A Guide to Research and Study

Inside HSR:
- How does one locate the source of Human Rights and the true nature of individualistic ethics? Does Aristotle provide an adequate basis for either? Professor Henry Veatch explores these questions in his review of two books: *Liberty and Nature* and *The Virtue of Prudence*.

- Can one successfully liberalize or overthrow a tyrannical government without resorting to violence? Is it realistic to resist a foreign invader through non-violent means? Bryan Caplan considers both of these questions in a classical liberal context in his review of the literature and ideas of nonviolent resistance and civilian-based defense.

- Our *Crosscurrents* section discusses IHS’s new hook-up to the Internet and offers brief reviews of two important new works, *Out of Work* and *Nature’s Metropolis*.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

The Literature of Nonviolent Resistance and Civilian-Based Defense

*by Bryan Caplan*

Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s *Dictatorships and Double Standards* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982) laid out a bleak picture for the possibility of internal reform in Communist-controlled nations: “Not all Communist governments feature slave labor, forced migrations, engineered famines, and forced separations of the sort that have at some time characterized the Soviet Union, Cambodia, Afghanistan,” she wrote. “Not all have, after the fashion of Stalin or Castro, imprisoned tens of thousands of political prisoners. But none has produced either freedom or development. Not one has evolved into a democracy. Not one” (Kirkpatrick, 6). Happily, matters turned out differently—both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself swiftly abandoned Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This would be amazing in itself, but what is more startling is that the ruling elites of the former communist countries typically gave up some, most, or all of their power without violence. Historically, power transfers in authoritarian regimes came via coups or civil war. While violence broke out in Romania and Yugoslavia, the remainder of the former East Bloc serves as a historical anomaly. Indeed, this exception is all the more puzzling because totalitarianism seemingly lacked the weaknesses of traditional authoritarian regimes. By breaking down every element of pluralism, totalitarianism seemed to possess the ability to crush organized opposition of any kind.

Since the Communist collapse does not appear to fit our standard picture of how oppressive governments can be abolished, it would be good to look at some other traditions of thought on the question of social change and see if any of them might apply. Of these, one neglected but useful perspective comes from the tradition of nonviolent resistance. While almost exclusively associated with Gandhi, the idea has a long history of theory and practice. This bibliographic essay outlines the con-

BOOK REVIEW

Aristotle, Human Rights, and Classical Liberal Ethical Theory

*by Henry Veatch*


What is there about these two books that is at once so timely and so significant? Of course, it goes almost without saying that both books reflect their author’s firm commitment to classical liberalism and/or libertarianism. More specifically, each book reflects a determined and sophisticated attempt at providing a properly philosophical—a particu-

(continued on page 12)
Nonviolent Resistance (Continued from page 1)
tours of this tradition, beginning with its roots in the more
general theory of resistance to tyranny; it then explores the
theory and practice of nonviolent resistance and its implications
for classical liberal social theory.

Resistance Thought: Violent and Nonviolent

An excellent survey of the history of theories justifying
resistance to tyranny is Oscar Jászi and John D. Lewis, Against
the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide (Glencoe,
IL: Free Press, 1957). While it focuses on the question of
tyranicide, it actually covers a much wider ground.

Unsurprisingly, the concepts of tyranny and justified resistance
to authority simultaneously arose in ancient Greece. Plato and
Aristotle discussed tyranny without comment on the permissibility of resistance
to the state, but the histories of Xenophon
and Herodotus openly sympathized with
instances of tyrannicide. Romans also con-
sidered tyrannicide. Cicero, Plutarch, Sen-
eca, and Polybius explicitly endorsed it.
Presumably, they would have endorsed less
drastic resistance to authority as well.

Christian philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas
and William of Ockham endorsed a limited
right to resistance against tyranny. Finally,
during the Italian Renaissance, the revival
classical authors led to a parallel revival of interest in the right
of resistance against unjust government.

The question of resistance appeared in its modern form and
won profound practical significance during the Protestant Ref-

nurmatism. While Martin Luther and John Calvin denied the right
of resistance in any form, their intellectual heirs—especially Calvin’s—questioned the doctrine that all “powers that be are
ordained of God” (Romans 13:1) and considered justifications for
rebellion against political and religious persecution. British
Calvinists radicalized first. John Ponet, successively Bishop of
Rochester and of Winchester, defended resistance and tyrannicide
in his book A Shorte Tractis of Politike Power (1556; reprinted
in Winthrop S. Hudson, John Ponet (1516?-1556), Advocate of
Limited Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942)).

The Scottish Calvinist John Knox turned radically against pas-
sive resistance and defended the right of the people to establish the true
religion by force if necessary. Knox’s English compatriot Chris-
topher Goodman took a similar line. Knox’s most famous work is his tract The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous

Regiment of Women (1558; reprinted in Knox, On Rebellion, ed.
Roger A. Mason [New York: Cambridge University Press,
1994], 3-47). Goodman is best known for How Superior Powers
Ought to Be Obeyed of Their Subjects (1558; reprint, New York:
Da Capo, 1972).

François Hotman’s Francogallia (1573; trans. J. H. M.
Salmon and ed. Ralph E. Giesey, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1972; Julian H. Franklin, trans. and ed., Constitutionality
and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three Treatises
by Hotman, Beza, and Mornay [New York: Pegasus, 1969], 47-
96) initiated the genre of French Calvinist resistance—or
“monarchomach”—literature. In it he argued that historically,
the French monarch had been limited, subject to both election
and deposition by the people. “It has been sufficiently demonstr-
ated, we believe,” Hotman concludes in the third edition, “that the kings of France
have not been granted unmeasured and un-
limited power by their countrymen, and
cannot be considered absolute” (Constitutionality and Resistance, 90). For a detailed
study of Hotman’s life and thought, see
Donald Kelley, François Hotman: A

Theodore Beza’s Right of Magistrates
(1574; Constitutionalism and Resistance, 97-135) gave this historical critique a firmer
theoretical background. Fearing individual rebellion, he gave
special weight to the right of lesser magistrates to rebel against
a tyrant. He counterbalanced individual rebellion only against
 tyrants without legitimate titles—but, only if the resistance
of lesser magistrates failed. Philippe du Plessis-Mornay, in his
Defence of Liberty Against Tyrants (1579; Constitutionalism and Resistance, 137-99) essentially drew the same conclusions,
emphasizing that the people, not the king, are properly the
owners of the kingdom. Julian Franklin has abridged and com-
mented upon all three works in his Constitutionalism and Resis-
ance. Franklin emphasizes that the Calvinist resistance literature
needed to avoid radical conclusions to convince moderate
Catholics to join the Huguenot cause. Quentin Skinner’s The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 2, The Age
of Reformaion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978)
contains an extensive discussion of Hotman, Beza, and Mornay,
as well as lesser-known Calvinist authors and comments on their
Lutheran, Catholic Scholastic, and humanist predecessors. For
general treatment of Huguenot thought, see Michael Walzer,

The radical Calvinists’ interest in the right of resistance
spread to broader religious circles. The humanist thinker George
Buchanan defended the right to resist tyranny not on partisan
religious grounds but on the basis of social contract theory and
Aristotle’s politics. Powers of the Crown of Scotland (1579;
trans. C. F. Arrowood, Austin: Texas University Press, 1949) is
his most famous book; I. D. McFarlane, in his Buchanen
(London: Duckworth, 1981), offers a more detailed treatment of
his thought. At the same time, Catholics like Juan de Mariana
and Francisco Suárez validated the right of resistance against
tyranny. Using state of nature theory and the idea that rulers’

The revival of
classical authors led
to a parallel revival of interest in the right of resistance against
unjust government.
power is delegated rather than inherent, both of these Jesuit thinkers justified some form of the right of resistance. Suárez stood behind the classical distinction between the usurper and the tyrant-by-conduct. While it was permissible to use violence against a usurper, such could be justified against a tyrant-by-conduct in only the most extreme situations. Mariana took a more extreme view; he bypassed the dichotomy between the two types of unjust rulers and argued for every individual’s right to kill a tyrant. Most of Suárez’s thought on resistance is in his Tractatus de legibus (1612; translated in Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suárez, [New York: Oxford University Press, 1944]). Mariana’s chief work in this area is The King and the Education of the King (1599; ed. and trans. George Albert Moore, Washington, DC: Country Dollar Press, 1948).

