Prof.
Bryan Caplan
bcaplan@gmu.edu
http://www.bcaplan.com
Econ
410
Week 4:
Rational Ignorance and the "Miracle of Aggregation"
I.
The Economics of Imperfect Information, I: Probability
A.
Everyone is familiar with probability to some degree, from rolling
dice, playing cards, and so on.
B.
Basic postulate of probability theory: events range from impossible
(probability=0) to certain (probability=1).
C.
Probability language allows us to quantify uncertainty.
D.
Even though people rarely put a precise number on each event, they
almost always have some probabilities in the back of their minds.
E.
When people are asked difficult questions, they often say "I don't
know." But what if they HAD to
guess? Note: in real life, you have
to guess all of the time.
F.
Common sophism: "No one can 'know' X."
1.
If this means "No one can know X with certainty," then
it's obvious but uninteresting.
2.
If this means "No one has any idea at all about X," then it
is clearly false.
II.
The Economics of Imperfect Information, II: Search Theory
A.
Must economists assume "perfect information"? Not at all: there is an extremely
general theory of economic action under uncertainty, known as "search
theory."
B.
Basic assumptions of search theory:
1.
More time and effort spent "searching" increase your
probability of successful discovery.
2.
Searching ability differs between people.
3.
People can make a reasonable guess about the probabilities of different
events and their ability to influence those probabilities.
C.
Main conclusion: People search so that the marginal cost of searching
equals the expected marginal gain of searching.
D.
The (endless) applications:
1.
Prospecting for gold.
2.
Searching for a job.
3.
Dating.
III.
Political Knowledge and Rational Ignorance
A.
Instead of assuming that voters are perfectly informed, search theory
suggests that we look at the marginal cost and expected marginal gain of
acquiring political knowledge.
B.
Easy part: The marginal cost is whatever time you would have to spend
reading the newspaper, watching the news, going to politicians' websites,
etc. A simple approximation for
this marginal cost is simply your after-tax hourly wage.
C.
Harder part: What are the marginal benefits of political knowledge?
D.
Naive answer: The marginal benefits are better government performance
stemming from a more informed electorate.
E.
But the naive answer is wrong.
Why? The logic of collective
action. Just because I personally
become more informed, will government performance appreciably rise? No.
F.
Your decision become a more informed voter is as unlikely to actually
improve government performance as your solitary vote is to change the electoral
outcome. For all practical
purposes, the MB of political information is 0!
G.
With positive MC and 0 MB, what is the privately optimal quantity of
political information to acquire?
None.
H.
This conclusion is so amazing economists gave it a name: rational
ignorance. When knowledge gives
you no practical benefit, and time is money, ignorance (the decision not to
acquire knowledge) is rational.
1.
Thus, while voters' lack of political knowledge tends to baffle
political scientists, to economists it is amazing that anyone knows anything
about politics at all.
I.
So why do voters know anything at all?
1.
Other benefits - not looking stupid in front of your boss
2.
Negative cost - curiosity ("politics is fun"); ubiquity of
information
IV.
Empirical Evidence on Political Knowledge
A.
Are voters really "rationally ignorant" with regard to
politics? A mountain of empirical
evidence says "yes."
B.
From Dye and Zeigler: Quiz
of adult Americans finds that...
Item |
%
|
Know
President's term is 4 years |
94 |
Can
name governor of home state |
89 |
Can
name vice president |
78 |
Know
which party has U.S. House majority |
69 |
Know
there are two U.S. senators per state |
52 |
Can
name their Congress member |
46 |
Aware
Bill of Rights is first ten amendments to U.S. Constitution |
41 |
Can
name both of their U.S. senators |
39 |
Can
name current U.S. secretary of state |
34 |
Know
term of U.S. House members is 2 years |
30 |
Can
name one of their state senators |
28 |
C.
Moving to specific policies, voters look far worse; once you reach
foreign policy, the level of ignorance is shocking.
D.
Voters are however fairly able to correctly answer questions about
affairs, scandals, personalities, and so on.
E.
If voters' goal was to pick sensible policies, this would be a crazy
way to allocate mental energy. But
if the main reason voters pay attention to politics is personal entertainment,
this pattern is easy to understand.
