Bryan Caplan 
	Koch Fellows Program 

Hobbes' Foundations for Totalitarianism 

1. Introduction 

Ayn Rand is well-known for her view that philosophers'  
positions in political philosophy are a logical consequence of their  
views on more fundamental philosophic questions.  While this theory  
does not always hold up, no clearer illustration of it could be found  
than in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan.  This paper briefly outlines  
Hobbes' positions on important questions of metaphysics and ethics.   
It then shows how these positions tend to imply and cohere with a  
political philosophy of the total state. 

2. Materialism and Determinism 

Materialism normally denotes the view that nothing exists  
except the physical: atoms, energy, chairs, chlorine gas, water, and  
so on.  It may be contrasted with dualism, with holds that in  
addition to physical things, there are also mental things like  
thoughts, beliefs, and minds.  On this question, Hobbes generally  
sounds like a materialist, albeit an inconsistent one.  "Neither in us  
that are pressed, are they any thing else, but divers motions (for  
motion, produceth nothing but motion.)" (p.14)  Again, he states "The  
Word Body signifieth that which filleth, or occupyeth some certain  
room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is  
a reall part of what we call the Universe.  For the Universe, being  
the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not  
also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not part of (that  
aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe." (pp.269-270)  Admittedly,  
whole chapters throughout Leviathan contradict these statements,  
such as the chapters on the passions and on imagination, both of  
which are clearly mental.  But the materialist strand is plainly  
present. 

More significantly and strongly, Hobbes explicitly denies the  
doctrine of free will and affirms that human beings are just as  
determined as inanimate matter; indeed, he argues that the doctrine  
of free will is not merely false, but a contradiction: "And therefore  
if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle; or accidents of  
Bread in Cheese; or Immaterial Substances; or of A free Subject; A  
free-will; or any Free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I  
should not say he were in an Errour, but that his words were without  
meaning; that is to say, Absurd." (p.34)  More positively, Hobbes  
explains his conception of liberty thusly: "Liberty and Necessity are  
consistent; as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a  
necessity of descending by the Channel; so likewise in Actions which  
men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed from their will,  
proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of mans will, and  
every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that  
from another cause, in a continuall chaine they proceed from  
necessity." (pp.146-147) 

3. Ethical Relativism 

Ethical relativism commonly denotes the view that denies that  
morality is a distinct and potentially objective discipline.  There are  
several ways to be a ethical relativist, one of which is to say that  
morality is "really" something else and thereby get rid of it.  For  
example, if "X is good" is just another way of saying "I like X" then  
relativism would be be true, because we could replace all "good"  
statements with "I like" statements without any loss of meaning.   
Hobbes clearly and repeatedly does precisely this.  "[W]hatsoever is  
the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for  
his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion,  
Evill For these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever  
used in relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing  
simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to  
be taken from the nature of the objects themselves " (p.39)  Of  
course, Hobbes speaks often of justice and injustice, and so appears  
to deny relativism; but if one reads closer, his relativism reveals  
itself boldly: "where no convenant hath preceded, there hath no Right  
been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and  
consequently, no action can be Unjust.  But when a convenant is  
made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of Injustice, is  
no other than the not Performance of Covenant.  And whatsoever is  
not Unjust, is Just." (p.100) 

In chapter 27, Hobbes states that sin means nothing other than  
contempt for the legislator, and crime nothing other than violating  
the law.  He qualifies this by pointing out that even without a  
sovereign, people are still bound by natural law.  But if we remember  
that natural law gives everyone the right to do whatever they have  
the might to do, we can see that this qualification doesn't make any  
difference.  And to top this all off, we have Hobbes' contemptuous  
dismissal of the very idea of individual conscience: "I observe the  
Diseases of a Common-wealth, that proceed from the poyson of  
seditious doctrines; whereof one is, That every private man is Judge  
of Good and Evill actions From this false doctrine, men are disposed  
to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the  
Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey or disobey them, as in their  
private judgments they shall think fit." (p.223) 