It should be emphasized that the monarchists chief justified resistance as such, rather than nonviolent resistance. Their principal contemporary critics are Jean Bodin and William Barclay. See Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from “The Six Books of the Commonwealth” (1576; ed. and trans. Julian H. Franklin, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Barclay, The Kingdom and the Regal Power (1600; translated, Chevy Chase, MD: Country Dollar Press, 1954). Both argue that this was more likely to lead to endless bloodshed and further tyranny than anything else. In this context, Étienne de La Boétie’s Discourse on Voluntary Servitude (1577; trans. Harry Kurz, 1942; reprinted as The Politics of Obedience: “The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude” [New York: Free Life Editions, 1975]) appeared, promoting the efficacy of nonviolent resistance. Anticipating David Hume’s Of the First Principles of Government (1777; reprinted as Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller, rev. ed. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), 32-36), La Boétie saw that the rule of a tiny minority over society was possible only if the majority voluntarily accepted it. Taking it one step further, La Boétie argued that the social consensus theory implied that it could overthrow tyranny peaceably if the majority withdrew its consent. “It is therefore,” he wrote, “the inhabitants themselves who permit, or, rather, bring about their own subjection, since by ceasing to submit they would put an end to their servitude” (La Boétie, 50). While La Boétie’s arguments for mass civil disobedience seem more moderate than the Huguenot justification for violent resistance, he is, in every other respect, far more radical. All tyrants, he argued, whether by inheritance, force of arms, or elections, are equally bad and, therefore, equally permissible to resist. Perhaps most significant, La Boétie justified resistance not through custom or national tradition but because “freedom is our natural state” (La Boétie, 57). La Boétie explained the oppressed state of mankind with a theory of ideology and caste exploitation. The former, he contended, suppresses humanity’s natural urge for freedom; the latter develops as a tyrant fortifies power by privileging a pyramid of followers.

Despite the originality of La Boétie’s theory, it exerted little influence on subsequent theorists who continued to equate resistance with violence. Thus, the three pillars of seventeenth-century British resistance theory—Locke, Sidney, and Milton—focused chiefly on violent revolution. John Locke, in his Essay concerning Civil Government, the second of the Two Treatises of Government (1689; student ed., ed. Peter Laslett, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), not only justified rebellion against tyranny but also assumed that physical force existed as the necessary means to subdue a tyrant. While more moderate than Locke on many questions, Algernon Sidney in his Discourses concerning Government (1698; reprint, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990) militantly advocated violent revolution against tyrants. And John Milton in his book The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649; reprinted in Political Writings, ed. Martin Dzelzains [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991], 1-48), defended the right of the people to execute a tyrant if the established watchdogs failed to manage him effectively.

The nineteenth century produced two significant theorists of nonviolent resistance: Henry David Thoreau and Count Leo Tolstoy. In Thoreau’s famous essay “Civil Disobedience” (1849; reprinted in On Civil Disobedience; American Essays, Old and New, ed. Robert A. Goldwin [Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969], 11-31), he argued that the individual had a moral duty to resist unjust acts of government. While not primarily a work on collective action, Thoreau noted that “[i]f the alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not hesitate which to choose. . . . When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is accomplished” (On Civil Disobedience, 21).

One can find Tolstoy’s arguments on nonviolence in the compilation Tolstoy’s Writings on Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence (New York: Bergman, 1967). Unlike Thoreau, who largely treated his conclusions as simply the consistent application of Jeffersonian principles, Tolstoy based his condemnations of violence on the philosophy presented in the New Testament. His most notable essays on the issue of nonviolence include “Patriotism, or Peace?” which argued that the general renunciation of patriotism was a precondition of international peace and his “Notes for Officers” and “Notes for Soldiers”, which argued that members of the military had a duty to resign their posts and obey their consciences rather than the state. For more on Tolstoy’s political thought, see his The Law of Violence and the Law of Love (New York: Rudolph Field, 1948), in which he favorably cited the work of La Boétie on the efficacy of nonviolent struggle against tyranny.

Nonviolent Resistance (Continued from page 3)

lifetime interest in nonviolence when, as a lawyer in South Africa, he used nonviolence to help repeal governmental discrimination against the Indian minority. He later acquired world fame for his leadership of the nonviolent struggle for Indian independence from the British. One can find a good sampling of Gandhi's writings in his Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha) (New York: Schocken Books, 1951). While Gandhi's advocacy of nonviolence was chiefly religious and deontological, he also defended its practicality. Not only will nonviolence win more public support than violence, he argued, but it also has a greater chance to convert one's opponents and succeed with minimal casualties. In a typical passage, Gandhi wrote that a "civil resister never uses arms and hence is harmless to a State that is at all willing to listen to the voice of public opinion. He is dangerous for an autocratic state, for he brings about its fall by engaging public opinion upon the matter for which he resists the State" (Gandhi, 174). Elsewhere, echoing La Boétie, Gandhi stated that in "politics, its [power's] use is based upon the immutable maxim that government of the people is possible only so long as they consent either consciously or unconsciously to be governed" (Gandhi, 35).

Gandhi makes for difficult reading because he mixed religious ideas with more practical observations. Gene Sharp does a good job of disentangling these two strains in his Gandhi as a Political Strategist (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1979). If one ignores Gandhi's religious views and focuses on his discussion of practical strategic questions, one finds a shrewd and insightful thinker in the tradition of La Boétie. Several of Sharp's interpretive essays—especially "Gandhi on the Theory of Voluntary Servitude"—bring together the bits and pieces of Gandhi's theory of nonviolent resistance. For further writings on Gandhi's philosophy which emphasize his mystical side, see Raghavan N. Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) and Joan Bondurant, Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958). For an unsympathetic view, see Murray Rothbard, "The New Menace of Gandhism," in Libertarian Forum, March 1983, 1-6, which focuses on his mysticism and economic program.

Nonviolent Resistance: Theory and History

There can be little doubt that today's foremost thinker sympathetic to nonviolent resistance is Gene Sharp. With an eye toward practical strategy rather than philosophy, his major work The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973) covers virtually every aspect of the theory and history of nonviolent resistance to government. In the opening of the book, Sharp carefully crafts his arguments as an extensive discussion of the nature of power. He draws on the long tradition of thinkers who argue that ideology and consent—whether grudging or enthusiastic—rather than brute force are the ultimate basis of political power. If a large enough segment of the population refuses to comply with the government, it will lose its ability to rule. Merely the threat of non-compliance is often serious enough to provoke the government to redress grievances. Moreover, when governments use violence against protesters who are clearly committed to nonviolence, they undermine their ideological foundations and often make uncontested rule even more difficult. He cites such diverse thinkers as Auguste Comte, Étienne de La Boétie, David Hume, Gaetano Mosca, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Max Weber, Jeremy Bentham, Montesquieu, and Niccolò Machiavelli.

Sharp distinguishes between three stages of nonviolence: protest and persuasion; social, economic, and political non-cooperation; and nonviolent intervention. Normally a movement begins with the first stage and gradually escalates until the government meets its demands or agrees to compromise. As examples of protest and persuasion Sharp lists public speeches, petitions, distribution of literature, public demonstrations, and fraternizing with low-ranking soldiers and other government enforcers.

Nonviolent resisters bring more serious sanctions to bear when they resort to social, economic, and political non-cooperation. Here Sharp offers as examples social boycott, excommunication, student strikes (social non-cooperation); consumers' boycotts, workers' strikes, refusal to pay fees, rent, or interest, refusal to accept a government's money (economic non-cooperation); and the boycott of legislative bodies and elections, draft resistance, tax resistance, deliberate bureaucratic inefficiency, and mutiny (political non-cooperation). Unlike protest and persuasion, many of these tactics could pressure a government into changing its policies without actually changing anyone's mind.

Sharp's final category, nonviolent intervention, includes the most radical forms of resistance against authority. Some examples include fasting until death (Gandhi's famed tactic), sit-ins, occupying or surrounding critical government buildings, blocking of roads, setting up alternative markets and transportation systems (such as black markets), overloading administrative systems, and forming a parallel government.

Humane Studies Review 4 (Winter 1986-87), Beito’s major work in this area, Taxpayers in Revolt: Tax Resistance during the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), offers a broad discussion of the largest tax rebellion in modern America; he emphasizes the tax resistance in Chicago during the New Deal era.

