Subject: free will and compatibilism

From: [email-masked] (ASP-Disc)
Date: Sun, 5 Feb 1995 20:24:49 -0500

From: "Brock 'Not (P and not-P)' Sides" <[email-masked]>

Brian Caplan stated recently (in a reply to Paul Torek) that his use of the 
term "free will" precludes the possibility of causal determinism. That is to
say, he has *stipulated* that if the Principle of Universal Causation 
("Every event has a cause") is true, then no one ever acts freely. Caplan
has further claimed that this use of the term "free will" is used in 
ordinary, non-philosophical contexts, and that the compatibilist's use of 
the term "free will" is inconsistent with ordinary use of the term. 

Brian, of course, is free to use the term "free will" however he pleases, 
as long as he makes it clear how he is using the term. And perhaps he is 
right that the compatibilists use of the term is inconsistent with the
ordinary use of the term. (Why else would so many people find incompatibilism
an initially compelling position? How else could the issue even have arisen?)
[I personally never found incompatibilism particularly compelling, but perhaps
I'm just aberrant.]

But if Brian is right about this, then incompatibilism is a mere "analytic" 
truth -- boring and unworthy of any serious philosophical consideration. The 
only interesting question about free will then is "Do we have it?", i.e. is 
there some sort of way in which certain events, "free choices", can be brought
about by a person, without being either causally necessitated or merely random.

But then the compatibilist may formulate his position in light of Brian's 
stipulative use of the term "free will" as follows: It is possible for a 
person to be morally responsible for an action, even though she was causally
determined to perform it.  Thi is the position that the compatibilist is 
commited to.

We might put the matter as follows. There are two sorts of pre-philosophical
beliefs that govern our use of the term "free will": one is the belief that if
one's actions are causally determined, then one's actions are not free; the 
other is the belief that if an action is not freely performed, one is not
morally responsible for that action. Now, one may take either of these as 
"analytically" true, i.e. as governing legitimate use of the term "free will":
but one may not take both as "analytically" true without begging important
philosophical questions. 

Brian focuses on the first of these pre-philosophical
beliefs, and rules compatibilism out by fiat. As Brian uses the term "free 
will" then, I don't think there is such a thing: the very idea I find 
metaphysically incoherent.

Anyone who calls herself a compatibilist about free will is focusing on this 
second use of the term. The compatibilist holds that causal determination is 
compatible with moral responsibility, and since free will is a necessary 
condition for having moral responsibility, it follows that free will is 
compatible with moral responsibility. 

Is the compatibilist's use of the term "free will" more in line with 
the pre-philosophical use of the term than is Brian's? I don't see any
substantial philosophical point that rests on the answer to this question.
I do think, however, that Brian's stipulative use of the term is out of line
with standard usage in the philsophical community, for most philosophers 
consider incompatilbilism to be a substantial thesis, and not a mere analytic
truth. Would Peter van Inwagen have bothered writing an entire book to 
argue for a trivial analytic truth? Would David Lewis have bothered to 
respond to van Inwagen's argument if the conclusion were analytic? I have
too much respect for both men to think that they would expend so much effort
fighting over a uninteresting thesis. (Nothing philosophically interesting
rests on this point either, but I do think that it deserves to be pointed out,
lest the compatibilist be accused of blatant inconsistency, as Brian has 
implied.)

Brock Sides
University of Rochester