A Reply to My Critics  
At the outset, let me say that I never realized how much 
effort Mike Huemer must have been putting into 
replying to his critics over the past year until I found 
myself compelled to reply to mine.  Ive gotten a wealth 
of responses, and I hope that it will be satisfactory if I 
reply to what I see as the high points of each of the 
critiques.  
Before I begin, I have to say that the portion of my 
Short Essay with which I was least comfortable was the 
opening sentence, taking a crack at describing 
(defining?) the most salient features of free will.  My 
critics, friendly and otherwise, have convinced me that 
my initial formulation can be seriously improved upon.  
I present now for your inspection the _two_ 
formulations between which I am not ready to decide 
(though I lean towards the second).  I think that these 
will make my thesis clearer and hence more 
objectionable to the compatibilists than it originally was.  
First Formulation:  
A choice is free iff it is caused by a free will.  A will is 
free iff its behavior it not caused (in either the 
deterministic or probabilistic sense) by anything 
_whatsoever_.  
Second Formulation:  
A choice is free iff it is an activity of a free will.  A will is 
free iff its choices are not caused (in either the 
deterministic or probabilistic sense) by anything 
_whatsoever_.  
If you are having trouble seeing the difference, it is 
basically the difference between choices being _part of_ 
the will, vs. something external to but produced by the 
will.  My reason for inclining to the second formulation 
is basically the introspective one: my choices seem to me 
to be a veritable piece of my will rather than something 
external to but produced by my will.  In contrast, 
actions seem external to the will but caused by choices.  
This said, let me turn to each of my critics in turn.  
---------------------------------------------------------  
  
To Mike Huemer: 
1.	I think that my new formulations can handle the 
definitional problems you raise.  
2.	With regards to the law of causality, I'm not sure that 
we are really disagreeing.  When C causes A, but you 
could have prevented C from doing so, we are 
thinking of "cause" in a looser sense than "is 
sufficient to produce," since adding an additional 
factor (the agent's prevention) stops C from causing 
A.  Similarly, I think that there is an ambiguity in the 
meaning of "ability" in your bicycle example: you are 
thinking of an ability to do something when 
circumstances are different (e.g., when the bike has a 
good cyclist riding it), whereas I am thinking of an 
ability to do something under exactly the same 
circumstances.  
3.	The atom's decay.  I must admit that I keep having 
the determinist in mind as my foil, but of course the 
probabilist is just as contrary.  So let me further 
clarify.  When I say (as in my second formulation) 
that the will is not caused by anything whatsoever, I 
have in mind not only deterministic causation, but 
also causality according to the pattern of any 
probability distribution.  Of course, ex post there will 
always be an empirical histogram of what 
_has_been_chosen; but I deny that ex ante the will's 
behavior is caused to behave according to any 
probability density function.  
4.	I didn't mean to quote your comment that "Judgment 
is something ones  does, whereas having a feeling is 
something that happens to one."  Rather it _inspired_ 
my own claim, even though they are about different 
subject matters.  Sorry if you felt mis-quoted.  
5.	My thought experiment.  Well, I hate to start 
lecturing one of the world's experts of thought 
experiments about thought experiments, but...  Your 
objection that we couldn't "measure the initial 
conditions" just seems to me to totally miss the point.  
For I could just as easily have said: suppose the 
scientists have these equations, and suppose they can 
measure the initial conditions perfectly.  NOW would 
you be able to falsify their predictions?  And of course 
you could.  And SINCE YOU COULD DO IT IN 
THIS HYPOTHETICAL CASE (as you must admit), 
I conclude that we actually DO have free will in the 
real world.  Why?  Well, you could only falsify the 
equations in the thought experiment if you have free 
will in the real world.  And you see via the experiment 
that you could falsify them; hence in the real world, 
not just the imaginary case, you have free will.  
------------------------------------------------------------  
  