Post-World War I Germany yields two significant examples of the effective use of nonviolence. In 1920, a pro-monarchist faction led by Dr. Wolfgang Kapp attempted to seize control of the Weimar government. German generals, sympathetic to the coup, refused to assist the civilian government, and many police actively sided with Kapp’s forces. In response, President Theodor Ebert called a general strike and bureaucratic non-cooperation. While the military eventually came to the aid of the elected government, nonviolent resistance acted as the chief obstacle to Kapp’s seizure of power. For more details on the Kapp putsch, see Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). A second instance of the use of nonviolence during the so-called Ruhrkampf from 1923 to 1925. When Germany defaulted on its war reparation payments, French and Belgian troops entered the Ruhr—one of Germany’s chief industrial centers—to extract the payments by force. Strikes and civilian and bureaucratic obstruction made the occupation so costly that the French and Belgians withdrew without net gain. Wolfgang Sternstein, “The Ruhrkampf of 1923: Economic Problems of Civilian Defense,” in Civilian Resistance as a National Defense, ed. Adam Roberts (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1968) discusses the Ruhrkampf instance at great length.

We must turn back to the Indian struggle for independence from Great Britain, the most famous and successful twentieth-century nonviolent movement. While Indian independence quickly sparked ethnic violence and failed to deliver prosperity and freedom to ordinary Indians and Pakistanis, the struggle compares favorably to violent colonial outbreaks such as in Algeria. Sharp estimates that if one takes India’s population into account, Algerian-level casualties would have left India with three million to three and a half million people dead. The number of Indians actually killed while taking part in nonviolence was about eight thousand. (See Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist, 7.) Indians tried virtually every nonviolent tactic—tax resistance (such as the famous salt march), boycotts of British goods, failure to support the British war effort, and fasting—during the independence movement. For more details on the history of the Indian struggle with the British, see Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British India (London: Cassell, 1963); Ram Gopal, How India Struggled for Freedom: A Political History (Bombay: Book Centre, 1967); Francis Hutchins, India’s Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973); and R.P. Masani, British in India: An Account of British Rule in the Indian Subcontinent (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).


Sharp lists many historical examples of both nonviolent struggles and violent struggles with a large nonviolent component. His examples include: Hungarian resistance to the Austrian empire from 1850 to 1867; the Belgian suffragist enlargement strikes in 1893, 1902, and 1913; Finland’s opposition to Russian rule from 1898 to 1905; and the Russian Revolution of 1905 and 1906. Anti-colonial struggles in Asia and Africa were also often nonviolent. They included China’s boycotts against the Japanese between 1906 and 1919; the struggle of the Indian minority in South Africa against discrimination from 1906 to 1914 and again in 1946; and Samoan resistance against New Zealand from 1919 to 1936. See Gene Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston: Porter Sargant, 1980) for a comprehensive list.

Sharp finds a common pattern throughout the history of nonviolent resistance. After a movement for social change acquires any sort of influence, it typically meets with repression. While badly organized movements collapse as soon as resistance begins, the inculcation of solidarity and discipline (akin in some ways to the training of normal soldiers) can hold a movement together long enough to win attention and score some victories. Moreover, the very fact that the protesters remain committed to nonviolence even as the government turns to repression to combat them tends to win over previously neutral parties, arouse dissent among the repressing group, and inspire and involve other members of persecuted groups. Sharp refers to this as “political ji-jitsu”—ji-jiitsu being a style of martial art that uses an opponent’s aggressiveness and ferocity against him. Sharp is far from a Panglossian advocate of nonviolence; indeed, it is precisely because of the possibility of failure that he is interested in studying the mechanics of nonviolent struggle. But, insofar as it succeeds, it usually does so by converting opponents, making repression too costly to continue, and threatening the very ability of the government to maintain power.

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Among Sharp’s other works in the area of nonviolence are Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971); Social Power and Political Freedom: Making Europe Unconquerable (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985); National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense (Omaha, NE: Association for Transarmament Studies, 1985); and Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). These books overlap one another to a significant extent, but, taken together, they detail the benefits of nonviolent action as a substitute for violence. Sharp generally utilizes a comparative institutions approach. For example, he compares the effectiveness of real-world violence to real-world nonviolence rather than ideal violence to real-world nonviolence as critics often do. As Sharp puts it, “Comparative evaluations of nonviolent and violent means must take into consideration that political violence is often defeated also. By conventional standards, does not one side lose in each international war, civil war and violent revolution? Such defeats have usually been explained as resulting from certain weaknesses or inadequacies, such as lack of fighting spirit, insufficient or poor weapons, mistakes in strategy and tactics, or numerical inferiority. Comparable weaknesses may also lead to defeat in nonviolent action. The common practice of explaining defeats of political violence in terms of such specific shortcomings while blaming defeats of nonviolent action on the presumption of its universal impotence is both irrational and uninformed” (Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, p. 756).

With this in mind, he first notes that violence is usually ineffective. The ability of the government to use violence greatly exceeds that of the rebels. Indeed, violent rebellion often strengthens oppressive regimes which can plausibly claim that rebel violence necessitates repression. Government’s comparative advantage lies in violent action. The comparative advantage of the people, in contrast, lies in their ability to deny their voluntary cooperation without which it is nearly impossible for government to persist. Consider the deadliness to a government of tax strikes, boycotts, general strikes, and widespread refusal to obey the law. While these tactics are nonviolent, their universal and unyielding use should terrify any government.

Nonviolence has other advantages as well. Because it seems less dangerous and radical than violence, it more easily, as mentioned above, wins broad public support. The costs of participation are lower, so more people are likely to participate. Traditional noncombatants like children, women, and the old can effectively participate in nonviolent struggle. It is more likely to convert opponents and produce internal disagreement within the ruling class. It generally leads to far fewer casualties and material losses than violence. And since it is more decentralized than violent action, it is less likely to give rise to an even more oppressive state if it succeeds.

In addition to Sharp’s impressive and far-reaching Politics of Nonviolent Action, one should examine other works, including Richard B. Gregg’s The Power of Nonviolence (New York: Fellowship Publications, 1944), which combines a theoretical discussion with a partial history of Gandhi’s struggle for Indian independence. Gregg’s theoretical approach is roughly equivalent to Sharp’s—albeit in a less detailed systematic form. A. Paul Hare and Herbert H. Blumberg’s Liberation Without Violence: A Third-Party Approach (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977) offers a collection of largely historical essays on the use of nonviolence in India, the United States, Africa, and Cyprus. V.K. Kool, ed., Perspectives on Nonviolence (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1996) collects thirty essays on various topics relating to nonviolence, including a keynote address by Kenneth Boulding. Leroy Peterson, in The Psychology of Nonviolence (New York: Pergamon, 1974), takes a psychological approach, focusing on the ability of nonviolent resistance to change minds while avoiding a vicious spiral of escalating violence.

Civilian-Based Defense

If nonviolent action can effectively force one’s government to change its policies or abandon power, then plausibly similar tactics might succeed against a foreign invader. And, since most nonviolence has historically been sporadic and unorganized, it might be possible to increase its effectiveness through training and strategic and tactical planning. These two possibilities have sparked interest in “civilian-based defense”—the self-conscious use of nonviolent means for the goal of national defense. Sharp defines civilian-based defense as “a projected refinement of the general technique of nonviolent action, or civilian struggle, as it has occurred widely in improvised forms in the past. This policy is an attempt deliberately to adapt and develop that technique to meet defense needs, and thereby potentially to provide . . . deterrence to those particular forms of attack” (Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, p. 233).

While this may appear intuitively impractical at first, on closer examination the argument may have strong appeal. From the outset, one should note that some of the most famous cases of nonviolent resistance were carried out against foreign powers: colonial North America and India against the British; Germany against France and Belgium in the Ruhrkampf; and Hungary against the rule of the Austrian Empire. Quoting Kenneth Boulding, Sharp writes “What exists, is possible.” More fundamentally, nonviolent resistance never had any of the advantages that military resistance does. Usually the military has years to train, strategize, prepare arsenals, test weapons, stockpile necessary resources, and study the past for lessons. But, nonviolent struggles have almost always been carried out without the benefit of personnel training or tactical and strategic planning. What would happen if countries spent as much energy preparing for a nonviolent struggle as they do for a military struggle? This is a question that Sharp and other authors sympathetic to civilian-based defense have tried to answer.

