I thought I'd take this time to reply to the critics of my little
essay on distributive justice.
For Paul Hsieh:
I'm not quite sure how to take your comments. Some of the time,
you seem to be agreeing with me, because you say things like
"the forced labor is cleverly _concealed_" which makes it sound like
you agree that even in your counter-example the surgeon is still
doing forced labor. But at other points, you appear to be arguing
that a different injustice than forced labor is achieving the same
effect. Namely: the government first imposes what may be called
"forced _leisure_" on everyone in a certain field, and then allows
exceptions for those that agree to its terms.
Indeed, we could imagine this system under other circumstances.
Imagine that after slavery was declared illegal in the United States,
Alabama passed a law that barred blacks from every occupation. Then,
it offered licenses to work to those that met its terms. And what would
the terms be? They could return to work for their previous masters,
and receive minimal food and shelter.
I'm not sure whether we should call the blacks' new condition
"slavery" or whether we should just say that it is just as bad as
slavery, since it has exactly the same effect. But it is hard to
see why this round-about means of achieving the same end should
make a moral difference. Rather, it appears to just be a means
of (as you say) concealing the fact that one thing is just as bad
as the other. Since you agree with my conclusion anyway, this
should be pretty clear to you; but I venture to affirm that almost
anyone would have difficulty arguing that this round-about manner
of extracting forced labor is morally less objectionable than slavery.
(Unless they are confused by the round-aboutness itself, which as
you suggest is probably just a way of disguising what would otherwise
be a patent injustice.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For Alan Eaton:
I'm having a little trouble understanding your reply. Are you saying
that educators will charge high prices, and that the poor will come
to them to get hand-outs? Even supposing that e.g. medical schools
could charge exorbitant prices, why would they automatically give
their extraordinarily large profits to the medically needy?
You do correctly describe how a monopolist would price (namely, if
the value of the education he offered were very great, he could
extract a very high price for it), although normally we would
expect competition to drive price down to average cost (which in
my hypothetical economy is just the cost of getting someone to
get out of bed and do some teaching).
I'm also puzzled by your remark that morality in such a society
might change its emphasis. Are you talking about "morality" in
the anthropological sense of "what people in X think is right"?
Or are you talking about morality in the objective sense of "what
is actually right"? Obviously morality in the latter sense cannot
change its emphasis. But maybe what you mean is that confronted
with this hypothetical, you begin to think that you were wrong
about forced labor, and it is actually perfectly just in some cases.
If that is what you think, then my thought experiment has utterly
failed for you. All I could ask you to do it reflect further and
see if you are actually convinced of the propriety of forced labor,
or if you have been too hasty in changing your initial intuition.
------------------------------------------------------------------
For Steve Blatt:
You make a lot of points here, so I'm only going to try with the
main ones.
1. Getting a Clearer Picture of the Pure Service Economy.
I admit that it is a little hard to visualize at first. Let's
put it this way: for all of the goods that there _are_, there
is superabundance. Plenty of food growing everywhere, pleasant
climate, natural shelter in caves, etc. And let's add further
that none of the services involve transforming naturally occuring
goods into new goods; rather, they are things like surgery,
maid-service, offering lessons, and so on. The world is a little
bare, but surely it is conceivable without the silliness of toasters
growing on trees.
2. Relevance
What is the relevance of my hypothetical? I do indeed try to extend
it to the real world; but I think that it is interesting in itself
to see _how far_ the redistributionist is willing to go. It is
interesting to see if this hypothetical will make him start drawing
lines and admitting that justice constrains his pursuit of equality
and the like. Even if you don't buy my extension, I still think
the example is instructive if it merely points to "the limits of
redistribution," since so many advocates thereof seem to take it
as an overriding good.
3. Examining Origins of Property Holdings
Well, I suppose that there are two senses in which one could be
a redistributionist. The first (and normal sense) is that of a
person who believes that the even the results of a free market
-- in which initial holdings were not taken from anyone by force --
ought to be modified, by force if necessary. The second (and
idiocyncratic) sense is that of a person who believes that some
current holdings are unjust and must be rectified by forced
transfer from the unjust holders to the just holders.
As far as I can tell, my argument only supports redistribution in
the second sense. And if someone tried to use my argument to
justify massive transfers from e.g. the current rich to the current
poor, I would challenge their _empirical_, not their _moral_
argument. I agree that stolen holdings ought to be returned to
their true owners; I just think that most current holding are
held by their just owners.