To Brock Sides:  
1.	The Failure of Compatibilism  
  
I hope that my revised definition distinguishes our 
views to your satisfaction.  That said, I have to say 
that I find your position to be highly implausible.  As 
you put it, "attributions of ability, such as 'could have 
done otherwise', are context-dependent modal 
attributions."  So when we say that I am free to 
choose what to drink, we make this statement in "a 
looser context than one which considers all the laws of 
physics."  It is true if we ignore some of the 
knowledge of the world which we have.  
Now the biggest problem with your view is this: on 
your definition of "freedom," even a ROCK has 
freedom.  If we talk in a looser context than one which 
considers all of the laws of physics, a rock might 
suddenly explode or fly off into space.  A plant, if we 
talk in the "looser  context," might grow on the 
ground or crawl up onto the wall.  Are we to conclude 
that plants and rocks are free?  Well, they do have 
freedom in the compatibilist sense; in which case, I 
suggest, the compatibilists' "freedom" is just a 
distortion of language.  Searle puts it more eloquently 
than I could:   
"The problem about compatibilism, then, is that it 
doesn't answer the question, 'Could we have done 
otherwise, all other conditions remaining the same?', 
in a way that is consistent with our belief in our own 
free will.  Compatibilism denies the substance of free 
will while maintaining its verbal shell."  (_Minds, 
Brains, and Science_, p.89)  
A final point to make about compatibilism is that it 
doesn't say anything that hard-core determinists 
would disagree with, but it sure does say things which 
the advocate of "libertarian" free will would disagree 
with.  It isn't even a position distinct from 
determinism, but rather a vain attempt to make the 
implausibilities of determinism a little easier to 
swallow.  
2.	My Four Arguments and Compatibilism  
  
I just don't see how any of my four arguments could 
support  compatibilism.  Let's go through the three 
you think do.  A. Observation.  Well, if I observe 
"libertarian" free will through  introspection, then 
obviously there is a contradiction between (A) and 
compatibilism.  "Begs the question!" you say?  All I 
can ask the reader to do is introspect further.  Do you 
observe your will to be free "in a looser context than 
one which considers all the laws of physics"?  Or do 
you observe yourself to be free in reality, taking any 
knowledge of science or philosophy into account? 
C.	Initial plausibility.  Again, I think that before you 
studied philosophy, you would have said that it is 
very plausible that your will is actually free in the 
hard-core sense.  And if that premise exceeds the 
probability of any of your subsequent studies 
conflicting with this view, then my argument 
works.  
D.	The Thought Experiment.  How in the world is this 
consistent with compatibilism?  I explicitly take the 
context of all the laws of physics into the structure 
of the thought experiment, and then argue that you 
could still do otherwise.  To agree with me in this 
thought experiment is to say that _whatever context 
we consider_ we are free, not just free if we 
disregard about some of what we know.  
3.	The Reductio Ad Absurdum to Skepticism.  Well, to 
begin with, free will does not lead to skepticism, 
because we can _choose_ to believe things because 
they are true.  (Nice point, though.)  And of course 
dualism and determinism are theoretically 
compatible.  I'm not sure if you've gotten my 
basic point that under the determinist assumption, 
our true beliefs are the result of irrational forces.  
(Unless you are a determinist who believes that Truth 
itself is an active causal force in the world, alongside 
matter/energy and genes/environment.  Any takers?)  
In any case, this is my least favorite argument of the 
four, though I am sure Mike Huemer would be happy 
to defend it more extensively than myself.  :-)  
------------------------------------------------------------------  
  
