Thomas Sowell's _A Conflict of Visions_ : A Critical Essay 1. Background and Summary I've recently finished reading Thomas Sowell's _A Conflict of Visions_ and I wanted to make some critical observations. Just for background, the goal of this work is roughly to investigate the assumptions underlying different political views, then develop a typology for distinguishing them. Sowell's thesis, his attempt to satisfy this goal, is that there are (empirically, not logically) two categories that contain the overwhelming majority of political thinkers. (And this includes not only intellectuals, but ordinary people with political opinions.) These two categories he calls the "constrained" and the "unconstrained." 2. The Two Visions, Defined and Described Now Sowell tries to distinguish these two visions in two different ways, which I will discuss in reverse order. One of the ways he tries to distinguish them is by means of an "operational definition." As Sowell puts it, "the two key criteria for distinguishing constrained and unconstrained visions are (1) the locus of discretion, and (2) the mode of discretion." (_A Conflict of Visions_, p.98.) Now what exactly does Sowell mean by this apparently obscure statement? Well, by the _locus_ of discretion, he roughly means _who_ gets to make _which_ important social decisions. According to the constrained view, each individual gets to make decisions about what immediately concerns him (such as his own person and his own property) and nothing else. According to the unconstrained view, important decisions should be made for the whole society by government experts. By the _mode_ of discretion, Sowell roughly has in mind the _means of deciding_, the epistemological basis of social action. The constrained view emphasises tradition and accumulated wisdom rather than individual human reason. The unconstrained view, in contrast, believes in individual human reason, or what Sowell calls "articulated rationality." Thus, to put the pieces together, the constrained view believes in individuals making decisions about what immediately concerns them, using tradition and the like as their guide; the unconstrained view believes in government experts making decisions for the whole society on the basis of their individual reason. This would seem to be controversial enough, but in addition to this "operational definition," which arrives only mid-way through the book, Sowell extensively describes the two visions in much broader terms before getting into the task of definition. The constrained and unconstrained views have different pictures of human nature: while both may agree that the typical moral level of mankind is currently low, the unconstrained vision believes that substantial moral improvement is possible, and the constrained vision does not. The unconstrained vision believes that abstract morality may ultimately guide human action, but the constrained vision relies instead upon incentives and disincentives. The constrained vision argues that whatever problems mankind faces are the result of unalterable facts rather than institutions: "The constrained vision is a tragic vision of the human condition." (p.33) The unconstrained vision, of course, puts the blame for problems on changeable institutions rather than what Sowell calls "the limitations and passions of man himself." (p.31) And this just scratches the surface of Sowell's multi-faceted description of these two visions. Without trying to state them all, let me touch upon their other salient features. The constrained vision holds that human reason is very weak; it prefers to rely upon the evolved wisdom of mankind. The unconstrained vision believes that human reason is at least potentially very powerful. The constrained vision believes that spontaneous order works better than governmental plans (spontaneous order being the order that results from individuals voluntarily interacting). The unconstrained vision believes the opposite. The constrained vision believes in equal application of rules; the unconstrained vision believes in equal results. The constrained vision believes that crime and war are inherent in human nature; the unconstrained vision blames them on institutions. The constrained vision sees justice as a means of promoting social interests; the unconstrained vision sees justice as a claim of the individual that can override social interests. The constrained vision believes that judges should apply, not make the law; the unconstrained vision believes in judicial activism. And just to quickly make a final point: Sowell insists that the visions do _not_ have different moral views. Political visions are descriptions -- positive, value-free statements of fact -- about how the social world works. At times, Sowell appears to say that both views agree that the sole good is benefit to society: "Neither the left-right dichotomy nor the dichotomy between constrained and unconstrained visionhs turns on the relative importance of the individual benefit and the common good. All make the common good paramount, though they differ completely as to how it is to be achieved." (p.117) Elsewhere he takes the more moderate view that the moral differences between the two visions are derivative from their positive analysis. Lastly, he sometimes makes the rather banal observation that people with identical values often advocate different policies (which is perfectly consistent with people with _different_ values also advocating different policies). 