalists extrapolate from their states of residence to the entire country,
they underestimate the party/income correlation. The problem, in a nutshell: Journalists know
and adjust for the fact that they are
weird, but they fail to realize or adjust for the fact that their states are weird, too.
Gelman et al’s story
makes a great deal of sense. You
could accuse them of overstating the party/income correlation by ignoring
race. But if you read them closely,
they acknowledge and correct for this problem.
4. The antiwar movement largely collapsed after Obama’s election. How would Zaller explain this change?
Zaller would apply his
concepts of the “polarization” and “mainstream”
effects. Potential members of the
antiwar movement, like all activists, have high political awareness. During the Bush era, elites were divided
along partisan lines regarding the War on Terror. As a result (“the polarization
effect”) Democratic activists opposed the War strongly enough to man a
sizable antiwar movement. During
the Obama era, however, the War on Terror became much more bipartisan. As a result (“the mainstream
effect”), Democratic activists have become much more accepting of the War
on Terror. Too accepting, in fact,
to continue to man a sizable antiwar movement.