

**Does economic development cause a decline in religiosity? Explaining the separation of
Church and State in France in 1905***

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Abstract

This article provides a test of the secularization hypothesis, which argues that economic growth, industrialization, increased literacy and decreasing fertility depress religiosity. It focuses on the elections of the secular politicians who voted in favor of the separation between Church and State in the French Parliament in 1905. If the secularization hypothesis is correct, these secular politicians should have been elected in the most developed areas in France at the turn of the twentieth century. Against the predictions of the secularization hypothesis, we find that the support for secular politicians originated in the rural areas of France.

Keywords: Economic Growth; Elections; Religion; Secularization.

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1. Introduction

While economists have shown that religious laws have consequences on economic growth and human capital, e.g. Kuran (2003), Botticini and Eckstein (2005), Hillman (2007), the causal relationship between a nation's actual degree of religious observance and economic development are still debated. There are two major theories of religiosity: the religion-market model and the secularization hypothesis. The religion-market model, developed by Iannaccone (1991), Iannaccone and Stark (1994) and Gill (1999) among others, argues that religious participation is mainly "supply-driven". In other words, the government's intervention, such as the establishment of state-religion, is a major determinant of religiosity.

However, following Weber (1905), proponents of the secularization hypothesis such as Chaves (1994) and Bruce (2001), argue that religious participation is "demand-driven". They consider that economic development, which includes industrialization, an increase in literacy and wealth, and a decrease in fertility rates, entails a decline in religiosity. This secularization process supposedly leads individuals to define themselves as less religious and decreases the influence of religion on social and political institutions. In a study of religiosity in 68 countries, McCleary and Barro (2006) find that economic development has an overall depressing effect on religiosity. Urbanization also makes individuals less observant but education and the presence of children are positively correlated with religiosity.

Still, studies by Finke and Stark (1992), Iannaccone and Stark (1994), and Stark (1999) among others, argue that there is no empirical evidence to support secularization theories. In particular, the secularization hypothesis predicts that the separation between religion and state should become widespread as countries become richer, but Barro and McCleary (2005)

cannot find any link between wealth, measured by a country's GDP, and the current existence of a state religion. In addition, they find that economic circumstances do not seem to have any influence in the countries' choice to adopt or forsake a state religion.

Historically, such a choice was seldom democratic. It resulted from the political leaders' willingness to consolidate their hold on power and did not reflect the people's attitudes towards a state religion. Even in the US, which is a democracy, the separation of Church and State did not result from a popular vote but was derived from the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and subsequently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.

Actually, France is one of the few countries where citizens had a say in the separation between Church and State. The democratically elected French representatives adopted in 1905 a bill that separated religion from the State. The bill abolished the *Concordat*, which had been instituted by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1801, so as to govern the relationship between the French State and the Roman Catholic Church. Under this arrangement, the members of the Catholic clergy were paid by the French State, which in return had a say in their appointment. The bill ended state subsidies for the Church but also the State's intervention in the appointment of the Church's personnel.

The passing of the 1905 bill illustrates the progressive rejection of the Church in French politics. It occurred at a time when France remained an agricultural country, even though a growing share of the population worked in industrial activities. In addition, because education had been made compulsory in 1881 for both men and women, illiteracy was decreasing. Nevertheless, there remained many disparities between the different French *départments*¹. For instance, the share of the French army's conscripts who were illiterate

¹ Departments are administrative divisions of the French territory that were created in 1790.

substantially varied between the different areas, from 0.32% in *Haute Savoie* to 16.89% in *Morbihan*.

This article provides a test of the secularization hypothesis, which argues that religion becomes less central in social and political matters as a result of economic growth. It focuses on the election results of the secular politicians who first campaigned and then voted in favor of the separation between Church and State in the French Parliament in 1905. If the secularization hypothesis is correct, we should find that the secular members of the French Parliament were elected in *départments* with a high level of economic and human development, i.e, where a high share of the workforce worked in the industrial sector and in services, as well as with a low fertility rate and a high level of literacy.