As with most scholarship on nonviolence, the work of Gene Sharp dominates the area of civilian-based defense. Social
Power and Political Freedom, a collection of essays on topics relating to nonviolence, contains two well-written introductory essays to the theory of civilian-based defense: “The Political Equivalent of War”—Civilian-Based Defense,” and “Popular Empowerment.” “The Political Equivalent of War,” criticizes traditional solutions to the problem of war: removing its “causes,” pacifism and unilateral disarmament; world government; and negotiated general disarmament. He also discusses the history of nonviolence, with examples from the Montgomery boycotts, the Soviet prison camp resistance at Vorkuta, and German and Norwegian opposition to Nazi policies.

These introductory examples provide a springboard for an extensive discussion of civilian-based defense. Sharp insists that deterrents are not limited to standard military ones. Rather, it is merely necessary for nonviolence to make occupation so difficult that the costs of conquest exceed the benefits. Massive tax resistance, boycotts, incitement of desertion, and strikes might accomplish this. And, if a would-be conqueror realized that nonviolent techniques might make the costs of occupation skyrocket, he might be deterred from trying. Sharp considers specific ways to prepare effective civilian-based defense: general education and training in the techniques of nonviolence, as well as a “West Point” for training specialists; the wide-spread dissemination of publishing and broadcasting equipment to prevent invaders from seizing all of the means of communication; and local stockpiles should exist to ease the pain of a general strike. Lastly, Sharp considers questions of strategy. He contrasts a “nonviolent Blitzkrieg”—a policy of total non-cooperation, a general strike, and massive protests—with the less dramatic but more sustainable “selective resistance”—targeting specific institutions for protection and defense and certain enemy policies for defiance and protest.

“Popular Empowerment” offers another telling point. While standard military defense is easy for a government to use against its own people, civilian-based defense is not. Civilian-based defense is a positive check against the abuse of power. If the government acts improperly, the same techniques that the citizenry can wield against foreigners can be turned on its own leaders. National defense, properly understood, shields society from all oppression, both foreign and domestic.

Making Europe Unconquerable was Sharp’s attempt to apply his theory of civilian-based defense to the protection of Western Europe against a Soviet invasion. While the subject is perhaps passé, the work is useful because it investigates a fairly specific issue in detail. Moreover, those who doubted the efficacy of nonviolence against the Soviets may find it a more plausible tool against the less serious threats that European nations face today. Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, one of Sharp’s shorter pieces, applies the analysis to the question of national defense. National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense, a long pamphlet, does nearly the same. Civilian-Based Defense, Sharp’s most recent book, summarizes his lifetime of scholarly research on nonviolence. It also contains fascinating treatments of the use of nonviolence in the final overthrow of communism in Eastern Europe. Short, clear, and wide-ranging, Civilian-Based Defense is the best single piece to read on the topic.


While nonviolence may be less useful against amoral or immoral tyrants, it is far from futile.

“IT Can Only Work Against the British”—Nonviolence Against Totalitarian Regimes

Almost everyone will concede that nonviolence can work against “civilized” nations. But what about the hard cases? What about totalitarian governments utterly lacking in moral scruples and prepared to kill as many people as necessary to cement their rule? Intuitively, the case against nonviolence in such circumstances is strong. Yet preliminary research into the history of nonviolent resistance against Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia casts doubt on this intuition. While nonviolence may be less

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Crosscurrents

The Market, the City, and the Great American West

William Cronon, former professor of United States history at Yale and now Frederick Jackson Turner Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, has graced the scholarly profession with his tome, *Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991). This intellectually immense book touches Western American/frontier history, economic/business history, environmental history, urban history, and social history. The author covers the nineteenth-century development of Chicago and its hinterland. More specifically, Cronon chronicles and analyzes the economic and environmental relationship between town and country. He accomplishes this rather foreboding task with keen wit and an engaging writing style. Virtually every paragraph contains an intellectual gem.

One should not, the author argues, consider the city as unnatural and the countryside as natural. Only degree separates the plowed field from the paved street. Rather, the city and countryside enjoy an essentially symbiotic relationship. Hence the title, *Nature’s Metropolis*: the countryside supplied the raw materials for the creation of the city, but, in doing so, the city remade the countryside. Chicago, to nineteenth-century minds, confirmed the prevailing belief in Natural Law; humans spontaneously saw advantages provided by the Divine; and, under the guidance of the Smithian invisible hand, profited themselves and their country through the creation of this urban center. As America expanded westward, the linkages between country and city grew more extensive, becoming intertwined and virtually indistinguishable. Americans of the last century perceived Chicago as a wonder of the Republic and the end of a “Darwinian sequence” (31).

Cronon’s analysis of Chicago sheds light on the creation of all nineteenth-century American settlements. Boosters promoted the cities; geography, the result of past glacial movements, determined the best areas of settlement; Chicago, because of its natural advantages—rich soil and its proximity to woodlands, Lake Michigan, and local rivers—epitomized such an area. When the land lacked a necessary natural feature, capitalists compensated with “improvements.” Every booster searched for the great city. The find could mean immense wealth.

Once the beginnings of a city occur, people move into the hinterland to supply the goods needed in that city. Profit motive and opportunity drive them. This, the “invisible hand,” Cronon argues, created the “Great West.” The market served as the prime mover and oversaw the relationship of town and country. “The nineteenth century saw the creation of an integrated economy in the United States.” Cronon argues, “an economy that bound city and country into a powerful national and international market that forever altered human relationships to the American land” (xvi). What Cronon calls the “logic of capital” affected every part of American life. The author notes, “Even those of us who will never trade wheat or pork bellies on the Chicago futures market depend on those markets for our very survival. Just as important, the commodities that feed, clothe, and shelter us are among our most basic connections to the natural world” (xvii).

At once intimidating and impressive, Cronon demonstrates—with the aid of commodity market and bankruptcy records—a profound understanding of economics throughout the book.

While Cronon, an ardent environmentalist, recognizes the power of the unrestrained market, he does not always look favorably upon its consequences. This is especially true in the case of the environment—over which he laments the passing of biologically rich and diverse grasslands and forests of the Midwest and the bison of the Great Plains. The “logic of capital” saw more profit in single-strain crops, hardwood lumber, and domesticated cattle. Cronon, using Hegelian terminology, labels the former “first nature” and the latter “second nature.”

Cronon details the development of the transportation economy from wagons to boats to railroads. Each new form of transportation altered the perceptions of time—maybe time itself—hazards—and further intertwined the city to its hinterland. Information—the price of a product—acted as the life blood of the economy and proved vital to expansion. With faster transportation, goods arrived more quickly. The speed of goods delivered was gradually catching up with the information needed. Cronon also analyzes the grain, lumber, and meat markets in a similarly comprehensive fashion. At each step, private business attempted to decrease its waste and prices to increase its competitive advantage in the market.


Out of Work


Although written by well-respected economic historians, *Out of Work* is user friendly for scholars in other disciplines. It provides an informative and clear introduction not only to Keynesian and Austrian views of unemployment. This is not just a work of theory, however. Vedder and Gallaway back up their case with solid empirical research and show an obvious mastery of the historical literature. At the same time, they avoid drowning readers with econometric jargon or equations.

Their discussion of the origins of the post-war economic expansion is easily worth the price of the book. It uncovers serious flaws in traditional Keynesian explanations which stress the release of “pent-up demand” after the war. According to Vedder and Gallaway, the boom already was well underway before any noticeable rise in consumption. Instead of a Keynesian success story, it was, they assert, very much a supply-side recovery which resulted from a temporary fall in artificially high real wages.

Significantly, the economic expansion, which began in 1945 and 1946, coincided with large doses of political decontrol and massive retrenchment in governmental debt, taxes, and spend-
ing. These policies were antithetical to those recommended during the war by leading Keynesians, such as Alvin Hansen. In nearly every case, Keynesians had predicted that cutbacks in governmental spending in peacetime would set off another depression. Ironically, once the decline failed to materialize, the failed prophets speedily, and successfully, claimed credit for the boom as the logical result of Keynesian doctrine.