F.
When you give random adult Americans a complete political exam and look
at the distribution of scores, it has the familiar bell-shaped curve; it isn't
a right triangle. But the mean
score is shockingly low compared to the idealized "civics textbook"
picture of the electorate.
G.
We will be exploring the practical significance of voter ignorance
throughout the course. But for now,
it is worth pointing out two things:
1.
People are rational ignorant about many things besides politics. I am rationally ignorant about car
mechanics, the activities of the firms I invest in, and so on. My performance on exams about these
subjects would also be "shockingly low."
2.
But there is a big difference here: For my car or my portfolio, I can
just look at the bottom line. Does
my car work? What has my rate of
return been? The key question to
explore as we go on: Do voters have a similar bottom line to check? Or are voters more analogous to quack
brain surgeons?
V.
Informed Voting as a Public Good
A.
The preceding argument only shows that it is privately optimal
to know little about politics: If you weigh your costs and your
benefits, it doesn't help you.
B.
Going back to public goods theory, it seems that acquiring political
information must be a public good.
Everyone benefits when the electorate is more informed, since sensible
policies are more likely to prevail.
But these benefits go to the informed and uninformed alike, leaving no
private incentive to gather information.
C.
As with other public good problems, then, we can draw the S of
political knowledge curve, the D curve showing private willingness to pay for
political knowledge, and the SB curve showing the total social benefits of
political knowledge. The
equilibrium quantity lies well below the efficient quantity.
D.
What could be done to raise the level of voter information? The usual approach is to bombard public
service messages at the populace, but people are pretty good at tuning out
unwanted information.
E.
Another would be to restrict the franchise based on an exam of
political knowledge. Why? Because the public good is not exactly
average political knowledge; it is average political knowledge of people who
vote. You can supply it by
improving the existing electorate OR redefining the electorate to include only
the informed.
F.
In today's world this is almost unheard of. But why is this idea so unpopular?
VI.
Education and Voter Ignorance
A.
The strongest predictor of political knowledge is education - not
income.
B.
As usual, the claim that "everyone is knowledgeable about
something and has something to contribute" is false. In fact, political knowledge of all
sorts is highly correlated: People who know a lot about foreign policy usually
know a lot about domestic policy, the Constitution, etc.
C.
Interesting factoid: Even though education levels greatly increased
over the last 50 years, political knowledge scores remained quite constant.
1.
This suggests that education might merely be a proxy for IQ.
2.
Alternately, TV and other forms of entertainment might have
counterbalanced rising education levels.
D.
One alternative to voter competency testing, then would simply be to
restrict the vote to college graduates.
This would drastically raise voters' average information levels.
E.
Probably the second-best predictor of political knowledge, controlling
for other variables, is gender.
Males out-perform females on tests of political knowledge, even when
their education, income, age, and other characteristics are the same.
VII.
Voter Ignorance, Principal-Agent Problems, and Optimal Punishment
A.
Economists have thought a great deal about "principal-agent
problems." An agent is a
person a principal hires to act in his (the principal's) interest.
B.
When information is imperfect, the principal needs to figure out some
way to "align" the agent's incentives with his own.
1.
Ex: Shareholders, managers, and stock options.
2.
Ex: Why an athlete might want to give his agent a high percentage of
his earnings.
C.
If information is available but costly, a natural way to align
incentives is random monitoring combined with harsh punishment.
1.
Ex: You only check in on your secretary once per day, but you fire her
if you catch her playing Tetris.
This risk might entirely keep her from playing video games at work
because she doesn't know when you'll show up.
D.
We can easily extend principal-agent thinking to politics. The voters are principals - they want
politicians to do a good job, keep their promises, etc. Politicians are the agents with their
own agenda.
E.
How does rational ignorance affect the principal-agent problem? One answer is that politicians
shamelessly and repeatedly violate voter trust because voters don't pay
attention to what politicians do anyway.
F.
This story may be largely true, but it does not necessarily
follow. Even if voters are poorly
informed, they could still induce good behavior with harsh punishment. If the media catches a politician taking
a $1 bribe, voters could decide to never vote for him again, or even give him
jail time.