Our results show that the secular politicians who voted for the abolition of the *Concordat* were returned in departments with a relatively high literacy rate. However, the other economic circumstances did not have the effects predicted by the secularization theory. Fertility rates and wealth are shown not to have any impact on the election of secular politicians. In addition, we find that the politicians who opposed the separation between Church and State were elected in areas where a majority of the workforce worked in industrial and service activities. Conversely, secular politicians were elected in the areas where most of the active population worked in the agricultural sector. Such a result suggests that the rejection of the Church in France at the turn of the twentieth century had less to do with economic development than with the Catholic Church's political stance, which was rejected by French peasants.

The rest of this article is as follows. Section 2 discusses the official status of the religions in France at the turn of the twentieth century. Section 3 presents the data and Section 4 analyzes the results. Section 5 concludes.

2. Religion in France at the turn of the twentieth century

Among the different religions in Western Europe, the Catholic faith had the most important role in the history of France². However, far from being controlled by the Pope, the French Catholic Church was always keen on preserving its independence from Rome, as it asserted in its *Declaration du Clergé de France* in 1682.

These French clergymen who sought independence from Rome were known as Gallican, while their opponents, who advocated the submission of Catholics to the Pope, were Ultramontane. Before the mid-nineteenth century, an Ultramontane thinker like Joseph de Maistre (1821) was an oddity among French-speaking Catholics. Afterwards, the Ultramontane faction progressively became the dominant force in the French Church; there was no almost Gallican clergyman left in 1905.

The shift from Gallicanism to Ultramontanism during the nineteenth century may partly result from the disappearance of the *Ancien Régime*. Before the 1789 French Revolution, the French Catholic Church was Gallican because it enjoyed a privileged situation thanks to the successive French kings. The good fortune of the French Catholic Church however came to end with the French Revolution in 1789. Revolutionaries confiscated and sold the Church's property. Religious marriages were not outlawed but only town mayors could officiate at weddings that were recognized by the French State.

² See Dansette (1965).

With the end of the French Revolution and the coming to power of Napoleon Bonaparte, the situation of the Catholic Church slightly improved. In 1801, Bonaparte signed with Pope Pius VII the *Concordat*, which came into force a year later. Under this arrangement, Bonaparte nominated the bishops who then received their canonical validation from the Pope.

Eventually, Bonaparte established a system where Catholicism was not the sole state religion, even though it remained the religion of most Frenchmen, as Calvinist Protestantism, Lutheran Protestantism, and in 1808, Judaism, were also granted an official status. Under these arrangements, which were suspended during the reigns of Louis XVIII and Charles X, but reinstated by Louis-Philippe, the French state paid the wages of Catholic clergymen, Protestant ministers and rabbis, funded places of worships but could also intervene in religious matters, notably in the appointment of religious personnel. That system was neither modified during the Second Republic nor during the Second Empire and would last until 1905.

In 1871, the Catholic members of the National Assembly, which eventually voted for the establishment of the Third Republic, were in favor of restoring the monarchy. They opposed the Republic whom they associated with persecution and revolution. Furthermore, they had no sympathy for the Bonapartists, since they resented Napoleon III's foreign policy, which had favored the Italian nationalists at the expense of the Pope. This position was shared by the clergy and the laity, as well as by intransigent and liberal Catholics alike.

But the Catholic opposition to the Republic was matched by the Republicans' hostility to the Church, whom they viewed as an ally of the monarchy. Soon, Republicans promulgated laws to make France more secular. These laws included the suppression of

public prayers, the suppression of the religious oath in courts, and the establishment of secular kindergarten schools (16 June 1881 law and 2 August 1881 decree). Then came the 28 March 1882 and 30 October 1886 laws which instituted the neutrality of the state-funded educational system in matters of religion, philosophy and politics, as well as the secularity of the educational content in public schools. In the meantime, divorced had been re-legalized by the 27 July 1882 law while official public prayers at the start of each new Parliamentary session had been suppressed by the 14 August 1884 law. Several members of Parliament also wrote private members' bills to abolish the *Concordat* and separate the Church from the State during the 1880s.

