Let me begin with a few thought-provoking facts, taken from the appendix to _Untangling the Income Tax_ by David Bradford. Combined (Federal, State, and Local) Revenues as a % of GNP Tax 1981 1902 Property 2.5 3.3 Sales 4.6 2.4 Corporate Income 2.5 0.0 Individual Income 11.2 0.0 Social insurance 7.6 0.0 All other 7.9 2.2 Total 36.4 7.8 So in other words, even taking the growth in population and per-capita wealth during this period, government's overall "take" has increased almost five-fold in less than one century. The picture from looking at the spending side is perhaps even more revealing. (Again, figures show combined (federal, state, and local) spending as a % of GNP). Program Type 1981 1902 Education 5.3 1.2 Welfare 2.5 0.2 National defense 5.9 0.8 Social insurance 6.6 0.0 Interest 3.3 0.4 All other 13.9 5.1 Total 37.6 7.7 It is almost hard to visualize how small government must have been back in 1902. Even though it still greatly exceeds the size of government that libertarians dream of, it must have been reasonably easy for people to go through life without even thinking of government. Neither of the two big payroll deductions existed, so the most common weekly reminder of the state's existence would not have been present. And provision for one's old age was a personal, rather than a governmental responsibility. Some poverty programs already existed, but at .2% of GNP, it is clear that responsibility for care of the poor rested primarily on the poor themselves, and secondarily on private and family charity, with government coming in third. And think of what foreign policy must have been like. Government was spending just .8% of GNP on military matters -- and that was .8% of a much smaller economy. The world, like the American people, must have rarely heard of the actions, if any, of the American state. (The wonders of the American nation, in contrast, were already legendary, judging from the flows of immigrants.) Obviously there are many views of the growth of the state in the 20th century, but several things strike me as I look at these figures. First, there are many government functions which seem like they should _decrease_ as a percentage of GNP as population and wealth expand. National defense is the easiest example: can't the same army defend 250 million Americans as well as 50 millions? If the U.S. population doubled today, what military basis could there be for expanding the size of the military in the slightest? (I suppose that twice the wealth and population makes for a more enticing conquest, but it's hard to see which nations would be prepared to invade the U.S. no matter what booty it contained.) And secondly, it seems that as a nation becomes richer, people's ability to provide for their own old age and misfortunes _increases_, making the rise of Social Security and the like especially hard to explain. Similarly, as wealth increases the _absolute_ position of the poor should improve, so the basis for expansion of welfare programs during a period of across-the-board economic improvement is hard to grasp. (Moreover, the view that urbanization made it necessary for government to take over family-based care seems quite wide of the mark; for in an urbanized economy the economic fates of individual family members are much less inter-connected than in a rural economy. A bad crop could wipe out an entire extended family, whereas an industrial depression, however severe, would rarely strike family members working in different firms and industries simultaneously.) The puzzle just grows larger if we consider that the 19th-century probably brought mankind in the industrialized world more rapid improvement in living standards than all of the centuries since the fall of Rome combined. Why would anyone want to change direction after such an impressive track record? My own view is that two factors were involved. First, people often demand change because their _absolute_ position is bad; the fact that things have improved rapidly rarely assuages their demands for change. If anything, improvement actually expands the emotional insistence on change by raising people's asirations. Second, and I think more importantly, is ideological change. Much of the 19th-century witnessed rising criticism and even hatred of classical liberalism and its insistence on a minimal role for government. As the universities, pulpits, newspapers, and writers gradually groped for some alternative to classical liberalism, it was always in the direction of the expansion of the state that they were reaching. What motivated their drive for the expansion of the state? Partly, it seems that it was based on the silly view that the _absolute_ level of poverty which still existed in the 19th century somehow proved that, contrary to all historical evidence, that classical liberalism was not the fastest route out of poverty. But at a deeper level, it seems that hard as it is for me to understand this attitude, many intellectuals felt a burning hatred for freedom and individualism and independence as such. Why? I can only wonder.