Bryan Caplan 
	Koch Fellows Program 
	Essay #6 

Rousseau and Religion 

1. Introduction 

Rousseau concludes his Social Contract with a chapter on  
religion.  His view on the subject is subtle and interesting; and  
moreover, I maintain that it provides us with one of the keys to  
Rousseau's thought.  Rousseau's near-deification of the General Will  
has led many analysts to argue that Rousseau's state is merely  
secularized Christianity.  A careful examination of this chapter may  
well help us understand to what extent this thesis is correct. 

2. Rousseau's Typology of Religion 

Strangely, Rousseau begins by telling us that there are two  
types of religion, but winds up giving us three.  "Religion, considered  
in connection with societies, whether general or particular, can be  
divided into two categories, the religion of the man and the religion  
of the citizen." (p.181)  The religion of the man is informal and  
unorganized, centering on morality and the worship of God.  The  
Christianity of the Gospels is Rousseau's example.  In contrast, the  
religion of the citizen is what has been called "civil religion."  This  
is the religion of a single country, a national religion.  Such a  
religion is organized and hierarchical, with formal dogmas.  It  
teaches love of country, obedience to the state, and martial virtues.   
The religions of ancient peoples like the Romans fit this mold. 
To this list Rousseau adds a third religion.  Unlike the religion  
of the man, it is organized and hierarchical, with precise dogmas.   
Unlike civil religion, it is independent of the state, in the sense that  
it is international and has its own agenda.  It may counsel  
patriotism, but only in a limited fashion, because it is the religion  
of many nations rather than one.  A religion of this kind is a  
competitor to the state for the allegiance of citizens, and it  
produces internal division as a consequence.  Catholicism is  
Rousseau's favorite example of this kind of religion. 

3. Rousseau's Critique of the Three Types 

To begin with, Rousseau is clearly not hostile to religion as  
such: "no state has ever been founded without religion at its base."  
(p.180)  But he does have serious complaints about each of the three  
types of religion.  Let us examine his complaints, then see what  
Rousseau judges to be the least defective of the three. 

To begin with, Rousseau will have no truck with the third kind  
of religion - organized yet separate from the state.  As Rousseau  
tells us, "The third kind is so manifestly bad that the pleasure of  
demonstrating its badness would be a waste of time.  Everything  
that destroys social unity is worthless; and all institutions that set  
man at odds with himself are worthless." (p.181)  The problem, in  
short, is that this kind of religion competes with the state for the  
total allegiance of the people; in consequence, society is divided.   
Individuals might think that conscience demands disobedience to the  
state, and they would have an organized hierarchy to back them up  
and marshall resistance.  To a convinced corporativist like Rousseau,  
this is intolerable. 

Let us turn now to the first type of religion, exemplified by  
the Christianity of the Gospels.  At the outset, Rousseau tells us  
that this form of religion is not only holy and sublime but true.   
While that would appear to settle the matter, it doesn't for  
Rousseau.  Instead, he moves on to complain that simple Christianity  
is bad for the state.  Christianity is other-worldly, and therefore  
takes away from citizens' love for life on earth as exemplified by  
the state.  As Rousseau explains, "Christianity is a wholely spiritual  
religion, concerned solely with the things of heaven; the Christian's  
homeland is not of this world." (p.183)  In consequence, Christians  
are too detached from the real world to fight against domestic  
tyranny.  Moreover, Christians make bad soldiers, again because they  
are other-worldly.  They won't fight with the passion and patriotism  
that a deadly army requires.  Why any of this should count against  
Christianity after its truth has already been conceded is hard to  
understand. 

We then turn to civil religion.  It has much to recommend it:  
"The second kind of religion is good in that it joins divine worship to  
a love of the law, and that in making the homeland the object of a  
citizens' adoration, it teaches them that the service of the state is  
the service of the tutelary God." (pp.181-182) If the sole purpose of  
religion is to butress the state, then a civil religion is the one to  
pick: it inspires obedience and service, but could never become an  
independent standpoint from which the state might be criticized or  
called to task for misdeeds.  Religion is necessary to provide the  
state with moral underpinings; but if religion is separate from the  
state, then there is always the danger that the decrees of religion  
will fail to match those of the state, and instead positively mandate  
disobedience. 

Yet Rousseau cannot give a whole-hearted endorsement to civil  
religion either.  For one thing, "it is based on error and lies, it  
deceives men, and makes them credulous and superstitious." (p.182)   
Again, this would appear to be a fatal blow; but for Rousseau, it is  
just one bad point to keep in mind.  Civil religion also makes the  
people "bloodthirsty and intolerant" and Rousseau doesn't like that  
either. 

4. Rousseau's Compromise and the General Will 

After considering the advantages and drawbacks of different  
sorts of religion, Rousseau figures out a compromise.  Tolerance  
should be granted to all religions that will grant it to others.   
Apparently, Rousseau believes to some extent in religious tolerance;  
at the very least, uniformity is no longer achievable in the modern  
world.  In this sense, religion becomes a matter for private  
conscience. 

But that is not the end of the story.  Rousseau wants to have a  
public religion in another sense.  Namely, he wants all people on pain  
of banishment to accept some religious doctrines, "not strictly  
speaking as religious dogmas, but as expressions of social  
conscience." (p.186)  The state should not establish one religion, but  
it should use the law to weed out any religions which are socially  
harmful.  All legal religions must accept: "The existence of an  
omnipotent, intelligent, benevolent divinity that foresees and  
provides; the life to come; the happiness of the just; the punishment  
of sinners; the sancity of the social contract and the law." (p.186)   
In addition, they must foreswear intolerance; not only "civil"  
intolerance (The state must crush unbelievers) but also "theological"  
intolerance (There is no salvation outside the church). 
Rousseau makes an important exception to the last point  
mandating tolerance: "unless the state is the church and the prince  
is the pontiff.  Such a dogma is only good in a theocratic government;  
in any other, it is pernicious." (p.187, emphasis added)  In principle,  
then, the state may be as intolerant as it likes, so long as it is  
theocratic.   

This exception is particularly interesting in light of the  
remainder of Rousseau's political theory.  For suppose that the  
General Will (in practical terms, the majority) believes that there is  
no salvation outside of their church?  Would it be wrong for them to  
vote to establish their own view and crush all dissent?  On  
Rousseau's terms I can see no objection.  It appears to be another  
legitimate exercise of the General Will; and if the minority  
disagrees, it is merely mistaken about what it wills and must be  
forced to free.  Rousseau's principles do not imply a theocratic  
state; but so long as a majority of the people want it, it is not only  
morally permissible but morally required.  The charge that  
Rousseau's system is just a secular version of Christianity is not  
exactly correct; as a matter of fact, Rousseau's system gives a  
secular justification for any form of popular intolerance, both  
secular and religious.