At the start of the 1890s, Pope Leo XIII tried to mend the relationships of the Church with the French Republic. His policy of *ralliement* stated that Catholics need not oppose the Republic and he encouraged them to infuse the Republic with Catholic values. However, this policy did not soften the hostility of the Republicans against the Church. If there was no attempt to separate Church and State between the 1890s, it was partly because the opposition between Republicans and Catholics took another form: the Dreyfus affair³.

But under the premiership of René Waldeck-Rousseau (1899-1902)⁴, Republicans renewed their attack against the Church. Waldeck-Rousseau, who headed a Republican coalition, suggested changes in the legal status of congregations, i.e., the Catholic religious organizations, so as to suppress their fiscal privileges. However, the debates in Parliament significantly hardened Waldeck-Rousseau's bill: the law that was adopted on 1 July 1901, jeopardized the very existence of the congregations.

³ See Thomas (1978) on the Dreyfus affair.

⁴ See Sorlin (1966).

Following the 1902 election, the Republicans continued their anti-clerical policies under the leadership of Emile Combes (1902-1905)⁵. He applied the 1901 law strictly, by notably refusing to legalize congregations and by forbidding congregation members to teach. Under Combes' tenure, eight private member bills which aimed at abolishing the *Concordat*, suppressing state subsidies for religion and separating Church and State, were discussed in the lower house of Parliament.

Finally on 10 November 1904, Combes presented a bill in Parliament that reorganized the relations between Church and State. He would not however fulfill his objectives as he was to lose a vote of confidence in Parliament on 18 January 1905 over a scandal involving his Defense minister. But Maurice Rouvier, who succeeded Combes as Prime Minister, immediately presented a new bill to abolish the *Concordat*. Eventually, on 4 March 1905, an agreement on the content of the bill, rewritten by the member for *Loire*, Aristide Briand, was found between the government and the parliamentary committee in charge of this issue⁶.

On 21 March 1905, discussions on the bill began in the lower house of Parliament. After 48 sessions, the law was adopted by the lower house of Parliament by a vote of 341 to 233. On 9 November 1905, discussions on the same bill began in the upper house of Parliament; it was adopted on 6 December 1905 by a vote of 181 to 102. The law was promulgated by the President of the French Republic on 9 December 1905 and published in the *Journal Officiel* – the newspaper run by the French State where all the laws and decrees are published – on 11 December 1905.

⁵ See Merle (1995).

⁶ See Joseph-Barthélemy (1934) on the works of parliamentary committees during the Third Republic.

It must be pointed out that the debates that preceded the adoption of the law were far from being superfluous. Emile Combes' original bill did not intend to separate Church and State but aimed at controlling the Church so as to render it politically irrelevant. Aristide Briand's proposal, which was eventually adopted, simply asserted the neutrality of the French State in religious matters. While the law protected freedom of conscience, the French State stopped recognizing official religions and ended subsidies to religious groups.

3. The data

Our dataset comprises information on the 87 departments that made up France at the turn of the twentieth century, including Corsica, but excluding the French overseas territories⁷. Our explanatory variables are built following the information on the characteristics of each department found in the French Census known as *Annuaire Statistique de la France* for the year 1902, when the representatives who were to adopt the 1905 law were elected on party lists under the proportional voting system at the departmental level by all men aged 21 and above. Table 1 describes the variables that we employ in this study while Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics.

[Table 1 here] [Table 2 here]

⁷ The territories that are excluded from our study are Algeria (8 representatives), French India (1 representative), Guyane (1 representative), Guadeloupe (2 representatives), Martinique (1 representative), La Réunion (2 representatives), Cochinchine (1 representative), and Senegal (1 representative). This exclusion is motivated on two grounds. First, we do not possess reliable information on the characteristics of these territories. Second, even if we possessed such information, we would have to distinguish between French settlers, who were allowed to vote, and the local population, which could not. For instance, in 1902, in Cochinchine, only 1489 individuals could vote. François Deloncle became the representative of this French colony by obtaining 836 votes while his opponent, M. Jourdan, received 606 votes.