3. Some Invalid Criticisms Before I proceed with the critical portion of the essay, I intend to reply to some of the invalid objections that might be raised to Sowell's work. Now many people will object that some people do not fit into either category. Sowell's reply to this, I think, is simply that the classification is not _logical_, but _empirical_. He is saying that despite a vast array of logically possible visions, as a matter of empirical fact the large majority of them are clearly one or clearly the other. Admittedly, every now and then Sowell does make the extravagant claim that the two visions are internally consistent, and even that seemingly derivative conclusions logically follow from the main conclusion. But this is hardly the main thrust of his claim. A second criticism that might be made is that Sowell seems to be advocating the superior merits of the constrained view in a book that nominally claims to be a neutral _description_ of the two visions. I don't think that this criticism is on the mark either; while Sowell's explanations of the constrained view generally made it sound quite a bit more reasonable, he is at least trying to present a fair description of each viewpoint. It is hard to argue persuasively for a view that you think is completely mistaken. Still, even if you can't argue very persuasively for a viewpoint, you can avoid explicitly taking sides when your goal is simply to state the issues of contention clearly. And I think that Sowell does a reasonable job of this. 4. Logical Critique A. Internal Inconsistencies Before we can even begin the empirical critique of Sowell, we must make sure that his categories are at least free from internal contradiction. And I do not think that they are. Sowell seems vaguely aware of the difficulties that I am going to raise when he mentions that, "Those on the political right may thus end up arguing, on the ground of the political left, that certain policies are 'irrational,' while the left defends them as part of the accepted social fabric, the traditional position of the right...[T]here is a very real philosophic difficulty...At the extreme, the now long-standing instititions of the Soviet Union are part of the social fabric of that society, and communists who oppose reforming them are sometimes considered to be 'conservative.'" (p.117) The problem that Sowell avoids here are telling. For on the one hand, both the constrained and the unconstrained visions appear to be universalistic prescriptions for any society. The constrained vision recommends one locus and mode of discretion, the unconstrained vision the other. But when we probe more deeply, we discover that there is a deep inner inconsistency. For suppose that the constrained visionary encounters a society in which the unconstrained vision reigns supreme. He could not advocate changing this society on the grounds of tradition or the accumulated wisdom of the society; for according to the traditions and accumulated wisdom of this society, the unconstrained vision is correct. But suppose that the constrained visionary decided to give in and support the institutions of this society. Once again, he faces a basic contradiction: for in this case the constrained visionary must abandon his commitment to the individual as the proper locus of discretion. There is a similar, though less telling, contradiction in the unconstrained view. For suppose that it were rationally proven that a centralized locus of discretion works worse than a decentralized one. The unconstrained visionary would then have to abandon his commitment to reason as the proper mode of discretion; or else abandon his preferred locus of discretion. The problem, in short, is that Sowell's "operational definition," of the two views is not even internally consistent in some important cases. Indeed, the case is particularly acute for the constrained vision, because empirically the centralized locus of discretion has been quite "traditional." B. A Major Oversight Even if Sowell's two categories were logically coherent, he would be open to a second objection: there are many views which clearly do _not_ fit either category. Borderline cases are no objection; but prominent ideologies that bear no resemblance to either category are another matter. The most obvious case may be found in movements like fascism and religious fundamentalism. Now these movements are often explicitly irrational; but at the same time, they oppose tradition. Where do they fit into Sowell's categorization? How can his two visions accomodate what appears to be a very historically significant body of movements? On the one hand, irrationalist movements do not appear to be constrained in either sense: they want to centralize power and overthrow traditions. But at the same time, they are not unconstrained, because they have no intention of ruling society by articulated rationality, but by explicitly irrational "modes of discretion." The essential problem is that the "constrained" view that reason is weak is not the opposite of the "unconstrained" view that reason is strong; rather, it is midway between the irrationalist view that reason is useless or worse, and the unconstrained view that reason is strong. Consider Sowell's rather tortured attempt to classify fascism. "Fascism, for example, heavily emphasizes surrogate decision-making but is not an unconstrained vision, because neither the mode of decision-making nor the mode of choosing the leader is articulated rationally. It is not merely that non-fascists find fascism non-rational, but that fascism's own creed justifies decisive emotional ties (nationalism, race) and the use of violence as driving political forces."(p.103) But one may notice from Sowell's own description of fascism that it is not mid-way between the constrained and unconstrained visions. It is not even a strange hybrid. Rather it is something completely different from either: a view based on neither reason nor tradition but a radical, irrational creed. C. Flawed Deductions Sowell repeatedly indicates that he thinks that the views are internally consistent. Not merely do those who hold the two visions _believe_ this; Sowell himself qua neutral describer of the two views. Sadly, his attempt to justify this claim are rather weak. For example, Sowell claims that the constrained view believes in a strong national defense based upon deterrence, whereas the unconstrained vision believes in disarmament, negotiation, and the like. Now how exactly is this consistent with Sowell's announced operational definition? Seemingly, the definition says that the constrained vision ought to distrust the use of concentrated power by self-anointed government experts for any purpose, including national defense. Similarly, it appears that the unconstrained vision ought to favor an activist foreign policy, since it believes in the efficacy of central planning by the best and brightest. What is going on here? I can only conclude that while a close