Subject: On Free Will

From: [email-masked] (ASP-Disc)
Date: Sat, 21 Jan 1995 11:06:26 -0500

From: alan eaton <[email-masked]>

If you had not guessed, this is in response to the short essay by Bryan 
Caplan. I will group my passages in the same manner he did and will use 
the same headings...

1. Free Will, what

        "A being has free will if given all other causal factors in the 
        universe ... it nevertheless possesses the ability to choose more 
        than one thing."

A nice, short, to the point definition. I like it but as you will find 
out later i do not hold much hope for its realisation.

2. The Objection from the Law of Causality

Bryan puts forward two formulations of the law of causality:

        "Every effect must have a cause; the same cause always produces 
        the same effects"

        "Every _change_ must have a cause."

To the first formulation Bryan says:

        "...it [free will] seems to violate the law of causality... The 
        reply here is fairly simple: it simply denies that a free choice 
        is an _effect_ of anything else."

I think that this is not as simple a statement as Bryan indicates that he 
thinks. On the surface it is, indeed, simple but it has difficult 
implications. In examining free will it must be remembered that any 
discoveries or claims should be able to be rationalised against the vast 
body of scientific knowledge that already exists. Either the claim or 
discovery is correct and science as we know it is wrong or it fits in to 
the existing scientific framework somehow. It seems to me that, whilst i 
am completly willing to discard any scientific principle on the basis of 
contrary evidence, the first option here has a fairly high initial 
_im_plausibility (more on that latter).

It also seems to be the case that it is just as simple to deny the 
existence of free will. Bryan says more about this form of scepticism 
later and so shall i (section 6.).

If free will, then, is not an effect of anything else and we wish to keep 
the  scientific principles we like to think of as established then it 
seems that we need to step into the realm of quantum mechanics. It is 
only here that we will find events that are not effects of anything else 
(ie quantum fluctuations - but don't quote me on this). Maybe i am wrong 
but i get the impression that this is not a move that Bryan would welcome 
even though it is a logical consequence of his previous statements (i 
suspect that my impression here has taken significant liberties with what 
is between the lines that Bryan wrote :). 

To the second formulation Bryan says:

        "Now this does indeed conflict with my notion of free will... I 
        simply deny that this is so."

It seems to me that this second formulation also conflicts with the 
outcomes of quantum mechanics as well (i am fairly certain of this but 
maybe someone who knows a little more can confirm it). The nature of quantum 
fluctuations seems to fly in the face of this formulation of causality as 
well. So there should be no argument against the denial of this 
formulation from the scientists among us (certainly none from me).

3. The Quantum Confusion

        "... But i say that free will and randomness have nothing 
        whatever to do with each other; indeed, a probabalistic theory of 
        choice is just as contrary to the freedom of the will as a fully 
        deterministic one."

I could not agree more with Bryan's ideas in this section. 

But if free will is going to be rationalised, somehow, with the sciences 
(and it seems that this should be the case) then it does seem that probability
is going to play _some_ part if there is going to be insistence that it is not 
an effect of anything else (see section 2.)

4., 5. nothing to say of relevance here :)

6. Four Arguments for the Existence of Free Will.

A. The Argument from Observation

        "... the simple fact of observation. I observe that i choose freely
        ... there is no reason to assume that these observations are illusory,
        any more than there is reason to assume that vision or hearing is
        illusory. ... scientists declare that real science ... rests on
        observation ..."

        "I would like to see a single argument for rejecting introspective 
        evidence in favour of the other senses because any argument against 
        the validity of introspection might be applied, ipso facto, to sight, 
        hearing, touch, taste, and smell."

I do not have an argument for rejecting introspective evidence outrightly 
but i think that we are at least justified in being wary of such 
evidence. While there is no reason to assume that introspective 
observations are illusory it is also the case that there is no reason to 
assume that they are real. As for comparing them to the other senses i 
believe that we are justified in making a distinction. Of all the senses 
introspection is the only one that is turned on itself and, as any real 
scientist can tell you, the results of any observation tool that is turned 
on itself should not be trusted. If the mechanism is faulty or 
consistently returns false observations how are we to know???

        "But our observation of our mental freedom is not an occasional
        fluke, but an emperical fact as repeatedly and continuously confirmed
        as the existence of the external world itself."

And what if our observation of our mental freedom consistently returns 
false information? we would not know and would be unable to discover 
through purely introspective means that such observations were in error. 
It is entirely conceivable that our will is not at all free but 
merely appears so because of evolutionary requirements for our well being.

