Subject: Re: On Free Will 2/2

From: [email-masked] (ASP-Disc)
Date: Sat, 21 Jan 1995 11:05:54 -0500

From: Mike <[email-masked]>

I have to answer Bryan's essay on free will, though he probably
already knows what I am going to say (from previous experience). 
But other list members don't.
 
The free will problem divides into 2 sub-issues:
(1) Is there free will?  Bryan and I agree the answer here is yes.
(2) What is it?  And is it compatible with determinism?
To this latter I admit I don't know the answer, but I think Bryan's
answer has some problems, to which I now turn.  (comments numbered
according to Bryan's sections)
 
1. In your definition, you use the phrase "given all other causal
factors ...":  Did you use the word "other" intentionally (to
contrast with, say, the person himself as a causal factor), or did
you just mean "given all prior causal factors..."?
(Not a problem really; just a need for clarification.)
 
2. You respond to the objection from the law of causality, by
denying that law (in the form it is usually understood), but you
don't argue that free will is actually incompatible with the law of
causality ("Every change has a cause").
"Surely that's obvious, from how I defined it," you say.
Not so.  As you defined it, a person has free will if he has the
ability, given the causal factors present, to do each of two
(incompatible) actions.  It's not obvious this means there is no
cause of his subsequent action, for two reasons:
(a) because it might happen sometimes that C causes act A, but the
person could have avoided doing A, because he could have prevented
C from causing A; and so A would have a cause, and yet the person
would still have free will even by your definition.  (I think you
want to allow this case.)
(b) because maybe a person retains an ability even in circumstances
in which he is caused not to exercise it.  Let me explain with an
analogy:  I can say of my bike, "It is capable of going 60 miles an
hour."  This is true of it right now, even though right now it is
parked and no one is on it, and it can't start up and drive out by
itself.  That is:  it has a certain latent capacity, even though it
requires some cause to activate it, and it has it even during the
times when it is not being activated.
     And so it might be (for all your definition of free will says)
with us:  We retain the ability of doing either of two incompatible
actions, even when we are caused to do one of them and not the
other.  This is because we still have the latent capacity that
would be relevant.
 
3. You claim that random or probabilistic origins of our actions
are incompatible with freedom.  Yet on your definition, they
shouldn't be.  For, again, your definition only speaks of the
ability to do each of two or more actions.  A radioactive atom that
has a 50% probability of decaying in a given time period is able to
decay or not decay, given all the antecedent causal factors in the
universe.  So according to your definition, the radioactive atom
has free will, right?
Of course I agree this conclusion is silly.  That just means your
definition has a problem.
 
5. Here you misquote me, I think.  I think you were referring to my
observation that "Judgement is something one does, whereas having
a feeling is something that happens to one" (which, in case anybody
is wondering, I said by way of distinguishing moral judgement from
moral sentiment).
 
6. I pretty much agree with these arguments for free will, except
for D.
D. The argument is basically:  if the physicists predicted you
would raise your arm, you could always refute them by not raising
it (just to be contrary).
You think it shows that there couldn't be an equation (or set of
laws) that necessarily and accurately predicts all human behavior.
Actually, it only shows that either
(a) if there were such laws, you couldn't know all the initial
conditions.  This conclusion is already believed by physicists
anyway (because of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle).  Or
(b) the equation could not correct for the effects of your finding
out about it, and for your finding out about its correction, and so
on.  And it's easy to see why this might be true, even if
determinism is true.  For the equation might predict this:  "If you
tell Bryan that he is determined to raise his hand, then he will
(necessarily) refuse to raise his hand.  If you tell Bryan that he
is determined not to raise his hand, then he will (by necessity)
insist on raising it."
Thus, the law implies that your (Bryan's) actions are determined by
external causes, so you definitely lack free will; yet it cannot
categorically predict your actions, because it first needs to know
which causes are going to be operating on you.
     You might imagine that you yourself know all the laws of
nature, and you measure your own initial conditions, and you lock
yourself in a room to isolate yourself from external influences. 
Then you should be able to predict your own behavior if determinism
is true, right?  Well, maybe not.  Maybe you can't measure your own
initial conditions with complete accuracy, for the quantum
mechanical reason that the measuring device has to interact with
the object, and will thereby change its state.  "So you correct for
the measuring device's impact."  But then you first need to
determine ITS initial conditions.  Etc.
     (This is not an argument that nothing can ever be measured. 
In most cases, the disturbance the measuring device makes is
negligible; but in the present case, it would not be.)
 
7. I'm not convinced you've answered the charge that your version
of free will makes human action mere inexplicable happenings.  You
say that a person's action can be explained by his motives and
reasons.  But you add that this is only because he chose to go
along with those motives.  All right, then:  what explained his
choice to go along with those motives?  There can't be an infinite
regress, so we must come to some original choice(s) which really
is, according to you, an inexplicable event.