deduction from definitions would have shown that constrained vision implies isolationism or a similar unambitious foreign policy, to admit this would mean that most of Sowell's "constrained" visionaries held inconsistent views (himself included). Or to take another example: on the one hand, Sowell tells us that the constrained visionary judges processes whereas the unconstrained visionary judges results. This rather cryptic claim becomes clearer once Sowell gives some specifics. Constrained visionaries favor free markets because despite any shortest long-run benefits if we refrain from _all_ intervention. Similarly, constrained visionaries favor a legal regime in which judges strictly follow the law -- even if this results in apparent injustices -- because the long-run effects of a stable legal regime are more important. All this sounds right until you read a few other passages, such as this one: "Modern defenders of legal technicalities for punishment who declare 'That is the price we pay for freedom,' or defenders of revolutions who say, 'You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs,' are contemporary exeemplars of an unconstrained vision which has historically treated process costs as secondary." (p.35) But what is this saying, except that the "unconstrained" vision is judging processes rather than results, just as the "constrained" vision does? The fact seems to be that when visions support an institution to begin with, they are willing to forgive its drawbacks; but when they oppose it to begin with, they are inclined to blow its defects out of proportion. Rather than both visions being consistent, as Sowell claims, they are in fact both inconsistent. 5. Empirical Critique With the purely logical criticisms out of the way, we can now turn to the empirical flaws Sowell's analysis. And they are quite extensive. For not only does Sowell's categorization fail to hold up empirically when we bring in a broader sample than Sowell does; it doesn't even hold for the narrow sample that Sowell himself employs. Let us begin with the empirical critique based solely upon Sowell's own sample. His favorite choice of an "unconstrained" visionary is William Godwin. If you re-read Sowell's operational definition, you may find yourself puzzled when you learn that Godwin was an anarchist who believed in laissez-faire capitalism. Sowell is not unaware of this point, so let me quote his proferred explanation for his classification: "In William Godwin's vision especially, each individual thus becomes in effect a surrogate decision-maker for society, even when making purely individual and unofficial decisions - a surrogate not in the sense of controlling others' decisions but in the sense of making his own available choices in such a way as to promote the general well-being, rather than his own. Thus the radical individualism of Godwin, which is procedurally the same as that of modern libertarianism in its sweeping rejection of a government role in the economy, is substantively much closer to modern socialism in wanting specific social results to be the direct object of the decision-making process." (pp.199-200) To be frank, this "explanation" is rather unconvincing. Granted that Godwin's preferred "mode of discretion" is rationalistic; but nevertheless, explain it however you like, his "locus of discretion" is with the individual. Sowell's attempt to present Godwin as a perfect example of the unconstrained vision neglects _half_ of the operational definition. Indeed, nearly all of Sowell's pre-20th-century examples of the unconstrained vision believed in laissez-faire capitalism. Thomas Paine was virtually a pure libertarian (a few unfortunate exceptions in the _Rights of Man_ being the only conflicting evidence). Condorcet was likewise a believer in laissez-faire capitalism, which Sowell himself acknowledges. These allegedly clear cases meet only half of the operational definition. Or to turn matters around: Sowell mentions Hobbes as a clear case of a constrained thinker. However, Hobbes meets not just one but _both_ of the criteria in the operational definition for an unconstrained thinker. With Hobbes, the locus of discretion is clearly that of the sovereign over the whole society; and the mode of discretion, is explicitly rationalistic. Interestingly, Sowell says that Rawls is unconstrained precisely because "the locus of discretion is the surrogate decision-maker 'society' which can choose trade-offs collectively and arrange results in accordance with principles of justice - these principles being derived in explicitly rationalistic terms." (p.103) But this is precisely Hobbes' procedure as well: his social contract is baased on explicitly rationalistic terms, and is designed to make collective trade-offs. There are so many empirical problems with Sowell's account that it is possible to discuss only a fraction of them. To begin with, Sowell inconsistently switches back and forth between his operational definition and his informal descriptions, even though the two criteria often yield very different classifications. Secondly, he makes very little effort to search for disconfirming evidence: in particular, he usually forces thinkers into one box or the other if they don't seem to fit either one well, instead of re-considering the validity of his classifcation scheme. Thirdly, and perhaps most fundamentally, his tends to put everyone who disagrees with his own views into the unconstrained box, even when they violently disagree with one another. Let us discuss each problem in turn. a. Shifting Criteria Sowell frequently switches between his operational definition and his informal descriptions when he classifies thinkers, and oftentimes this changes his result. Thus, if we apply the operational definition to Hobbes, we find that he believed strongly in centralized decision-making and a rationalistic mode of decision-making. So he seems to be unconstrained. But if we (like Sowell) use the informal description, we find that Hobbes believed that human beings were basically wicked, and that they would only respond to incentives rather than moral suasion. So he turns out to be constrained. Or consider Justice Holmes. As a judge, he consistently voted to permit the