We construct our dependent variable as the share of the secular members from each department of the lower house of the French Parliament, known as the *Chambre des Députés* (CD), who voted in favor of the Separation of Church and State. For this purpose, we use the records of the *Annales de la Chambre des députés* (July 3rd, 1905, pp. 1258-1264)⁸. In what follows, we discuss the construction of our explanatory variables.

3.1. Characteristics of the population and of the workforce

If the secularization hypothesis is correct, so that economic development does decrease religiosity, then areas where a large share of the population works in the industry and services, rather than in the agricultural sector, should return secular politicians. And since industries and services are usually located in urban areas, we should also find that departments with a high urbanization rate returned secular politicians.

For each department, we collected data on the relative shares of the urban and rural population, as well as the share of individuals employed in the agricultural sector, industrial activities, private services and the civil service. As can be seen in Table 2, France remained at the turn of the twentieth century a country where only 31.2% of the population lived in urban areas. In addition, 49.2% of the workforce was employed in the agricultural sector, 30.3% in the industrial sector, 13.5% in the service sector, and the remainder in the civil service.

We collected additional data on the workforce to assess the robustness of our results. These data include the number of members affiliated with labor unions in each department. We also have information on the different types of private services as listed by the French

⁸ We cannot replicate this test for the members of the upper house of Parliament since they were not elected in a direct vote by the people but by politicians with a local mandate, e.g., mayors.

Census: domestic services, services provided by professionals, e.g., doctors and lawyers, and retail.

Finally, we also possess data on the social status of the French workforce. Following the classification of the census, we distinguish between male and female employers, employees, and self-employed individuals who did not employ anyone. We may hypothesize that employers are likely to be richer than their employees; therefore a higher share of employers in a department may have a positive effect on the election of secular politicians.

3.2. Wealth and human capital

As discussed in the introduction, the secularization hypothesis suggests that religious observance is negatively correlated with wealth. Therefore we expect wealthy departments to return politicians who supported the separation between Church and State. Since we cannot rely on modern data like GDP per capita, we use as a proxy for wealth the amount of direct taxes per capita collected by the French State in each department.

Secularization theories also predict that a decrease in the fertility and increased education is associated with a decline in religiosity. We investigate this relationship by computing the number of births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 49 in each department. We also consider the differences in the educational achievement of the individuals living in each department. Since only men were allowed to vote during the Third Republic, we rely on the statistics for the French Army's conscripts, i.e., men age 18, who were enrolled in each department in 1902. We distinguish between men who were illiterate, i.e., who could neither read and/or write, those who could read and write but did not finish high school, and those who were high school graduates. As can be seen in Table 2, at a time when French children

were only compelled to attend school until the age of 15, merely 2% of the conscripts completed their high school education.

3.3. Religiosity and religious minorities

As a measure of religiosity, we use the relative share of pupils who attended secular primary schools, as opposed to religious schools, in each department. As discussed by the school-choice literature, e.g., Cohen-Zada (2006), this variable is a reliable measure of religiosity since it reflects parents' preferences as to whether they wanted their children to be educated in a secular or in a religious environment. We expect a high level of secular school attendance to be positively correlated with the vote for secular politicians.

The presence of religious minorities in some departments may also have an impact on the vote. We do not have direct information on the exact number of Protestants and Jews in each department, and hence rely on the number of Protestant ministers and rabbis in each department, which provide a reliable indicator of the size of these two religious groups. For instance, there was no Protestant minister in a strongly Catholic area like *Morbihan* but respectively 54 and 120 ministers in *Ardèche* and *Gard*, which always retained large Protestant communities.

Given the relationships of the Catholic Church in France vis-à-vis Protestants and Jews, and in particular, the portrayal of Jews by many French Catholics as a threat to France during the Dreyfus Affair, it may be assumed that both minorities might have favored secular politicians who wanted the separation of Church and State. However, under the provisions of the *Concordat*, Protestant ministers, rabbis and Catholic clergymen were all civil servants who were paid by the French State, while Catholic, Protestant and Jewish places of worship alike were funded by the State. Therefore, it is not certain that the Protestant and Jewish

minorities would support the separation of Church and State in France, since the financial costs of practicing the religion would entirely fall upon the faithful.