Humane Studies Review

The Humane Studies Review is devoted to advancing scholarship in the classical liberal and libertarian traditions. These traditions include among their principles the recognition of inalienable individual rights and the dignity and worth of each individual; protection of those rights through the institutions of individual private property, contract, and the rule of law, and through freely evolved intermediary institutions; and advocacy of the ideal of voluntarism in all human relations, including support of the virtues of the unhampered market in economic affairs and the goals of free trade, free migration, and peace.

Contributions dealing with questions or problems of special relevance to classical liberal and libertarian scholarship in any of the humane sciences are welcomed. The humane sciences include, but are not limited to, history, sociology, economics, law, philosophy, anthropology, literature, and political science.

The Humane Studies Review features three main essay formats: a bibliographical review essay, which unfolds a theme or problem through a broad review of the relevant literature (suggested length: 3,500-4,700 words); an essay on a current issue in law, philosophy, history, economics, or any other of the humane sciences, which explores a well-defined issue and raises possibilities for liberal scholarship (suggested length: 2,500 words); and a review of a recent book treating problems central to liberal thought (suggested length: 3,500-4,700 words). The Humane Studies Review offers to the author: $350 for a bibliographical review; $250 for a current issue essay; and $150 for a book review.

Contributors are encouraged to submit essays that raise questions and present challenges, rather than papers that merely attempt to sustain a thesis. The goal of the review is to encourage thought and discussion, to promote research, and to serve as a "seminar in print."

Those submitting essays should send two typewritten hard copies of each manuscript; the essays should be in a twelvecount, courier font and double-spaced with one-inch margins. Footnotes should be kept to a minimum and should appear at the end of the manuscript. Quotations and citations should be carefully verified. Citations should follow either Kate L. Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 5th edition or The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th edition. Authors should, additionally, submit their essays on a 3.5 inch computer disk; both Macintosh and DOS formats are acceptable, though Macintosh format is preferred.

As to style, please refer to the short but essential William Strunk, Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style, 3rd edition. As they note, "Vigorous writing is concise."

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Humane Studies.

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E-mail

Thanks to Internet, IHS has entered into the world of on-line communication. We are using electronic mail to communicate with our friends and colleagues everywhere from down the street at George Mason University to around the world in Australia.

Some e-mail addresses are listed below, including those of IHS staff members and participants of the Claude R. Lambe Fellowship 10th Anniversary Celebration last year who are online.

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Nonviolent Resistance (Continued from page 7)

useful against amoral or immoral tyrants, it is far from futile.

Danish, Norwegian, and Dutch resistance to Nazism from 1940 to 1945 was pronounced and fairly successful. In Norway, for example, teachers refused to promote fascism in the schools. For this, the Nazis imprisoned a thousand teachers. But, the remaining teachers stood firm, giving anti-fascist instruction to children and teaching in their homes. This policy made the pro-fascist Quisling government so unpopular that it eventually released all of the imprisoned teachers and dropped its attempt to dominate the schools. Other forms of struggle included ostracism, the refusal to speak to Nazi soldiers and intense social hostility to collaborationists.


But, surely the most amazing but widely neglected case of nonviolent resistance against Nazi Germany was the protection of Jews and other persecuted minorities from deportation, imprisonment, and murder. In “The Lesson of Eichmann: A Review-Essay on Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem” in Social Power and Political Freedom, Gene Sharp shows how the nations which nonviolently resisted National Socialist racial persecutions saved almost all of their Jews, while Jews in other Nazi-controlled nations were vastly more likely to be placed in concentration camps and killed. When Himmler tried to crack down on Danish Jews, the Danes thwarted his efforts. Not only did the Danish government and people resist—through bureaucratic slowdowns and noncooperation—but, surprisingly, the German commander in Denmark also refused to help organize Jewish deportations. This prompted Himmler to import special troops to arrest Jews. But, in the end almost all Danish Jews escaped unharmed. In Bulgaria, the parliament refused to assist the German anti-Jewish measures, and Bulgarians held public demonstrations against the persecution of Jews. As far as can be known, no Bulgarian Jews were killed or deported by the Nazis. For more on this, see Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963). The omnipresent pattern that Arendt finds and that Sharp emphasizes is that totalitarian governments are not omnipotent. They need the cooperation of the ruled to exert their will. If a people denies cooperation, even a government as vicious as Hitler’s, bound by few moral constraints, might be unable to get what it wants.

The history of nonviolent struggle against the Soviet Union has, until recently, been much more bleak. When, in 1953, East Germans used the general strike and other nonviolent tactics to win better treatment for workers, the Soviets brutally crushed all opposition, leading to worldwide recognition—even among socialists—that the Soviet regime’s claim to represent “workers” was absurd. Stefan BrANT, The East German Rising (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957) covers the history of the largely nonviolent 1953 struggle. The Hungarian uprising in 1956, while generally considered a military struggle, contained strong nonviolent elements, including a general strike, mass demonstrations, and the formation of a parallel government. Again, the Soviets harshly repressed it, though it is worth noting that the nonviolent resistance (for example the general strike in Budapest) held out longer than the Hungarian military. On this, see Ferenc VAl, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961) and George Mikes, The Hungarian Revolution (London: Andre Deutsch, 1957).

The Czech struggle of 1968 is a final tragic chapter in the history of resistance to the Soviets. Remarkably, the Czechs used nonviolent means almost exclusively and, consequently, lasted considerably longer than did the Hungarians. The Dubcek government ordered its soldiers to remain in their barracks, the state news agency refused to announce that its government had “requested” the invasion, and the Czech Congress condemned Soviet actions and demanded a release of its kidnapped officials. Other forms of resistance included short-term general strikes, transportation obstruction, and the use of radio to rally the people against Soviet invaders. Even though the invasion was a complete military success, the Soviets decided that the political situation made it unwise to replace the Dubcek government with
collaborators. Instead, after some compromise on reforms, they released the kidnapped Czech leaders and restored them to their previous positions. The liberal reformers retained power for eight more months, at which point the Russians replaced them with their own favorites. This ended Czech reforms. On the 1968 struggle see Robert Littell, ed., The Czech Black Book (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969); Robin Alison Remington, ed., Winter in Prague (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969); and Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

It would be easy to draw deeply pessimistic conclusions from this long string of suppressed attempts to liberalize communist nations. Not only did history support the pessimistic conclusion of Jeane Kirkpatrick and other conservatives, but it, a priori, also made sense. Violent revolution in a totalitarian system seemed futile. The ruling elite might fight amongst itself, but they had no intention of giving up power voluntarily. And, nonviolence proved clearly useless against conscienceless dictators.

Or did it? As Sharp emphasized, nonviolence can win by converting opponents and neutrals and by creating divisions within ruling groups. In a way, that was happening for decades under communism. Not only the people, but also subgroups within the ruling elite itself gradually came to see the evil and inherent contradictions within their own system. Circulation of illegal literature, smuggled videotapes, and infiltration of Western cultural influences slowly eroded confidence. It is a mistake to look at communist nations over the past few decades and conclude that all resistance had been crushed; rather, it had been occurring covertly, slowly undermining all of the claims of communist governments of legitimacy.

The move for liberalization began with the Solidarity movement in Poland. One readable journalistic history of Solidarity is Timothy Garton Ash’s, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 1980-1982 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1983). Ash emphasizes that the election of a Polish pope marked the beginning of rising expectations in Poland. By highlighting the role of non-state institutions, John Paul II’s election tended to make people more conscious of the distinction between society and state. Ash describes one of the pope’s Polish appearances: “For nine days the state virtually ceased to exist, except as a censor deleting the television coverage. Everyone saw that Poland is not a communist country—just a communist state” (Ash, p. 29). The chief tactic of Solidarity was the strike, which it used both to highlight particular grievances and to attain broader reform. Peter Raina’s Poland 1981: Towards Social Renewal (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985) details the history of Solidarity’s tactics, demands, and compromises that critical year. The author analyzes the precise text of reform bills on independent trade unions, worker self-management, censorship, and higher education. For a broader history, see Jadwiga Staniszewski, Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

This work gives a solid account of the crucial 1980 through 1982 period—the height of Solidarity’s influence—but it also discusses moderate reforms during the 70’s, the Polish people’s rising expectations prior to Solidarity, and the early period of Soviet occupation after World War II.

