Why Religious Beliefs Are Irrational,
and Why Economists Should Care
by Bryan
Caplan
Larry
Iannaccone and his co-author Rodney Stark once wrote that the belief that
society is getting less religious says "less about empirical fact than it does about secularization faith � a faith that, despite a mountain
of evidence to the contrary, sustains the conviction of many social scientists
that religious institutions must soon
decay..."� In short, belief in
secularization is just a religion.�
Larry's
critics were, unsurprisingly, not pleased.�
To tell people that their non-religious beliefs are just a religion is an
insult.� Why is it an insult?� There isn't any nice way to answer, so I'll
be blunt.� It is an insult because the way
that people form religious beliefs is so intellectually irresponsible that
their conclusions are almost guaranteed to be false.� People:
�
accept their
religious beliefs with little or no evidence
�
accept religious
beliefs that are contrary to the evidence
�
accept religious
beliefs without studying competing views
�
are certain
about religious beliefs that are dubious at best, and
�
accept their religious beliefs not because they are
intellectually compelling, but because they are emotionally comforting.�
Forming
non-religious beliefs in a religious way is irrational
because forming any beliefs in a
religious way is irrational.
Now
I am not one of those people who says that modern
science has disproven religion.� If I
said that, it would imply that two thousand years ago,
there was not solid evidence against
the claims that Jesus was born of a virgin and rose from the dead.� But the counter-evidence has always been
overwhelming.� Everyone else is born of a non-virgin and stays dead.� It is absurd to recognize an exception
without overwhelming evidence, but all we have is the testimony of a few of his
disciples.� And yet not only do
Christians believe these things; they often claim to know them with certainty, and get angry if you
disagree.� Christianity has always been
irrational, and of course the same goes for Judaism, Islam, Greek mythology,
Satanism, and belief in Santa Claus.
Larry
has won a great deal of attention for his rational choice theory of
religion.� But if you look closely, he
doesn't really have a rational choice theory of religion; he has a rational choice theory of group membership.� As Larry
occasionally admits, virtually everything that he says about religion applies just
as well to fraternities, chess clubs, and football teams.� Yes, belonging to a fraternity has costs and
benefits; yes, competition between fraternities leads to more efficient
outcomes.� And both religions and
fraternities have been known to use what Larry calls "bizarre" rules
� such as "You can't drink any alcohol," or "You can only drink
alcohol," to exclude half-hearted members.
What
Larry's research strangely neglects � or, to use his word, "sidesteps" - is the differences
between religions and fraternities.� The
most obvious of these, the 800-pound gorilla in the room, is doctrine.� Fraternities don't have much of a doctrine; religions
do.� To ignore doctrine is to ignore the
very thing that makes religion special � and the main reason why critics of
religion consider it irrational.� Furthermore,
to ignore doctrine is to sidestep the deepest objection to Larry's rational
choice view of religion: How can you have a rational choice theory of
irrational belief?�
Larry's
neglect of irrational beliefs is glaring because in the last decade economists
have started to take irrationality seriously.�
Behavioral economists emphasize, for example, that people overestimate
the riskiness of air travel because plane crashes are vivid and memorable.� But if that's irrational, how much more
irrational is it to believe that someone rose from the dead because one old book
says so?� Economists who study religion know
enough about irrationality to send Kahneman, Tversky, and Thaler back to the
minors.� But � presumably out of respect
for religion � they refuse to swing their bats.
What
would economists learn if they started paying attention to the doctrinal side
of religion?� Now is my time for
shameless self-promotion.� In a series of
papers on what I call "rational irrationality," I try to handle the deep
objection that Larry sidesteps.� I defend
a rational choice theory of irrational belief.� The gist of my theory is that people persistently hold wildly irrational
religious beliefs because the material cost is usually very low.� In terms of daily life, what difference does
it make if the earth is 6000 years old or 6 billion?� So it's not surprising how readily people
shut their eyes to the geological evidence.�
In contrast, when the cost of irrationality is high, believers
conveniently forget the teachings of their religion.� Lots of religions promise paradise to martyrs,
but adherents eager to die for their beliefs are one-in-a-million.
Is
religion rational?� In
an important sense, NO.� The
doctrines of every religion are at best extremely improbable, but adherents are
still very certain about them.� Religious
beliefs and standard economic models don't fit together.� However, rather than ignoring or denying this
incompatibility, economists should deal with it.� If I'm right, it's not hard.� Yes, religious beliefs are irrational, but
they are so divorced from reality that they are rarely costly.� When they do become costly, a few fanatics
lay down their lives, but the overwhelming majority of the faithful open their
eyes and face the fact that it's crazy to bet your life on fairy tales.��