To Alan Eaton:  
You've made me a little more aware of the need to 
confront the probabilist along with the determinist; 
hopefully my new formulations make you happy in that 
respect.  
1.	The Argument from Science.  I agree with your claim 
that "any  discoveries or claims should be able to be 
rationalised against the vast body  of scientific 
knowledge that already exists."  However, I also think 
that any  purported scientific knowledge must be 
rationalized against the vast body  of common sense 
and philosophic truth which already exists.  My  
rationalization, if you haven't guessed it, is pretty 
simple: the scientific  claims you have in mind have 
only been verified with regards to inanimate  matter 
with any precision; whereas the common sense and 
philosophical  claim that free will exists has been 
verified for human beings for as long as  people have 
had either common sense or philosophy.  I claim that I 
witness the experimental falsification of whatever 
scientific laws you have in mind  every time I lift my 
arm.  Of course, this falsification merely _sets limits 
to_ the applicability of these scientific laws rather 
than refuting them.  Why is this so hard to swallow?  
After all, the point of science is to explain our 
observations, not to systematically discredit some 
empirical observations at the expense of others.  
2.	Contra Observation.  I am still unclear as to what 
your basis for discounting introspective knowledge is.  
Apparently, it contradicts  scientific findings.  But 
those scientific findings are based   on...extrospective 
observations (such as what we see).  So despite your  
appeal to the authority of science, you don't see to be 
doing anything other  than choosing some kinds of 
observations over others.  I am trying to  explain how 
all of our observations, extrospective and 
introspective alike,  can be valid, which strikes me as 
satisfying the true empirical spirit of the  sciences.  As 
for your claim that introspection is turned in on itself, 
the  same could be said of any we study the 
eye by looking at it, etc.  Your final remarks seem to 
bely your claim that you aren't systematically  
favoring some senses over others: "And what if our 
mental freedom  consistently returns false 
information?"  And what if X consistently returns  
false information, where X is wherever you think you 
are getting your  information?  To appeal to "science" 
on this one would, in Hume's words,  "Evidently be 
going in a circle, and taking for granted the very 
point in  question."  
3.	My Reductio.  
You basically seem to accepted my reductio to 
skepticism.  "Determinism  might imply skepticism 
(and it certainly does) [!!! - BC] but it does not  imply 
that we _know_ that skepticism is true."  Hold on 
here.  If we know  determinism as true (you more or 
less do, I'm not sure if you have  probabilistic or 
regular determinism in mind), and we know (as we 
certainly  do [?]) that determinism implies skepticism, 
then why don't we know that  skepticism is true?  We 
seem forced to that conclusion.  Which is absurd,  
because the conclusion contradicts the premise.  As 
far as I can tell, you've  admitted everything needed 
for the reductio to work, but then just refuse to  reject 
the premises and accept free will.  I'm honestly 
puzzled.  
4.	My Thought Experiment.  
You seem to make the same mistake that I accuse 
Mike of.  This is a  thought experiment.  The premises 
don't need to be true to yield an  interesting 
conclusion.  John Searle doesn't really be able to 
memorize  Chinese manuals for the Chinese room 
argument to work; nor does  Einstein's train need to 
be able to travel at the speed of light.  So to your  
allusions to Chaos theory, I just say: OK, run the 
same thought experiment,  assuming that the 
scientists have figured out how to surmount any  
difficulties raised by Chaos theory so their predictions 
are perfect.  
5.	The Propriety of Bringing Up Consequences.    
Of course, bringing up "some unsavoury 
implications" does not refute a  view.  That's why I 
left it for the end.  After having refuted a view, it 
seems  perfectly reasonable to point out the damage 
caused by the alternative  view, in order to motivate 
and inspire people to actively crusade against the  
view after they have rationally changed their minds.  
Moreover, bringing up  unsavoury implications has 
an added bonus: if the proponents of  determinism 
want to be consistent, they must accept all of the 
unsavoury  implications or abandon determinism (or 
be irrational).  Since they rarely  do accept the 
unsavoury implications, I think it suggests that they 
are more  in inner doubt that they will admit.  
----------------------------------------------------  
  