B. The Reductio Ad Adsurdum to Skepticism

        "... Determinism, then, leads to skepticism, the denial of the 
        possibility of justified true belief. ... but i hold that skepticism 
        is necessarily false. For suppose we affirm skepticism ... if we 
        know that skepticism is true ... then at least one item of objective 
        knowledge exists, which contradicts the premise. But if we don't know 
        that skepticism is true either, why should we accept it? ... 
        Determinism implies skepticism; Skepticism is necessarily false; 
        Hence determinism is false."

If Determinism is true and so none of our true beliefs are justified 
because they are all determined then we cannot know anything. If we 
cannot know anything then we cannot "know that skepticism is true" and to 
assert that we might, as part of a denial of determinism, is to beg the 
question. 

Determinism might imply skepticism (and it certainly does) but it does not 
imply that we _know_ that skepticism is true. For us to believe that 
skepticism is true or for us to believe that we know that skepticism is 
true is of no import.

There is no logical problem with skepticism being true. If it is true 
then we cannot know anything, including that skepticism is true. If it is 
not then it is not. Both options are valid.

C. Moore's Proof of the External World Extended

        "In order for any argument to work, it is necesary that the 
        initial plausibility of its premises have greater initial plausibility 
        than those of the denial of its conclusion. ... Nothing has greater
        initial plausibility than the premise "I have free will" ... So 
        how is it even coherent to argue against free will?"

I have no problem whatsoever with believing that i have no free will - as 
defined in section 1. This being the case it is also the case that the 
premise "I have free will" has _less or equal_ initial plausibility than any 
other premise. This means that it is possible that there is an argument 
against it that is coherent.

An what of plausibility anyway. How do you measure it. Is it measured 
subjectively or objectively. And is it possible or relevant in a universe 
in which skepticism is true???

Another question is whether the initial plausibility of any premise is 
fixed. The answer to this is, i think, a very definite no. Consider the 
premise that the speed of light is a constant. To our normal, everyday, 
Newtonian sensibilities this is an absurd premise. Surely if you throw 
something at a velocity of V of the front of a train travelling at the 
speed of light the velocity of the object to an observer at rest will be 
V+C. Do we all know the answer to that? (if you don't the objects 
velocity will be C!).

Today such a premise has high plausibility. Could not the premise "Bryan 
has free will" be the same kind of statement (this time in reverse). In 
the first example the only thing that changed over time was the range of 
observations people had made (someone ran an experiment that determined 
that the speed of light was constant). I feel that the same will happen 
regarding free will.

I also suspect that it only makes sense to attach plausibility to a 
premise in a universe where determinism is the go. Whether one premise 
has a higher plausibility than another would be solely a product of the 
causal interactions you have partaken of in your past. Thus an argument 
via plausability is vacuous if you place it in the context of determinism.

As for poor old tortured John Searle, why should he change his mind when 
it has been determined that he should be tortured thus???? :) 

D. A Thought Experiment Showing the Freedom of the Will

Bryan asks us to consider some super-neurophysiologists that have an 
equation for predicting all of your behaviour. In the experiment the 
equation predicts that the next thing you will do is to raise your arm. 
Bryan then asks:

        "Do you seriously believe that you couldn't falsify this 
        prediction by failing to raise your arm?" 

I imagine that if the equation does what it is supposed to then i would 
not be able to falsify the prediction. I might get an irresistable urge 
to scratch my armpit or something. Even if i did seriously believe that i 
could falsify the prediction the thought experiment in no way shows that 
i would, indeed, be able to falsify the prediction.

        "Surely if human behaviour were unfree, then science could in 
        theory at least predict when i am going to raise my hand."

And Chaos theory states that systems can exhibit unpredictable behaviour 
and yet be deterministic (even based on a simple set of rules). Even if 
human behaviour does turn out to be unfree is no gaurantee that science 
will ever be able to predict it.

7. Some Objections to and Misconceptions about the Freedom of the Will

nothing to object to here.

8. Conclusion

        "The most telling proof for the existence of free will is that we all
        observe it during our every waking moment."

Do we now. I have already said that i do not believe that my will is free 
in the way defined in section 1. I observe that i make choices but i do 
not observe that they _are_ free. The best i can do is observe that to me 
they _seem_ to be free. Does this mean that i am arbitrarily excluding 
"introspection as a valid source of imperical knowledge" ? Certainly not. 
I exclude it as such a source but only for good reasons (section 6A).

        "The denial of our freedom leads to the denial of virtue and vice,
        individual responsibility, and the value of political freedom. And
        ultimately, this denial of our free will leads to the 
        dehumanization of us all."

Is this at all relevant. Just because the denial of free will might have 
some unsavoury implications does not mean that it is the right thing to 
do. Actually, if it turns out that it is true that we have no free will 
then there is nothing we can do about it apart from pretend that we do. 
And so what. If we construct false visions of the universe then it is 
only because our causal history impells us to.

---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Alan Eaton                       | May your life be filled with frustration
[email-masked] |