Date: Fri, 04 Feb 1994 20:31:48 -0500 (EST) From: "Mark.Sulkowski." Subject: More direct reason To: libernet-d@Dartmouth.EDU From: Bryan Douglas Caplan >1. The morality-math analogy. I'm not sure why Sulkowski places >exclusive emphasis on my mathematics example; if you recall my original >posting, I also adduced two decidedly non-mathematical instances of the >use of direct reason. That's correct. I do remember that. However, you specifically stated that since direct reason worked for you in math, then there was no reason to suppose it didn't work in morality -- a claim I dispute. >Now my argument was NOT: math is known by direct reason, morality is >like math, therefore morality is known by direct reason. Yes, I realize that. I'm still not sure exactly what this "direct reason" is, where it is located in the brain, and how many different faculties we are really talking about here. Naive physics could be one faculty. Naive morality could be a separate faculty. If you believe that direct reason works well for math, this is NOT enough evidence to justify the belief that direct reason works for morality too UNLESS morality has something to do with math. >Rather, the >three examples of the use of direct reason -- only ONE of which was >mathematical -- were intended to draw attention to the existence and >workings of direct reason. Then, I suggested that we simply apply this >general faculty to moral propositions, and see if any answers emerge. Hmmm. If you are looking for answers I am sure you will get them. But this seems like witchcraft to me. >2. Naive physics. [...]Now of course they might choose to deny Newtonian physics and affirm their original intuition; but their direct reason would most likely inform them that Newtonian physics is the solider basis for judgment. Could you explain this one? How would direct reason inform them that Newtonian physics is better, when naive physics is much more "obvious"? >In fact, the groundwork for Newtonian physics was frequently heavily >dependent upon direct reason/intuition. For example, how did Galileo >prove that an object in motion will continue in motion in a straight >line forever? By watching things go in straight lines forever? Of >course not. Agreed. But aren't we stretching things here? I certainly won't deny that people have intuition, as I understand it. Intuition doesn't reveal the truth of anything; it simply guesses at it. We can test our intuition against reality and see if general principles hold though. > The answer is that Galileo used the following thought >experiment: He arranged inclined planes so that a ball would roll done >one and up the other. And he noted that the ball always rolled up the >second plane until it regained its initial altitude. So he tried reduce >the angle of the second plane, and found that he could make the ball >roll farther and farther as the second plane became more and more >horizontal. And then he used his direct reason to see that IF the >second plane were perfectly horizontal , the ball could never regain its >former altitude, and would therefore continue in a straight line >>forever. The uncritical use of direct reason may be dangerous, but >without its skillful use science would be quite impossible, regardless >of how much data we were to gather. I'm still not sure what this "direct reason" of yours is. Are you just talking about conceptual thinking? >3. Direct reason has been mistaken. I agree. Okay. Noted. >The ONLY >question my theory is trying to answer is to find out how we get >knowledge in general, and moral knowledge in particular, if there is any >such thing. Well, I'd like to know this myself. >I'm saying that the world in general, and morality in particular, is an >objective factual matter, and that you have to work hard to make sure >that what you believe to be moral corresponds to what actually IS moral. Certainly. That's what I have been saying. >First, we can test moral conclusions (or logical or mathematical >conclusions) by thinking about them some more until their truth is >clear. And how does the truth of moral conclusions become clear? What does it _mean_ for the truth of something to become clear? >[...]since some moral statements are exceedingly straightforward and there >is no way that I've erred with respect to them. (For example, the judgment >that murder is wrong, or the judgment that we ought to believe what is true.) Alright then. Why is the judgment that murder is wrong straightforward? Or the judgment that we ought to believe what is true for that matter? Let's think about these statements and suggest answers for why they might be true. >6. Some questions for my critics. > a. Do you recognize the faculty of direct reason in general, i.e., >would you admit that such a faculty exists and that we can use it to >know at least SOMETHING? This seems to be Sulkowski's position, but I >want to be sure. Given what you have said in this post, I really am not sure that I know what you mean by "direct reason". It seems to be a fuzzy concept vaguely associated with intuition. I'm not sure what its relationship is to conceptual thinking and thinking in principles. I'm not sure if you believe that this is some sort of low-level thinking, perhaps below what we are conscious of. Perhaps you simply haven't explained it in enough detail. > b. Do you reject the arguments given in my original post which >purport to prove that without direct reason, moral skepticism >necessarily results? I have the feeling that Sulkowski (a la Rasmussen& >Den Uyl) would deny my analysis. I'm not quite sure how to respond to that argument. I don't see any necessary reason why moral skepticism _necessarily_ results. Intentionally skeptical people will always be skeptical, no matter what. > c. Don't all of your complaints about the use of direct reason apply >a fortiori to theories like that of Rasmussen and Den Uyl? By this I >mean, that if you worry that direct reason is too untrustworthy to rely >on, mustn't you also worry that philosophical argument in general is too >untrustworthy to rely on? I particularly remember Tom Palmer's review >of the Den Uyl/Rasmussen work, which plausibly pointed out that >Aristotelian teleology is a rather shaky basis for morality, and in any >case unlikely to persuade either the moral skeptic or even other >Aristotelian teleologists who don't share your substantive moral >conclusions. Well, I've never read Tom Palmer's review. I've only read the reviews in _Reason Papers #18_, and I don't recall his as being one of them. Frankly, I don't think that anyone can convince a moral skeptic of any moral proposition. Why should the moral skeptic even believe that "Murder is wrong" is "obvious"? I see no reason why this might be the case. Also, I don't understand why Mr. Palmer believes that Aristotelian teleology is a "shaky basis" for morality or why it won't convince other teleologists. As to your question of whether philosophy fails without direct reason, I will state again that I am not quite sure what you believe direct reason to be. Philosophy relies on conceptual thinking and (hopefully) perceptual evidence. What else is necessary?