To William Adlam:  
1.	The Argument from Science, revisited.  
You have a whole section premised on "Every physical 
event is governed by the laws of physics."  Obviously, it 
is child's play to get out of this.  Either an event 
involving mental-physical interaction is not "physical," 
or else the law is false.  What is supposed to be so 
plausible about this law, anyway?  It just sounds good 
until we think about mind-body interaction, when it just 
breaks down.  
2.	Do We Choose Beliefs?  
This is a point more about my specific version of free 
will, which I am only too happy to move the discussion 
towards.  Let's take your example:   
"There are several occasions when, if I had been able to, 
I would have chosen to believe that I would never die."  
But hold there are _lots_ of people who have 
chosen to believe this.  People who have the same 
knowledge of science etc. as yourself.  How do they do 
it?  Probably by consciously ignoring the implications of 
their other views.  
If you have any doubt about the ability to choose beliefs, 
just look at what crazy beliefs some people have.  The 
evidence isn't breaking their mental door down.  
Now I'll admit that it would be _difficult_ to belief some 
things.  But I think that they are difficult in the sense I 
mentioned: it is difficult for someone who has developed 
virtuous mental habits to cast them aside in favor of 
illusory but pleasant hopes.  Just as it would be difficult 
to murder a loved one or do anything else you think is 
wrong.  It is difficult to do because your emotions 
militate against it, not because a steely exercise of will 
could not accomplish it.  
3.	Observing Uncausedness.  
I just have to say that I positively observe uncausedness 
in my choices.  I bet most other people do as well.  It 
isn't like finding a murder victim and then saying, 
"Hmm.  I wonder what caused it."  We experience our 
choices as positively uncaused, rather than merely as 
difficult to identify the cause.  
4.	The Thought Experiment.  
Again, I reiterate that a thought experiment need not 
have true premises to yield interesting conclusions.  It 
doesn't matter if a train can really travel at the speed of 
light.  Similarly, it doesn't matter if there could be a 
"negative feedback loop."  Just run the same thought 
experiment, plus add the stipulation that the scientists' 
equation eventually converges.  Even then, I could still 
refute it.  
------------------------------------------------------  
To Tom Clark:  
Well, I don't disagree with much of what you say, 
because you mainly seem to be point out the practical 
problems with living consistently with the determinist 
conclusion.  All I can say is that I would be very 
surprised indeed if ordinary people suddenly dropped 
all of the talk of free will and started looking at e.g. 
criminals as helpless puppets.  
It is also unclear to me why, on your own view, we 
"ought" to give up these allegedly false ways of 
evaluating behavior in favor of the "scientific" model.  
Maybe we are helplessly determined to be unscientific.  
(Searle sure seems to think he is.)  What comes to mind 
is an old cartoon of a judge pronouncing sentence: "I 
realize that you committed these crimes because of your 
background.  What I want you to realize is that my 
background is making me sentence you to twenty years 
of hard labor."  
-----------------------------------------------------------  
  
To Ben Fischer:  
Yep, you are basically right.  I am a hard-core dualist.  
And since I think that mental things cause physical 
things (which even the determinist dualist might think), 
I guess that makes me an "interactionist."  Does that 
help?  


From lsanger@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu Sat Feb  4 10:24:03 1995
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From: lsanger@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (ASP-Disc)
Subject: belated reply to Caplan (part 1)
Status: RO

From: "Paul V. Torek" <flink@elf.bsdi.com>

Part 1 of my reply to Bryan Caplan <bdcaplan@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>
on free will.  Since it's a pain to insert a ">" before each line,
I'll just put three ---'s above, and three below, each quotation.

Starting here.
---
At the outset, it is necessary to gt a clear understanding of what
exactly "free will" is. A being has free will if given all other
causal factors in the universe (genetic and environmental, physical and
chemical are two popular current pairings) it nevertheless possesses the
ability to choose more than one thing.
---

Bryan's definition has incompatibilism built-in.  I will argue that
this is an error.  (In later posts Bryan revised his definition 
slightly, but not in respects relevant to the criticism I'll make.)
Free will is real.  But this does not mean that we are not fully
integral parts of the causal network of nature.  There is no conflict
between the acknowledgement that a person acts freely and the claim
that her acts are a result of causal chains that stretch back
far before her birth.

---
I observe uncaused changes
during my every waking moment, whenever I contemplate my own choices.
---

When I contemplate my choices, I see that it is *up to me* whether 
I shall do one thing or another.  But this is different from seeing
that my choices are *uncaused*:  that is an interpretation, and a
bad one, of the phenomenon of choice.

---
My second argument consists in a reductio ab absurdum.  I shall
begin with the assumption of determinism, and show that it leads to
the self-contradictory position of abject skepticism.

[... deletia ...]
point is that my views -- correct and incorrect alike --
would be the result of inexorable causal forces.
And these forces determine people to error just as inexorably as
they determine them to truth.  Of course, I might be 
correct by coincidence.
---

Or you might be correct by skill.  There are good evolutionary
reasons why organisms like human beings could be expected to be
good at tracking the truth.  And if a being is good at tracking
the truth, is sensitive to evidence, etc., how much more
justification can you possibly want?

As readers of one list already know, I hold "externalist" views
in the theory of knowledge.  Basically that just means that the
paradigm of knowledge, for me, is the cognitive state of a being
who uses reliable truth-tracking methods and gets true beliefs
as a result.

(I'll delete some further argument concerning "bottom-up
explanantions" and "micro-particles", because I've already
replied to Mike Huemer's version of that argument.)

[to be continued]
--Paul Torek, flink@elf.bsdi.com