The Solidarity movement and student and peasant associations expressed discontent and struggled for reform despite harsh persecution. Their limited successes inspired dissidents in other communist nations to push harder for reform and frightened communist leaders into mild compromises. One work documenting the spread of the “Polish virus” is Elizabeth Teague’s Solidarity and the Soviet Worker (London: Croom Helm, 1988) which discusses the influence of the Solidarity movement on Soviet politics. The Politburo clearly feared the growth of the ideas of the Solidarity movement and made concessions to workers in the early 1980’s to prevent this. While Teague found little Polish influence upon ethnic Russians, the Solidarity movement frequently influenced other ethnicities within the USSR to push peacefully for reforms in their own republics.

Eventually the accumulated effects of resistance penetrated the Soviet Politburo itself. Gorbachev announced that Soviet forces would not quell reforms in Eastern Europe. At this point, the self-conscious tactics of nonviolent resistance went public. A half million East Germans demonstrated in Berlin for democratic elections and civil liberties on 4 November 1989. A half million Czechs and Slovaks protested the phony reforms of communist bosses in Prague three weeks later. Thousands of protesters in Leipzig forced state security headquarters to submit to public inspection. As Sharp writes, repression often rebounded against the repressors: “Czechs and Slovaks erected shrines at the main sites of the beatings, raising those injured to the stature of heroes. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets daily following the police actions. As one student put it, the beatings were “the spark that started the whole movement’” (Sharp, Civilian-Based Defense, pp. 58-59). Success was contagious—once East Germany’s neighboring communist regimes fell, the East Germans began to flee to West Germany by way of their government’s former allies. In the final chapter, communism within the Soviet Union itself collapsed, and the last-ditch attempt of hard-line communists to seize power was foiled with no small thanks to mass demonstrations, fraternization with soldiers, and other nonviolent tactics.

While there has been some overlap between the classical liberal tradition and the theory and practice of nonviolent struggle, they remain virtual strangers to one another in scholarship. There is, however, no intrinsic reason for this. While nonviolence is compatible with many viewpoints, some of the best arguments in its favor have a rather classical liberal flavor. The analysis of political power and civil obedience put forth by nonviolence theorists closely resembles classical liberalism. Similarly, the observation that violent revolution often serves only the interests of a new elite fits comfortably into the classical liberal tradition. The nonviolence literature contains few explicit references to spontaneous order, but the idea is often present nonetheless, especially in Gene Sharp’s work. The idioms of the nonviolence literature is initially foreign, but frequently it is a difference chiefly of style, not of substance.

Classical liberals interested in the issue of nonviolence will find several gaps in the existing literature waiting to be filled. First of all, the notion of spontaneous order in general, along with rational choice and game theories, rarely appears. But, these tools could shed considerable light on the feasibility of nonviolence; they might also help answer the objection that centrally planned resistance is necessarily more effective than civilian.

(continued on page 12)
Nonviolent Resistance (Continued from page 11)

based defense. Second, classical liberals may be able to draw on a broader range of historical examples than the current literature does. The self-conscious resistance movements are its primary focus; but aren’t there many voluntary institutions whose result is to check state power even though that is not part of the intention of the participants? Thus, the informal economy is rarely a form of ideological protest, but it is nevertheless a decentralized and nonviolent check upon the abuse of governmental power. A third insight that classical liberals might introduce and expand is the role of markets and economic freedom as a nonviolent check upon the state. Since contemporary advocates of nonviolence tend to be suspicious of capitalism, they often ignore typically liberal observations.

Classical liberals may learn from—as well as contribute to—the nonviolence literature. Besides its intrinsic interest, it may point the way to answers to several difficult issues within the classical liberal tradition. Despite their distrust of state power and interventionist foreign policy, classical liberals have had a difficult time envisioning specific alternatives to violence to combat tyranny. The literature of nonviolent resistance is filled with penetrating insights in this area. And, while classical liberals frequently long for alternatives to both electoral politics and violence, specific suggestions have been sparse. These are merely a few gaps that the nonviolence literature may fill. On a more aesthetic note, many of the historical examples of nonviolence are beautiful illustrations of the power of voluntary institutions to supplement or replace the role of the state.

Finally, the role of civilian protest and direct action in recent anti-communist revolutions lends a new credibility to the idea of nonviolent resistance. It would go too far to attribute the demise of communism purely to nonviolent resistance. But it was one important and neglected factor in the greatest triumph of freedom in the twentieth-century. Classical liberals should study the lessons that it teaches. In particular, they should learn how freedom may be defended against tyrannical governments. A central lesson here is that even when the government has the weapons, there is something that it cannot seize: the voluntary compliance of its citizens. Without it, maintaining power becomes costly or even impossible. But, as we have seen, governments almost instinctively sense this risk and strive to prevent it from arising. As La Boétie explains, “it has always happened that tyrants, in order to strengthen their power, have made every effort to train their people not only in obedience and servility toward themselves, but also in adoration” (La Boétie, 75). All that is necessary to prevent tyranny is to let the citizenry come to know its own strength. Or, in the timeless words of La Boétie, “From all these indignities [of tyranny], such as the very beasts of the field would not endure, you can deliver yourselves if you try, not by taking action, but merely by willing to be free. Resolve to serve no more, and you are at once freed. I do not ask that you place hands upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply that you support him no longer; then you will behold him, like a great Colossus whose pedestal has been pulled away, fall of his own weight and break into pieces” (La Boétie, p. 53).

Aristotle (Continued from page 1)
larly moral-philosophical—basis and foundation for the author’s undeviating liberalism in ethics. This explains why the concern in both books is not so much with law, with economics, or even with political philosophy. Rather, it is with ethics.

Nor can there be any denying that given the present state of Anglo-American philosophy, ethics merits particular attention. Throughout nearly the whole of the present century, what one might call academic ethics or moral philosophy has been almost entirely dominated by the fashions of a so-called Altruism and/ or Imperialism, as the current terms have it. Be they Kantians or Utilitarians, nearly all professors of moral philosophy seem to share the conviction that ethics only begins when the moral agent looks away from his or her own interests or personal concerns, and looks instead to the interests and concerns of others. The basic and all-pervasive moral imperative is that in all of one’s choices and decisions one ought never to put one’s own interests ahead of the interests of others. The morally requisite course should be, the thinking runs, always to value all interests equally, whosoever and howsoever they may be—and this entirely impartially.

Little wonder, then, that libertarians like Rasmussen and Den Uyl are determined to counter all such fashionable affirmations of Altruism and Imperialism in ethics with a determined reaffirmation of a genuine moral individualism. But, just how are they to do this, and upon whom do they propose to rely as forerunners and authorities for their own subscription to a moral individualism in the present day? When it comes to working out a genuinely liberal or libertarian moral philosophy for today they believe they can turn for inspiration and support to Aristotle and, more generally, to the long Aristotelian tradition in ethics.

Immediately, though, one might counter with the observation that such appeals to the authority of Aristotle are decidedly “old hat,” as far as libertarians are concerned. For who else but Ayn Rand originally, and quite vociferously, proclaimed herself to be an Aristotelian in matters of philosophy and, particularly, of ethics? And, no doubt, neither Rasmussen nor Den Uyl would deny that in their earlier years they directed their own affiliation and allegiance toward Rand and the Randians. There can be no denying that, whatever may have been true of Rasmussen and Den Uyl in the past, they have not left Rand and the present-day Randians far behind. In their subtle and sophisticated reliance upon Aristotle for philosophical resources they attempt to counter the fashionable Kantian and Utilitarian ethical traditions that dominate moral philosophy today.

When it comes to leading present-day moral philosophers out of the doldrums of an ever-repeated Altruism and Imperialism in ethics and onto the more exciting playing fields of a genuine moral individualism are Rasmussen and Den Uyl really well-advised to make Aristotle their guide and mentor? True, Aristotle did insist—and insisted most emphatically—that the key notion in ethics should be a human individual’s own personal happiness and well-being. Only this notion should guide a human individual in all of his choices and actions, this being no less than the proper end or goal or telos. And, only in the light of the telos can one make sense of anything and everything that he undertakes to do or to accomplish in his life.

