Subject: On behalf of freedom & against Alan

From: [email-masked] (ASP-Disc)
Date: Sun, 22 Jan 1995 15:14:12 -0500

From: "Mike 'P or not-P' Huemer" <[email-masked]>

Bryan has gotten so many and so lengthy replies to his "free will" message
that I am sorry for having added to his burden; therefore, I will now
turn to defending him (as a good friend must).

First, Alan, you apparently disbelieve in free will, but you don't seem
to give any reason why.  You start by saying that it would be very
implausible that "science as we know it" is wrong (this is in discussion
of the law of causality).  I agree with that, and I'm sure (if I may
presume so to speak for him) so does Bryan.  But how does free will 
conflict with science as we know it?  Because it conflicts with the law
of causality?  Yet, even supposing that to be so, you yourself later
noticed that the law of causality is NOT upheld in current science
(sc. quantum mechanics).  So the supposed conflict with science still
eludes me.
     By the way, my general advice is nobody should attempt to draw any
philosophical lessons from quantum mechanics.  The interpretation of it
is highly controversial and unsettled.  There are some interpretations
which are deterministic, and some which are indeterministic.

Second, on the 'initial plausibility' argument:  If I may again speak for
Bryan, I think "initial plausibility" means the extent to which something
at first (i.e., prior to considering arguments) appears to you to be true.
Thus, reconsider the argument:  Suppose that something at first just seems
true to you, prephilosophically.  How could you, ever, rationally, come to
overturn that initial credence?  Well, someone might give you a reason to
overturn it.  (Though as I say, you have so far given no reason to reject
the commonsense belief in freewill.)  But if someone gives you a reason,
do you automatically have to give up the belief?  No -- not unless it's a
strong reason.  That is, specifically:  not unless that reason he gives
seems to you to be true, even more clearly than the first belief.  Then
you overturn the initial belief.  But if someone gives you a reason which
initially appears false to you, then why should you pay any attention to
it?  (He might give you a further reason, but then we just repeat the
process.)
     Okay, now here's an interesting question:  Is there a maximum possible
level of initial plausibility?  Bryan thinks there is (certainty).  Suppose
then that something had that level of initial plausibility.  Then how
could it ever be overturned?  What argument would do it?  Clearly nothing
could do it.  So in particular, no philosophical theory could do it.  That,
I take it, is the substance of G.E. Moore's answer to skepticism.
     Also, this sort of argument doesn't just apply to propositions with
absolute certainty -- you can apply it to propositions which have greater
initial plausibility than any philosophical theory has.  The conclusion is
that it is *irrational* to accept skepticism (in regard to such proposi-
tions).  This is a simple but highly important point.
     "Well," you might now be wondering, "but what reason was there ever
to accept the 'initially plausible' proposition *to begin with*?"  Well, it
seemed to you to be true.  What other reason could you want -- or could you
possibly ever have, anyway?

"Ah, but," you say, "it does NOT seem to me that I have free will.  It
seems to me that I don't."  Remember that we're talking about *initial*
plausbility here (how does it seem prior to considering arguments?)  If
you still think that it doesn't seem to you that you are free, I think
that either you have poor introspection, or you don't understand the
meanings of "free will" and "determinism".  Consider... You make choices
frequently in your life, don't you?  Often you make them consciously, I'll
bet.  Now, when you do this, do you sometimes first deliberate?  I think
you do.  But if you don't believe you have free will, then what are you
deliberating about?  If there's only one possibility open to you, then
why do you deliberate?  Clearly, you think you have multiple alternatives.
     Again, do you sometimes regret actions?  Do you ever resent others'
actions as wrong?  Or applaud them as wise and good?  Do you ever
prospectively recommend anything to anyone?  I suspect that you do.  But
again, this implies that you must think that more than one alternative
is possible (you would not recommend to someone what he either could not
do, or could not help, &c.)
     What this shows is that you are wrong to say you don't believe in
free will.  In fact, you believe it implicitly, and very firmly.  Now
what reason is there for questioning or attempting to change this belief?

Finally, you suggest that if our introspection were systematically 
deceptive, we would have no way of knowing it.  Probably true, but also,
if our reason were systematically deceptive, we would have no way of
knowing; and if our senses deceived us systematically, we could never
find out; and if any of our natural faculties is like that, then, as
Reid says, "If I am deceived, I am deceived by him that made me, and
there is no remedy."  There is no special charge against introspection.
     You say that introspection is turned upon itself, but so what?
How do you verify your senses' accuracy?  Only, possibly, by using them
(you can take eye tests, and then ask the doctor the results; but you
have to rely on what your ears tell you he is saying).