

CURSE OF ALLIANCES:
HOW THE US WON THE COLD WAR AND LOST THE THIRD WORLD
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Since the Cold War, the ideology behind U.S. interventions in the Third World has stagnated. Yet major shocks such as the rise of China, India's awakening, and the failure of neoclassical economics have radically altered the stimuli to which the U.S. must now adapt. Dr. Root, former senior Treasury official, raises questions that officeholders of both developed and developing nations must address to establish enduring global stability.

- Why do U.S. political actors interpret current geopolitical stress using Cold War metaphors that disregard the importance of nationalism, industrialization, and state-building for developing nations?
- Why has the cognitive framework of U.S. foreign policy-making come to equilibrium when complex, dynamic changes throughout the world suggest that U.S. policy makers have fundamentally misclassified the relationship between global economic development and political stability?
- What renders U.S. allies who receive foreign aid ineffectual at confronting poverty and inequality in their countries?

Dr. Root's manuscript *The Curse of Alliances* proposes that a new definition of national security must respond effectively to the challenges of global development and challenges many of the assumptions of mainstream Democrats, Republicans, and Independents alike. He questions the usefulness of diplomacy that links the promotion of

democracy with free trade, of defeating terrorism with hard power, and of counterbalancing the growth of China by tightening alliances with neighbors such as India. The durability of interdependency with the world's emerging powers has created conditions that are ripe for building a pattern of stable cooperation.

Most U.S. political actors perceive current threats and opportunities within a mental model constructed during the Cold War to prevent the spread of Soviet power throughout Europe and the Third World. Continued use of Cold War mental models to define U.S. national interests hides the gap between the goals and impacts of our actions and it leads to conceptions of national security that are highly unstable. The legacy of ideas shared by all parties must undergo cognitive reorganization. An approach that envisions relations with developing nations as a complex adaptive process will be far more productive than focusing political debate on recent election results, domestic power shifts, or the competence and performance of a particular administration.

But before contemplating a new script for the nation on the world stage, it is imperative to think differently about the dynamics of political, economic and social change in developing regions.