state to expand its regulatory powers, dissenting on several famous cases where the majority ruled federal action unconstitutional. He showed no particular sympathy for the free market or private property. In this way, he seems unconstrained. But Sowell marks him as constrained, because he had a negative, incentive-oriented view of human nature, and because he believed that _judges_ should have limited powers. (Legislatures were perhaps another matter.) Or consider Sowell's treatment of Jefferson and Hamilton. Jefferson was clearly more in favor of laissez-faire than Hamilton. But Sowell marks Jefferson as unconstrained because of his rationalism and optimistic view of human nature, whereas Hamilton is constrained because he holds more negative views. Or consider Sowell's treatment of Rawls. Here is a thinker who clearly has no great hopes for the radical moral improvement of mankind. He accepts the need for incentives, and takes self-centeredness for granted as a binding constraint. Nevertheless, Sowell says he is unconstrained, because he believes in the centralized locus and the rationalistic mode of discretion. It seems very much like Sowell is trying to _force_ people into the categories he believes they belong to on other grounds. b. Searching for Disconfirming Evidence It very much seems like Sowell didn't look too hard for disconfirming evidence. For it is rather easy to name significant political movements that don't fit his category, and can't be easily dismissed as "hybrids." For example: European conservatism. Was it constrained or unconstrained? I suspect that Sowell would mark it as constrained. And yet: here was a movement which was explicitly anti-capitalist and opposed to the free market from its inception. Far from being the ordinary case, the American link between conservatism and free-market economics is a singular exception. Even the British Conservative Party failed to link itself to free-market ideals until Thatcher. And in addition, European conservatism surely held a centralized locus of discretion as its ideal: it admired the powerful, centralized state. Of course its mode of discretion was not rationalistic; the European conservatives were traditionalists, which is why Sowell could not switch and call them unconstrained in the face of this conflicting evidence. Indeed, Hayek, Sowell's favorite example of a modern, constrained thinker, devoted a chapter in _The Constitution of Liberty_ to sharply distinguish himself from European conservatism (see "Why I Am Not a Conservative"). Sowell's taxonomy just seems to re-blur the differences. And this is not an isolated counter-example. As mentioned before, fundamentalism and fascism don't fit either category. Classical liberals get inconsistently put into both categories; thus, even though Godwin, Paine, and Condorcet were at least as pro-free-market as Smith or Burke, the first group gets labelled "unconstrained" and the second group gets labelled "constrained." This follows if we rank them according too their views of human nature (the first group was more positive), but not if we are rating their adherence to free-market policy prescriptions. The bottom line is that Sowell achieves superficial plausibility only by arbitrarily excluding many prominent political movements from his study, or else labelling them as "hybrids" and ignoring them. Sowell's comments on the dangers of insulating a thesis from empirical criticism should have alerted him to this danger. c. The Over-Full "Unconstrained" Vision One of the most disturbing features of Sowell's analysis is that such a wide variety of thinkers get thrown together into the "unconstrained" box. At times, it simply seems like Sowell's own vision is getting in the way; he assumes that everyone who disagrees with himself must deep down agree with each other. But this is simply not the case. There have been many thinkers who have favored free-market policies who were highly rationalistic and believed that vast moral improvement was open to mankind. Indeed, they are at least half of the classical liberal movement. Moreover, there have been many thinkers with negative assessments of human nature, dis-trustful of human reason, who believed in a strong central government and a government-controlled economy. Rather than reaching deep insights about the worldwide ideological conflicts of the past three centuries, Sowell has over-generalized on the basis of recent American politics. It is to some extent true that since World War II in the United States that people who favored free-market policies were more pessimistic in man and reason and those who favored extensive government action. But the generalization really goes no farther. Once we broaden our sample, we find that around the world and through history the "conflict of visions" was frequently reversed. 6. Conclusion: A Simpler Typology What really puzzles me is why Sowell did not try a much simpler typology. Why not simply distinguish between advocates of laissez-faire, free-market policies on one pole, and advocates of government control on the other pole? _This_ dichotomy is unable to accomodate left-wing anarchists, but almost every other ideology fits neatly into place. Of course, this typology fails to capture the "underlying assumptions" of the two polar views. And it fails to do so for a simple reason: each of the polar views has supporters with a wide range of underlying assumptions. Now there may very well be room for argument about which underlying assumptions provide better support for the two polar views. My own view is that the rationalistic, optimistic view gives the best support for the free-market position, and that the anti-rationalistic, pessimistic view gives the best support for the statist position. But when I make that claim, I abandon my role as a neutral _describer_ of different views. I make claims about what is true, rather than what different people think is true. In the end, this is the more productive role. Sowell would have done much better if he wrote a book _arguing_ that certain assumptions support his political views, rather than merely stating it and ignoring the long of thinkers who share most of his conclusions but reject his proffered foundations.