4. Depravity 

Hobbes does not have a great deal of respect for human beings,  
to put it mildly.  He tells us not only that it is permissible for them  
to do anything they feel like (in pre-political society), but that they  
automatically do so.  "I put for a generall inclination of all mankind,  
a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth  
only in Death."  (p.70)  Moreover, what they like generally involves  
hurting, killing, or humiliating other people.  "[I]f any two men desire  
the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they  
become enemies; and in the way to their End endeavor to destroy, or  
subdue one another." (p.87) 

To get an idea of Hobbes' view of social relations, consider  
this passage: "To have received from one, to whom we think our  
selves equall, greater benefits than there is hope to Requite,  
disposeth to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred." (p.71)  He  
explanation for why it is permissible to break unenforceable  
contracts is similarly illuminating: "bonds of words are too weak to  
bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without  
the feare of some coercive Power." (p.96) 

5. The Totalitarian Connection 

What is the connection between the aforementioned doctrines  
and totalitarianism?  Well, while strictly speaking none of them  
necessarily imply totalitarianism, it is easy to see why they tend to  
go together.  Consider first the doctrine of free will.  While political  
freedom is not the same thing as freedom of the will, it is difficult  
to see why the former would be valuable if we lacked the latter.  For  
if we automatically do as our genes and environment condition us to  
do, the very idea that we can "chart our own course in life" is  
mistaken.  Even uncoerced, we are helpless before physical and  
social forces.  So coercion doesn't take away our autonomy, since we  
never had it in the first place; moreover, it might actually be a favor  
if the government coerced us for our own benefit, since the option of  
simply choosing to save ourselves is illusory. 

Materialism also tends to support totalitarianism.  In moral  
philosophy, it is widely accepted that in order for two things or  
actions to differ in their moral properties, they must also differ  
significantly in their non-moral properties.  (This is known as  
supervenience.)  Now if materialism is true, human beings are just  
aggregates of matter; they do not differ in kind from inanimate  
objects.  Given this, it is hard to see why human beings are entitled  
to any more moral consideration than inanimate matter; that is,  
none.  In contrast, if dualism is true, then human beings can be  
distinguished from inanimate matter because they have minds,  
consciousness, thoughts, emotions, and so on; and so a plausible  
basis for special moral treatment for humans can be found.  (I should  
mention, though, that Hobbes repeatedly contradicts his basic  
materialist thesis, and never specifically denies the existence of  
mental properties.) 

Moral relativism also tends to support a total state.  Only if  
some things are objectively right or wrong is it possible to  
rationally critique the existing order.  If moral relativism is true,  
then it isn't wrong for the state to coerce or even kill individuals;  
for the doctrine of individual rights is a moral theory, and if moral  
relativism is right, then all moral theories are false or nonsense.   
Overall, since most of the things that total governments do  
intuitively seem immoral, a would-be total ruler must undermine  
morality in order to quell protest against his policies. 

Finally, let us turn to the issue of human depravity.  Hobbes  
wants to use his pessimistic view of human nature to justify  
government, on the theory that human beings are so vicious that only  
fear can restrain their natural urge to harm one another.  Even if it  
were true, this theory wouldn't work, since it would imply that  
government officials are just as wicked as their subjects.  Giving  
all of the power to a small group of wicked men just aggravates the  
problem of human depravity.  But in another sense, the doctrine of  
depravity does tend to support totalitarianism.  For if it were true,  
it would cause us to lose respect for other people and for ourselves.   
And if we have a low opinion of mankind and low self-esteem, we  
are less likely to care if the government is cruel or even murderous;  
for what they are destroying is of no great value to begin with. 

Naturally, in so short a paper neither the textual analysis nor  
the succeeding arguments can be completely convincing.  I overlook a  
number of conflicting passages in Hobbes, though the positions that I  
attribute to him are certainly the ones that he maintains the large  
majority of the time.  And I don't deny that there have been thinkers  
who have combined materialism, determinism, relativism, and  
human depravity with a more liberal social and political theory; I  
merely argue that such views better cohere with an authoritarian  
political philosophy.  In contrast, I think that the views that tend to  
support classical liberalism are the opposite of what Hobbes  
affirms: namely, a dualistic philosophy of mind, free will, moral  
objectivism, and an optimistic view of human potential.  That each  
of these views is true I would surely maintain, but I will leave that  
task for another work.