4. Results

Since we computed our dependent variable as the share of the secular CD members from each department who voted in favor of the Separation of Church and State, issues of endogeneity in our regressions are unlikely, as is usually the case in studies on religiosity which relate church attendance to education and/or GDP. This is because CD members are unlikely to have had an influence of the educational attainment of conscripts or on the amount of taxes collected in the departments where they were elected.

However there may be some issues of measurement error in our dataset as we rely on census data. Therefore, in addition to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors which are presented in Table 3, we run Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) regressions whose results are available in an appendix which is available upon request. Results are shown to be robust to the different specifications and the econometric methods that we employ.

[Table 3 here]

4.1. The presence of religious minorities

As we discussed above, Protestants and Jews alike were a priori likely to support politicians who favored the abolition of the *Concordat*. However, in our regressions, the number of protestant ministers does not have any effect on the vote, but the number of rabbis is found to be negatively correlated with the support for secular politicians. It may be that Protestants were not concerned by an issue that mainly involved the Catholic Church, even though Protestant leaders favored the separation between Church and State. As for the Jewish

community, it may have opposed the separation between Church and State that was to end state subsidies which were financing its activities.

A more likely explanation of these two results is that, at a time when the Dreyfus affair was still a major issue in French politics, the presence of a sizeable Jewish community, which we proxy by the number of rabbis, galvanized Catholics and thus had a positive effect on the electoral successes of Catholic politicians. However, the presence of Protestants did not have any effect on the Catholic vote.

4.2. Literacy and urbanization

If the variables which are related to educational attainment in our dataset have the effects predicted by the secularization hypothesis, we should find that a high rate of literacy is associated with the support for secular politicians who favored the separation between Church and State. Our results show that this is almost the case. We find that illiteracy is positively correlated with the support for the Catholic politicians who opposed the abolition of the *Concordat*. At the same time, *départments* where a sizeable share of the population is literate but did not finish high schools are found to elect representatives who favor the separation between Church and State. However, high school graduates, who make up the most educated group in our sample, do not have any effect on the vote. This result, which somewhat contradicts the secularization hypothesis, may result from high-school graduates only being a small fraction of the population.

Moreover, we find that the higher the share of the population living in urban areas in a *département*, the higher the support for secular CD members. This result suggests that the growing urbanization in France might have decreased the religiosity of the French population, but it is not robust across all our specifications.

4.3. Fertility, occupation, and the secularization hypothesis

While literacy has more or less the effect predicted by the secularization hypothesis, the other explanatory variables in our dataset do not. We notably find that wealth, gauged by the amount of taxes per capita, and the fertility rate do not have any effect on the election of representatives.

The secularization hypothesis is also invalidated by the regressions where we consider the socioeconomic statuses and occupations of the French population in each department. First, we find that the relative shares of business owners, employees and self-employed individuals in each department are shown to have no impact on the vote. This result holds when we consider both men and women in columns (5), (6) and (7), or when we separately take into account men in columns (8), (9) and (10), and women (in regressions that are available upon request). Incidentally, this result suggests, along with our previous observation on the fertility rate's lack of significance, that the elections of secular representatives would not have been altered had women been allowed to vote.

Second, when we consider the different sectors of occupations in each department, we find that a high share of individuals working in services has no effect on the vote while a high share of individuals working in industrial activities is negatively correlated with the support for secular representatives. The robustness of this result is shown in column (14), where the number of members in labor unions is also negatively correlated with the support for secular politicians. Conversely, we find that the higher the share of the workforce working in the agricultural sector, the higher the support for the secular representatives.

Clearly, such a result provides a perspective on the determinants of the separation between Church and State that conflicts with the secularization hypothesis which argues that

economic development leads to a decline in religiosity. It actually suggests that the rejection of the Church stemmed from the rural and less developed areas of France. In what follows, we discuss the possible roots of this rejection.