Bryan Caplan is a graduate student in Economics at Princeton University.
Unfortunately, given the present state of the art in ethics and moral philosophy, no sooner does one undertake to follow Aristotle and to make the individual’s own happiness and well-being the key concept in ethics, than one is likely to be simply laughed out of the court by nearly all present-day moral philosophers. For just how, the critics will ask, can one possibly set up an individual’s own happiness, or what that individual takes to be of supreme personal value to himself, or what he likes and cherishes most in life as the central concern of a moral system? How can one, the critics will continue, take this sort of thing to be the veritable key to how a human individual ought morally to order and conduct his or her own life? After all, the standard moral-philosophical consideration currently contains, how can one possibly determine what one morally ought to do by merely having a regard for what one naturally likes to do or is inclined to do? And, who is there who does not as a result of mere natural inclination, seek after his or her own happiness or well-being?

In other words, what is at work here in such standard criticisms of an Aristotelian eudaimonism—or happiness-ethics if you will—is the recognition that there is nothing normative about such an ethics. And, what kind of an ethics can one be said to possess, if it leaves no place for genuine moral norms, standards, and obligations? Yet, there is no way in which one can very well get from mere considerations of what human beings just naturally do, or are inclined to do—namely seek their own happiness or well-being—to a conclusion that therefore it is only right (morally right) that human beings should, or ought, to seek their own happiness or pursue their own interests. Such a move would be tantamount to what Hume would have labeled an attempted inference from “is” to “ought”—i.e. from what human beings do (namely follow their own inclinations and seek their own happiness) to what they ought to do, or what is only right that they should do.

Still more telling, contemporary moral philosophers continually, with little more than supposed facts of a largely logico-linguistic nature, attack Aristotle’s attempt to erect his eudaimonism into an actual ethics. In this case, the criticism turns on what these present-day philosophers are wont to call the “Principle of Universalizability.” According to this principle, all words of a proper normative—hence, of a properly moral and ethical—import are held to be universalizable, whereas all words or terms expressive merely of our personal desires, preferences, and values are, it would seem, never universalizable. For instance, suppose I say that I ought to do thus and so, or that it is right, or my duty, that I do thus and so, then the implication—by the very meaning of terms such as “right,” “ought,” “duty”—is that it is no less right, or no less the duty, of each and everyone else to do thus and so, given similar circumstances. Contrast what one might call mere “desire words,” or words expressive of one’s own likes, preferences, or personal desires: such words or terms are never universalizable just as such. For instance, suppose I say that I like x, or that x is a thing of personal value to me. From such statements it can never be inferred that therefore x must also be liked by, or be reckoned to be of personal value to, any and everyone else as well, given similar circumstances.

Apply the “Principle of Universalizability,” then, in the context of an Aristotelian and, therefore, of a teleological type of ethics and the consequence would seem to be nothing if not disastrous for any and all would-be Aristotelian moral philosophers. For, if such an ethics counsels us to seek no more than our own personal values, and, hence, merely our own personal happiness and well-being, it would seem that all such advice would have to be ruled out as not having even the slightest import for any kind of ethics—at least not for an ethics properly so-called. How could recommendations to the effect that, as moral agents, we need have regard only for our own personal values and interests, or for our own personal happiness and well-being, have any properly normative import? Thus, granted that I do indeed have a genuine concern for my own values and my own well-being, it still does not follow from this that anyone and everyone else ought to have a like concern for my values, happiness, and my well-being as well. But, if my testimony to the value of my personal values or my own happiness (well-being) to me is not universalizable, then that can only mean that my mere personal concern with pursuing my own values, or with achieving my own well-being, will be a concern without the slightest normative force or import. Neither can I claim that it is only right—i.e. morally justified—that I pursue my own ends and foster my own interests—nor can I claim that, as an individual moral agent, I have a right—a natural and a moral right—to such a pursuit of my own interests. With that, the entire case for either an Aristotelian or a libertarian type of ethics or moral individualism seems to collapse like a house of cards, and to collapse simply as a result of the application of what seems to be merely a purely verbal—which is to say, a purely logico-linguistic—Principle of Universalizability.

Is it any wonder, then, that Rasmussen and Den Uyl, given their subscription to an Aristotelian and libertarian type of ethics, when faced with such generally accepted logico-linguistic presuppositions as characterize so much of modern ethics, have their work cut out for them? Happily, one has only to read their two books, and one quickly comes to see that they not only face up to the work cut out for them, but they also execute that work deftly and brilliantly. More specifically, it should be apparent from what we have said thus far that what Rasmussen and Den Uyl need to do is to answer the anti-Aristotelianism and anti-teleology of modern ethics is precisely to show how an individual’s pursuit of his or her own ends, or his or her own personal values—yes, even of his or her own happiness or eudaimonia—can be an entirely principled pursuit.

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To do this, they need to show, and they do show, that the end or goal of life for a human being—man’s very telos, if you will—is a properly objective and, therefore, an entirely obligatory end. That is to say, the true end or goal for a human individual is not merely what a given person just happens to like or desire. But, rather, the end is something that not only that individual, but also, by the Principle of Universalizability, something that each and every individual ought to like and desire, and, therefore, ought to direct his or her every effort toward trying to achieve and to accomplish. With a human being’s true end being thus what each individual ought to pursue, the prescription of such an end will be nothing if not universalizable. The human telos rightly understood, therefore, will be normative and obligatory for all alike, considering always and in each case their several circumstances.

But, what is this telos, and how do Rasmussen and Den Uyl specify it? It is principally in their joint volume, Liberty and Nature, that they show how a human being’s true end or telos is something determined by nature. That is, it is from nature and from the observation of nature—as opposed to obvious examples of human failure, folly, and frustration in the living of our own human lives—that we human beings learn to recognize in what true human fulfillment, perfection, and flourishing must consist. As the title, Liberty and Nature, implies, it is only in freedom and only in the light of an individual’s own self-determination that the individual is ever able to bring himself to just such a condition of well-being, as is demanded of him by his very nature, and which thus constitutes for him his true natural end and natural perfection.

Moreover, for a fuller and more illuminating account of in what this natural end or natural perfection of a human must needs be thought to consist, one needs to turn to Den Uyl’s extremely luminous account in his own volume The Virtue of Prudence. Here, one finds spelled out in contemporary language a brilliant account of Aristotle’s famous characterization or definition of human happiness as simply “the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.” The relevant virtues in such a case are the so-called intellectual virtue of “prudence” and good judgment and the moral virtues of character through which we have schooled and disciplined ourselves to choose and to act ever in accordance with the determinations of our own “prudence” and good judgment.

Very well, let this suffice by way of a characterization of how Rasmussen and Den Uyl manage so successfully at once to differentiate and to defend their own ethics of an Aristotelian moral individualism, in contrast to the still fashionable and dominant ethics of moral Altruism and Impartialism. But, what of other moral philosophers of a more or less libertarian persuasion on the current scene? For, though these may be avowedly libertarian ethics, it can hardly be said that they are necessarily Aristotelian as well. What significance, then, do the Rasmussen and Den Uyl books have for their fellow libertarians who would scarcely want to—or who scarcely could—call themselves Aristotelians?

Let me single out, somewhat arbitrarily to be sure, an issue that is very much a concern to all classical liberals, but with which not many such liberals, other than Rasmussen and Den Uyl, have dealt either very forthrightly or very successfully. This is the issue of human rights. Do not all classical liberals wish to champion human rights—particularly so-called “negative rights” to such things as life, liberty, and property? Still, to what philosophical ground or principle do such liberals say one must appeal, if one is not merely going to affirm such rights but actually going to lay claim to them even if the societies in which we human beings are living have deprived us of such rights in actuality?

Unfortunately, all too often present-day libertarians are unable to give a proper philosophical defense of the contention that human beings really have certain rights “by nature” and “by right,” even when they are quite patently deprived of them in fact. Not so for Rasmussen and Den Uyl. For, particularly in Liberty and Nature, they have propounded a most interesting line of argument to show just how a proper ground for human rights may be derived from the Aristotelian notion that man’s end or telos is no less than a veritable natural and obligatory end for human beings. We have noted, in an Aristotelian context, that a human being’s end or telos in life is not one that all human beings happen to want, to like, to desire, or to find pleasing, but rather one that amounts to what we earlier defined as an obligatory end—i.e. an end which it is morally right for human beings to choose as their true end or goal, and, therefore, should pursue accordingly. Availing themselves, therefore, of this Aristotelian notion of man’s end or telos in life, Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that human rights need always to be understood with reference to prior duties—specifically with reference to our duty to work toward a more or less specific type of goal.