1.
Ex: Abuse of the franking privilege.
G.
While this sounds unrealistic, for offenses voters care about, it
happens. Voters really hate racist
politicians, so they ruin the career of any politician who lets the wrong word
slip out. The media is always
listening, so politicians carefully watch what they say.
H.
What is interesting is that politicians seem far more likely to ruin
their careers with a slip of the tongue, an affair, youthful drug use, petty
bribery, or other indiscretions than by aggressively pursuing foolish policies
- or even breaking campaign promises.
1.
Ex: Al Gore's calling card
I.
Main point: Rationally ignorant voters remain able to control
politicians in spite of their ignorance.
If they wanted highly honest politicians, they would harshly punish
dishonesty whenever they happened to notice it.
VIII. The Principle of Aggregation
A.
When you roll a single die, you are highly uncertain about how the roll
will turn out. It is equally likely
to be anything between 1 and 6.
B.
But when you roll ten dice and add the sum, your level of uncertainty
is far lower. It is very likely to
lie between 30 and 40, and virtually certain not to be 10 or 60.
C.
Why? Because when you roll
more dice, you are likely to get some high rolls and some low rolls, which tend
to "cancel each other out."
You may get 3 6's, but also 3 1's.
D.
Exams work on the same principle.
If an exam consisted in a single question (or 1 question where each part
builds on the last!), an excellent student could easily still mess it up and
get an F. But if an exam has 100
questions, good and bad luck tends to cancel out, leaving a reliable measure of
student knowledge.
1.
Imagine basing SAT scores solely on, say, the first question. A little bad luck would keep a good
student out of college; a little good luck would admit a bad student into
college.
E.
Even in the hard sciences, experimenters will frequently measure the
same object several times, and record the average height, weight, or
whatever. The idea is to reduce the
importance of random measurement errors.
F.
This observation - that random errors tend to cancel out as sample size
increases - is known as "the principle of aggregation." (Or in mathematics and statistics as
"the law of large numbers.")
When you add up a bunch of random errors, they tend to cancel out,
leaving you would a surprisingly good overall measure.
G.
Some aggregation examples
1.
Reaction time experiments
2.
Altruism experiments
3.
Public opinion on NATO
IX.
Voter Ignorance and the "Miracle of Aggregation"
A.
A number of economists and political scientists have admitted the
ignorance of individual voters, but still defend the quality of the
electorate's decisions.
B.
Why? The principle of
aggregation.
1.
Individual voters are poorly informed, and thus their votes are highly
random.
2.
But elections are based on aggregate opinions of millions of
voters.
3.
Thus, even if there is a large component of randomness in individual
voting, the principle of aggregation ensures, for all practical purposes, that
outcomes still make sense.
C.
Another way to understand this point: Suppose than 90% of all voters
are uninformed and vote randomly.
The remaining 10% are perfectly informed.
D.
In a two-party race, then, the principle of aggregation gives each
politician approximately 45% of the vote no matter what they do.
E.
But they need 50% to win.
Nothing they do matters to the uninformed. So who must the politicians cater
to? The informed voters! In this example, whichever candidate
wins the support of a majority of informed voters also wins the election.
F.
This result has been named "the miracle of aggregation." It seems miraculous because it
implies that a highly uninformed electorate may - at the aggregate level - act
"as if" it were perfectly informed. Lead into gold indeed.
G.
If true, this is an amazing result. But as we shall see, it hinges
critically on the assumption that errors are random, as opposed to systematic.
X.
Uncertainty and Platform Convergence
A.
Suppose that politicians are uncertain about the exact location
of the median voter. What then?
B.
If politicians care solely about winning, they move to wherever they
think the median voter is most likely to be located.
C.
However, if politicians care about both winning and policy, uncertainty
gives them some slack. With full
certainty, you either compromise your principles or lose. With some uncertainty, in contrast, you
can make a trade-off between your probability of winning and your ideological
purity.
D.
If the two parties have opposing ideologies, then uncertainty provokes
each to move somewhat away from the position they believe the median voter is
most likely to hold.
E.
This allows for a moderate degree of platform divergence, as
each party lowers its chance of winning in order to be true to their cause.