4.4. The rejection of the Catholic Church in rural France

Our results indicate that the support for the Church in politics did not stem from the agricultural but from the industrial areas. This support for the Church in industrial areas is likely to have resulted from the actions of the priests and laity who were supplying to workers social services that neither the French state nor the emerging labor unions were providing at the time. Such actions were in line with the social tradition in the French Catholic Church which can be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century⁹. It was given a new impetus when Pope Leo XIII published in 1891 the *De Rerum Novarum* encyclical, which laid out the so-called “social doctrine” of the Church. This “social doctrine” encouraged Catholics to help workers and alleviate their hardships in the new industrial era.

Conversely, our results suggest that the decline in religiosity stemmed from the agricultural areas. The dechristianization of rural France during the nineteenth century has already been discussed by many studies, e.g., Badone (1989), Ford (1993), Marcilhacy (1964), Weber (1976), which point out that the degree of religious observance varied extensively across regions, and even within regions. These studies provide several competing explanations which emphasize the French political situation and the changes that occurred inside the French Catholic Church during the nineteenth century.

An explanation suggested by McManners (1972) is that the scientific and social changes that occurred during the nineteenth century were misinterpreted by Churchmen who

⁹ See Duroselle (1951) and Rollet (1958)

refused to adapt. In particular, the educational program of the seminaries were devoted to mediation and pious exercises, and purposely ignored the scientific analysis of religious texts which originated in Germany and which was exemplified in France by the works of Ernest Renan (1862). It is quite telling of the French Church's unwillingness to address changes that the reply to Renan by the leading French Catholic apologist of the nineteenth century, Archbishop Félix Dupanloup (1872), was a simple collection of texts where the divinity of Jesus was established by prophecies. But while weak justifications of the Catholic dogma might have driven academics in search of scientific objectivity out of the Church, it is unlikely that the religious observance of French peasants would be influenced by scholarly debates on the authenticity of the Old and New Testaments.

It is more likely that the disaffection for the Church stemmed from the upheavals that took place inside the Catholic Church during the nineteenth century. As we mentioned in the introduction, the clergy progressively became ultramontane and forsook the Gallican tradition. But the loyalty of the laity laid with the French Catholic Church and not with the Pope. French Catholics opposed the imposition of the Roman liturgy instead of their dialects, and the disappearance of local holidays. For instance in 1860, many French Catholics refused to contribute to a fund in defense of the Pope. One group of parishioners even told the emissary in charge of collecting contributions: "The priest bores us with his Pope" (Gough, 1986). In other words, the imposition of Roman discipline may have driven many French Catholics out of the Church.

In addition, the development of Ultramontanism inside the French Church played into the hands of Church opponents who always accused priests to be agents of a foreign entity

which was bent on weakening France. This old tradition of anticlericalism in France¹⁰ took on a new form in the aftermath of the French defeat in the 1870-71 war against Prussia. Many, e.g., Renan (1871), argued that the Catholic Church was responsible of the defeat because it had weakened the “French spirit”.

All in all, our results suggest that the changes in political circumstances during the nineteenth century had a larger impact on religiosity in France than the economic transformations that occurred at the same time. Under the *Ancien Régime*, there was an obligation to attend religious ceremonies which masked the indifference and ill-will of the French peasants. After the French Revolution and the First Empire, peasants feared that the Church might regain its past influence, as it may involve the restoration of tithe or the repayment of the Church’s property that had been confiscated by the French Revolutionaries and sold during the French Revolution. Hence, when the official pressures that had supported religious conformity weakened in the second half of the nineteenth century, those French peasants for whom personal religion did not have any meaning openly abandoned a Church which they never supported.

5. Conclusion

This article provides a test of the economic circumstances that led to the separation between Church and State in France in 1905. It focuses on the economic characteristics of the *départments* which elected the secular members of the lower house of the French Parliament who voted in favor of the separation between Church and State on 3 July 1905. Through this event, which was telling of the Church’s decreasing influence in France, we examine whether the support for the separation of Church and State originated in the most developed areas in France at the turn of the twentieth century.

¹⁰ See Rémond (1976) on anticlericalism in France.