It is important not to fall into what is, perhaps, a natural misunderstanding. One frequently hears the assertion that rights and duties are reciprocal. If A enjoys a certain right with respect to B, then B may be said to have a duty to respect A’s right. Correspondingly, if there is some duty B owes to A, then A may be said to have an obvious right-claim with respect to B—namely that B acquit himself of his obligation.

Such is not the relationship of duty to rights, or rights to duty, that is in question. Rather, if A were said to have a duty, or to be obliged, to act or to live in a certain way, A could hardly be expected to fulfill his obligation, if we were forcibly prevented from doing so or if the very means and resources necessary for his doing so were taken away from him. Thus whenever someone is under obligation or has a certain duty to do thus and so, that person can surely claim that he has a right not to be interfered with in the exercise of his duty. Otherwise, he could no longer be said to have the duty or to be under the obligation, given that it would be quite beyond his power to perform the duty or to acquit himself of the obligation. Nothing more nor less than the somewhat shopworn Kantian principle that “ought” implies “can” is involved.

Applying such considerations, then, in the context of an Aristotelian system of ethics—in which human beings have a certain basic moral obligation to try to perfect themselves and to try to achieve the sort of end or goal that is appropriate to human life and to human existence—it would seem such human beings have a moral right—and, by extension a political right—not to be interfered with. Simply because they are humans, they should not to be deprived of the means necessary to lead such lives as
are required of them. As I suggested above, according to an Aristotelian view, the end goal or telos in life, as far as a human being is concerned, is simply that a person live rationally—which is to say that he needs both to cultivate and exercise the so-called intellectual and moral virtues.

But, how can a person live rationally—which is to say, how can one possibly follow a life of (1) wisely coming to see and understand what a concrete situation demands, and (2) then actually choosing to do it, and choosing to do what the situation requires frequently, in the face of countless contrary impulses, desires, passions, and feelings of all kinds. How, all of this is to ask, is such a business of one’s actually living wisely and intelligently ever going to be possible for a human person if he is prevented from anything like genuine self-determination, if he is killed, or if he is deprived of the necessary physical and spiritual resources for the living of one’s life as it ought to be lived?

Merely by raising such a question, however, have we not in effect simply enumerated the very items that have traditionally been cited as being the objects of so-called “negative rights”—life, liberty and property? Furthermore, is it not by now apparent that the only way a claim to such rights—the same would go for positive rights as well, if there are any—can ever be justified is by showing the possession of such rights to be nothing less than necessary means to our acquitting ourselves of our basic obligations and responsibilities, as human beings, to try to become the kinds of persons that as individuals we ought to be. In other words, "ought" implies "can." Given that our natural end or telos as humans imposes certain obligations upon us, we should be able to claim, as being our natural right as humans, that no one should deprive us of the necessary means and conditions of our flourishing and fulfillment—again, life, liberty, and property.

Such, I would suggest, is no more than the basic line of argument that needs to be followed if one is not merely going to affirm such things as human rights but is actually going to show that there is a genuine—even if long neglected—argument to justify them. Moreover, what is so distinctive and, as I feel, so eminently commendable about the two books by Rasmussen and Den Uyl is that they not only see the need for trying to provide a genuine argument in defense of so-called natural rights, but they actually provide the argument itself.

Still, one must raise the question whether Rasmussen and Den Uyl deserve the distinction here ascribed to them of not merely talking piously about human rights but of actually providing an argument to justify them. And, what about other classical liberal philosophers? May it not be said that at least some of them have been forthcoming with actual philosophical arguments in support of such things as human rights? Here and now is hardly the time to offer anything like an exhaustive review of philosophical writers of a classical liberal persuasion to see whether or not they actually affirm rights and try to come up with philosophical arguments in demonstration of them. Instead, let me confine myself to a few examples before concluding.

For instance, what about liberal legal philosophers like Richard Epstein or Randy Barnett? Certainly, there is no denying that theirs is a most impressive and even pyrotechnic display of legal sophistication. But, what about philosophical sophistication? More importantly, what about a philosophical sophistication which applies directly to specific questions in ethics and moral philosophy? Subject to correction, I would suggest that in neither Epstein nor Barnett does one find much actual philosophical discussion pertaining to morals or ethics per se. Certainly, apart from repeated and commendable affirmations of human rights, the reader will not find an actual moral-philosophical argument in justification of such rights.

Take another example, Stephen Macedo’s book Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). While this book is both a rich and intriguing one, so far as the manifestation and import of the so-called liberal virtues in society are concerned. Macedo is largely silent on the more fundamental philosophical questions—"Why liberal virtues?" or "What sort of justification is to be given in justification of the practice of liberal virtues?" or "How does one argue directly to the point that there really are such things as human rights, which it is the concern of liberal virtues to acknowledge and recognize?"

And, now finally, consider the example of Loren Lomasky. Certainly, in his brilliant book, Persons, Rights and the Moral Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), he displays considerable philosophical sophistication. Directly in the title of his book there is a manifest and commendable concern with rights and, particularly, with the rights of individuals within the community. But, what about an actual argument to show that rights are not merely things to be championed but also things that people actually do possess? Here Lomasky faces a problem. Presumably what he wants to show, with respect to the “project-pursuits” of individuals, is not only that such project-pursuit is what human beings are given to doing and like to do, but also that it is morally commendable for human beings to engage in it. In fact, it is commendable to such a degree that human beings should be able to claim a right to their own project-pursuits. But, just what is the basis and ground for such right-claims on the part of individuals to choose their own project-pursuits?

Here Lomasky falters. For, unlike Rasmussen and Den Uyl, (continued on page 16)
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he does not argue that our projects should be directed toward the end of our own true human flourishing or perfection. Instead, Lomasky does not tolerate any notions of obligatory ends or genuine standards of perfection in human projects. Still, he wishes to insist that human beings do have rights and rights that are not to be interfered with—so far as the pursuit of their own projects are concerned. However, as an argument for such rights, Lomasky is somehow precluded from following Rasmussen’s and Den Uyl’s Aristotelian line that because projects should be directed towards the obligatory end of a human person’s own self-perfection, project-pursuers have a right not to be interfered with in their project pursuit—and this simply on the ground that “ought” implies “can.”

Rather, Lomasky falls back on the argument that, as we saw earlier, the so-called ethical Altruists and Impartialists are given to using. Accordingly, as applied to the question of one’s right to one’s own project-pursuit, what such a line amounts to is that while my neighbor’s projects do not have “personal value” (Lomasky’s term) for me, they do have value for my neighbor—even though they have an “impersonal view.” But, value—particularly if it is reckoned to be of “impersonal value”—being universalizable, I am supposedly compelled to acknowledge that my neighbor’s project, even though it can only be of impersonal value for me, still deserves my respect and even my aid and cooperation. In short, my neighbor can claim it as being no more than his right that I both honor and contribute to his own project-pursuit.

What we have here, if not a case of Lomasky’s forsaking his friends and associates among the libertarians and classical liberals, is his seemingly going over to join the welfare liberals! I do not mean to judge Lomasky by what, from his own point of view, seems to be the rather questionable philosophical company that he now appears to be keeping. The really serious thing about the kind of argument to which Lomasky here seemingly wishes to resort is, to justify the rights of project-pursuers, is that, as we have already seen, it is simply a bad argument. In effect, it abuses the Principle of Universalizability by supposing that because my neighbor’s project-pursuit has value for him, it must therefore be pronounced to have value for me as well. That does not readily follow: the supposedly mere impersonal value that my neighbor’s project has for me in no way commits me even to respect his project or, in any way to concede that my neighbor has any moral right to pursue his own project. Instead, all that application of the Principle of Universalizability requires of me is a recognition that the kind of project that my neighbor has undertaken for himself is the kind of project that I may myself want someday to undertake, given similar circumstances. But, that his same identical individual project is anything that I am in any way committed to furthering does not follow from the argument from universalizability. It does not even follow that I have so much as an obligation merely to respect my neighbor’s project, much less to further it or to concede that he has a right to his own project-pursuit.

Returning again to the books of Rasmussen and Den Uyl, they have clearly recognized that right-claims may be upheld only if a proper philosophical argument can be made to support and justify them. Moreover, Rasmussen and Den Uyl have worked out and developed such an argument. Be theirs the credit, then, as well as the compliments and congratulations!

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