Prof. Bryan Caplan
bcaplan@gmu.edu
http://www.bcaplan.com
Econ 370
Week 12: Problems with Regulation
I.
Recap:
Problems with Markets
A.
In the first
10 weeks, we identified a number of problems with free markets:
1.
AC pricing
instead of MC pricing prevails in many (most?) real-world cases. (A)
2.
Most efficient
firm can price just below MC of second most efficient firm. (I)
3.
Externalities
lead to too little of some activities and too much of others. (I)
4.
Intellectual
property rights and other incentives for innovation don't work perfectly (still
some free riding), and are inconsistent with MC pricing. (I)
5.
Markets may be
unable to solve coordination problems. (A, K)
6.
Others?
B.
Are these
problems of ability, knowledge, or incentives?
C.
One natural
way to try to improve upon free markets is through regulation. Retain private
ownership, but use "stick and carrot" to correct the problems of
markets.
D.
Examples of
regulation:
1.
Subsidies
2.
Taxes
3.
Price controls
4.
Quality
controls
5.
Licenses
6.
Prohibition
II.
Ideal
Regulatory Solutions to the Problems of Markets
A.
Recall that ideal regulation assumes away any
problem of incentives. Politicians and
bureaucrats are simply assumed to have the sole desire to increase efficiency.
B.
Could ideal
regulation correct any of the problems of markets? Maybe.
C.
Ability
Problem #1: Many kinds of regulations
necessarily increase inefficiency.
1.
Price controls
in a competitive market. (Reduces gains
to trade; also, lobbying turns transfers into costs).
2.
Mandated
benefits/quality/safety
(If consumers were willing to pay the extra costs, the market
would already provide it).
D.
Ability
Problem #2: Even ideal regulation always
costs something (often a lot): direct cost of maintaining agencies, paying
regulators; indirect costs of reduced productive efficiency and higher fixed
costs.
1.
Question: What is the impact of higher fixed costs on
the number of firms in an industry?
E.
Ignoring these
costs, there are ideal regulatory solutions to the 5 problems of free
markets listed above.
1.
Subsidize
firms to permit MC pricing.
2.
Offer to subsidize
inefficient firms. This can
actually be a free lunch: as long as the MC of the second-best firm minus its
subsidy is still more than the MC of the first-best firm, prices fall but no
subsidy actually has to be paid!
3.
Optimally
subsidize activities with positive externalities and optimally tax activities
with negative externalities.
4.
Get rid of
intellectual property; replace with government prizes for innovation equal to
the full social value of innovation.
5.
Have government issue order (with penalties for non-compliance)
to switch to efficient technology.
6.
Have government issue licenses to eliminate excess variety, and
pay subsidies to correct for insufficient variety.
F.
Some problems
with these ideal regulations:
1.
Subsidies,
prizes, etc. have to be raised by taxation, which also creates allocative
inefficiency. (A)
2.
Hard to know
what MC of firms is. (K)
3.
Very hard to
know what the optimal subsidy or tax is.
4.
Very hard to
know the "full social value" of an innovation. (K)
5.
Hard to
identify efficient technology. (K)
G.
General
conclusion: Often even ideal
regulation can't improve upon laissez-faire.
III.
Real
Regulation and Politicians' Incentives
A.
Real
regulation faces all of the problems of ideal regulation, plus the incentive problem.
B.
What do
politicians and bureaucrats have the incentive to do? In particular, why would politicians and
bureaucrats use their powers to solve the problems of markets, when they could
instead use their problems to gain political support and wealth for themselves?
C.
But: if
politicians are democratically elected, won't it be in the self-interest of politicians to only do things that benefit most
people?
D.
[Attachment on
IV.
Why
Politicians Have Bad Incentives, I: Public Choice Theory
A.
Public Choice Theory
claims that democracies mainly give politicians incentives to benefit special
interests, not the majority of voters.
B.
The case of
the sugar subsidy: it pays the sugar interests to be informed, but not the
general public.
1.
If you are the
special interest, what is the marginal benefit of extra lobbying for e.g. a
sugar subsidy? Possibly huge; your
effort may make a big difference to you.
2.
If you are a
random citizen, what is the marginal benefit of extra lobbying against the
sugar subsidy? Effectively zero: your
effort won't make a difference.
C.
"Rational
ignorance": in any election with a reasonably large number of voters, the
probability that you will cast the decisive vote is so low that it isn't worth
gathering information.
D.
The general
pattern: Concentrated benefits, dispersed costs yield strong incentives for
politicians to do the wrong thing.
E.
Ex: Regulatory capture. Regulatory bureaus often work in the
interests of regulated industries, with a "revolving door" between
public and private employment.
F.
Moreover, once
regulators have "prizes" to give out, people lobby to get the
prizes. As seen in Part I of the class,
the end result of competitive lobbying can be to waste resources equal to the
prize being awarded.
1.
Ex: Litigation.
V.
Why
Politicians Have Bad Incentives, II: Rational Irrationality
A.
People often
don't like thinking rationally about problems.
They often find it more comfortable to believe whatever they feel like
believing.
B.
The demand for
irrationality slopes down: the cheaper it is to be irrational, the more people "buy."
C.
The marginal
cost of voting irrationally is zero, so people buy a lot of irrationality in
politics. The same thing happens either
way, so why not feel good about it?
D.
Ex:
Protectionism.
E.
This makes
politicians' incentives even worse, since they can do well by satisfying the
demand for willful irrationality.
VI.
Interest
Groups or Voter Irrationality?
A.
Politicians'
incentives are shaped by both lobbying of special interests that take advantage
of rational ignorance, AND rational irrationality. ("Bootleggers and Baptists")
B.
Real
regulation bears little resemblance to ideal regulation, because real
regulators have totally different aims than ideal regulators. They often have incentives to make the market
less, not more efficient.
C.
"The
tyranny of the status quo." Once a
regulation is established, classes of beneficiaries arise that resist reform
and constantly push for expansion: lawyers for both sides,
regulators, liasons, expediters, etc.
D.
Rational
ignorance or rational irrationality?
1.
Price
controls.
2.
Monopoly
privileges for inefficient producers and political allies.
3.
Banning or
restricting risk-adjusted insurance premiums.
4.
Prohibiting
drugs until proven "safe and effective."
5.
Banning low
qualities.