Our results provide scant evidence for the secularization hypothesis. Even though secular politicians seem to have been returned in areas with a high literacy rate, others indicators of economic development, such as a declining fertility rate or wealth, are found to have no effect on the vote. Furthermore, we find that the politicians who opposed the separation between Church and State, were elected in industrial areas, while secular politicians were returned in the *départments* where most of the population worked in the agricultural sector.

All in all, our results make it difficult to attribute the separation between Church and State to economic development, and its consequences, e.g., an increase in wealth and a decline in fertility. Rather, they seem to point out that the decline in faith originated in the most rural areas of the countries, where the political and social obligations that fostered religious participation progressively disappeared.

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Table 1. Variable and definitions

Dependent variable

separation share of the representatives at the lower house of Parliament who supported the separation between Church and State

Explanatory variables

urban pop	percentage of the department's population living in urban areas
per capita taxes	amount of direct contributions per capita collected in the department by the French state
secular schools	percentage of pupils enrolled in state-secular primary schools
illiterate	percentage of the French army's conscripts (men aged 18) unable to read and write
literate	Percentage of the French army's conscripts (men aged 18) who can read and write but did not finish high-school
hsgraduate	Percentage of the French army's conscripts (men aged 18) who are high-school graduates
fertility	number of birth per 1,000 women aged 18-49 in each department
protestant	number of protestant ministers
jewish	number of rabbis
employer	share of the workforce that employs workers and/or employees
worker	share of the workforce that is employed
independent	share of the workforce that is self-employed and does not have any employee
male employer	share of the male workforce that employs workers and/or employees
male worker	share of the male workforce that is employed
male independent	share of the male workforce that is self-employed and does not have any employee
industry	share of the workforce that works in the industrial sector
agriculture	share of the workforce that works in the agricultural sector
services	share of the workforce that works in the service sector
retail	share of the workforce in the service sector that works in retail
professionals	share of the workforce in the service sector that is made of professionals, e.g., lawyers, doctors
domestic services	share of the workforce in the service sector that is employed in domestic services, e.g., butlers
union members	number of members affiliated with labor unions

Table 2. Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent variable</i>				
Separation	0.663	0.306	0.000	1.000
<i>Explanatory variables</i>				
urban pop	0.312	0.172	0.106	1.00
per capita taxes	0.021	0.007	0.009	0.049
secular schools	0.737	0.109	0.416	0.901
illiterate	0.053	0.040	0.003	0.167
literate	0.927	0.038	0.823	0.973
hsgraduate	0.020	0.009	0.007	0.052
fertility	4.204	1.204	1.590	10.340
protestant	8.080	16.170	0.000	120
jewish	0.655	1.620	0.000	12
employer	0.221	0.055	0.071	0.402
worker	0.494	0.094	0.178	0.747
independent	0.285	0.100	0.109	0.751
male employer	0.213	0.066	0.052	0.420
male worker	0.526	0.107	0.136	0.787
male independent	0.261	0.097	0.110	0.811
industry	0.303	0.114	0.119	0.626
agriculture	0.492	0.156	0.014	0.705
services	0.135	0.051	0.075	0.383
retail	0.074	0.029	0.037	0.218
professionals	0.017	0.006	0.008	0.045
domestic services	0.044	0.022	0.019	0.159
union members	7313	23651.880	0.000	208504

Note: there are 87 observations for each variable.

Table 3. The support for the separation between Church and State

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
urban pop	0.37579 [0.25640]	0.37579 [0.25640]	0.36237 [0.23894]	0.61135 [0.28109]**	0.46259 [0.38157]	0.46259 [0.38157]	0.46259 [0.38157]
per capita taxes	-1.55684 [6.74193]	-1.55684 [6.74193]	-1.47839 [6.24507]	-2.19417 [6.66579]	-1.36122 [6.76951]	-1.36122 [6.76951]	-1.36122 [6.76951]
secular schools	0.80172 [0.30804]**	0.80172 [0.30804]**	0.79747 [0.30504]**	0.86229 [0.32248]***	0.80752 [0.32279]**	0.80752 [0.32279]**	0.80752 [0.32279]**
illiterate	-1.77715 [0.85952]**		-1.68502 [0.85289]*	-1.82138 [0.86037]**	-1.68998 [0.90504]*	-1.68998 [0.90504]*	-1.68998 [0.90504]*
hsgraduate	-3.24158 [4.51411]	-1.46443 [4.46061]	-3.29552 [4.36905]	-1.39643 [4.47823]	-3.67738 [4.71963]	-3.67738 [4.71963]	-3.67738 [4.71963]
literate		1.77715 [0.85952]**					
fertility			-0.03683 [0.03266]				
protestant				0.00127 [0.00100]			
jewish				-0.0477 [0.01702]***			
independent						0.34362 [0.77954]	0.15392 [0.65000]
worker					-0.34362 [0.77954]		-0.18969 [0.58893]
employer					-0.15392 [0.65000]	0.18969 [0.58893]	
constant	0.14667 [0.26322]	-1.63048 [0.72393]**	0.3034 [0.31325]	0.02745 [0.28481]	0.32907 [0.54282]	-0.01454 [0.50610]	0.17515 [0.36845]
Observations	87	87	87	87	87	87	87
R-squared	0.16	0.16	0.18	0.2	0.16	0.16	0.16
Adjusted R2	0.109	0.109	0.12	0.127	0.089	0.089	0.089
F-stat	4.657	4.657	5.258	4.55	3.354	3.354	3.354
Prob > F	0.001	0.001	0	0.001	0.008	0.008	0.008

Notes:

- OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets.
- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table 3. The support for the separation between Church and State
(continued from previous page)

	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
urban pop	0.48288 [0.34412]	0.48288 [0.34412]	0.48288 [0.34412]	0.91425 [0.31882]***	0.94385 [0.31050]***	1.03181 [0.33814]***	0.77482 [0.31928]**	0.5393 [0.26065]**
per capita taxes	-0.71349 [6.69450]	-0.71349 [6.69450]	-0.71349 [6.69450]	2.15027 [6.80192]	8.49085 [7.78404]	7.36798 [7.45244]	8.40299 [8.69188]	-0.28545 [6.93677]
secular schools	0.80769 [0.32417]**	0.80769 [0.32417]**	0.80769 [0.32417]**	0.8989 [0.30991]***	0.80693 [0.30674]**	0.86035 [0.30707]***	0.75359 [0.37652]**	0.8042 [0.30540]**
illiterate	-1.63546 [0.90572]*	-1.63546 [0.90572]*	-1.63546 [0.90572]*	-2.03378 [0.81213]**	-1.62668 [0.83573]*	-1.77107 [0.82743]**	-1.36157 [0.92227]	-1.61705 [0.87394]*
hsgraduate	-3.78164 [4.56446]	-3.78164 [4.56446]	-3.78164 [4.56446]	-5.48392 [4.56249]	-4.97142 [4.66712]	-4.74199 [4.49856]	-2.31928 [4.48193]	-3.08135 [4.43422]
male independent		0.46901 [0.58149]	0.26374 [0.60680]					
male worker	-0.46901 [0.58149]		-0.20527 [0.52833]					
male employer	-0.26374 [0.60680]	0.20527 [0.52833]						
industry					-0.58682 [0.33888]*			
agriculture				0.79015 [0.29378]***		0.66235 [0.33583]*		
services					-2.23625 [0.75798]***	-1.58543 [0.87310]*		
retail							-3.90685 [2.68422]	
professionals							-1.90856 [9.78409]	
domestic services							-1.15402 [0.93265]	
union members								-0.00228 [0.00101]**
constant	0.41056 [0.44843]	-0.05845 [0.44328]	0.14682 [0.39022]	-0.49918 [0.35395]	0.26453 [0.26561]	-0.3676 [0.36250]	0.18327 [0.32922]	0.0725 [0.26952]
Observations	87	87	87	87	87	87	87	87
R-squared	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.2	0.18
Adjusted R2	0.095	0.095	0.095	0.147	0.144	0.155	0.116	0.117
F-stat	3.476	3.476	3.476	6.212	5.094	5.289	4.154	4.372
Prob > F	0.006	0.006	0.006	0	0	0	0.001	0.001

Notes:

- OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets.
- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.