Even on a very strict interpretation of property rights, according
to which the transfer must be voluntary at each and every nexus,
it is easy to avoid the conclusion that most current holdings are
unjust. Most obviously, if we also hold strictly to the principle
of individual guilt and individual restitution, it would be necessary
for a complainant to show that a certain individual unjustly held
his _own_ property. If NO individual can show this, then even if
the chain of just transfers were broken some point in the past,
why shouldn't current property be considered unowned or abandoned
property which was re-homesteaded by the current possessor?
Or consider the case where a criminal grabs your bag of gold dust
and blows it to the wind. This dust is going to land on the
land of a mass of individuals, and it will be completely impossible
for you to recover it from them. Should we not then treat the
_original thief_ as if he had simply _destroyed_ your property,
and hold him accountable? And if he then killed himself and had
no estate, why should we think that an unknowable percentage of
the population owes you an unknowable amount of restitution?
Why not think that the robber has robbed you and escaped punishment,
without in anyway placing guilt on the rest of the populace?
4. Rules of Valid Argumentation
Well, there are at least two rules for an argument to work. First
of all, as I said in my first posting, it is necessary that the
premise be more initially plausible than the conclusion. If p
is the premise and q the conclusion, then P(p)>P(q). This avoids
absurdities like trying to argue that the external world exists
because I can clearly and distinctly conceive of the idea of God,
and God would not deceive me.
Second of all (as Mike Huemer pointed out to me), it is also necessary
that the premise be more initially probable than the _denial_ of
the conclusion. This avoids absurdities like trying to argue that
we have no knowledge because all statements are either analytic or
synthetic. The denial of the conclusion (We have knowledge) is more
initially probable than the premise, so the argument doesn't work.
Mathematically, P(p)>1-P(q).
For example, my argument would be a good one if P(slavery is wrong)=.99
and P(redistribution is right)=.7
For .99>.7, and .99>(1-.7).
5. Is Having Children Wrong?, The Duty of Slaves to Commit Suicide, etc.
Now Steve's attempt at reductio ad absurdum don't even slightly
convince me, for they make a critical conflation:
With regards to having children, all that my argument says is that
it is _wrong_ to _oneself_ impose forced labor on another. It
doesn't say that it is wrong to fail to avoid it; nor does it
say that it is wrong to create another human being who is likely
or even certain to be victimized. Similarly, my argument that
slavery is wrong for the slaver to commit does not mean that it
is wrong for the slave to submit to it or fail to kill himself.
To put this in teleological/deontological terms, I am saying that
it is wrong to enslave people. This is distinct from it being
wrong to be a victim of slavery. We would only be driven to
Steve's conclusion if we thought of slavery as a _teleological_
moral cost which exceeded all others. Hence, the moral cost-
minimizing solution requires the production of no further children
and suicide for existing slaves. I however am saying that slavery
is a deontological moral wrong; it is wrong for it to be done at
all, but it may despite this be teleologically good that people
exist even if they are enslaved. In Nozick's terms, I see
"no slavery" as a side constraint rather than a moral goal.
--Bryan Caplan
From lsanger@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu Tue Apr 4 22:22:24 1995
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From: lsanger@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (ASP-Disc)
Subject: a response to the problem of distributive justice in a pure service economy
Status: R
[Moderator's note: You know, Brian's essay and the little controvery
it started might be a very interesting thing to include in the JASP.
If Brian or one of his commentators would like to organize and edit
it all, I could very easily include it as a special feature. Larry]
From: Ben Fischer <bdfische@mailbox.syr.edu>
B.D. Caplan's essay means to a prove the following conditional, where A =
redistribution in a pure service economy and B = forced slavery in a pure
service economy:
A -> B
Since forced slavery is unacceptable in a just society, he argues, by
*modus tollens* redistribution is unacceptable. In this response I mean
to show that the conditional is false, at least in any interesting way.
That is to say, I mean to show that it is possible to have a situation in
the pure service economy which would be acceptable to the
redistributionist, yet would not entail any interesting kind of forced
slavery.
We can imagine a certain group of people unhappy with the state of affairs
in the society which Caplan describes. They come together to discuss what
they see as a problem, that there is too much suffering in the pure
service economy. They agree that none of them will conduct business
(i.e., conduct the kind of voluntary exchanges that Caplan describes) with
anyone not in their group. Furthermore, everyone in their group will be
required (on pain of expulsion) to devote a certain percentage (which
might differ from profession to profession) of their services to those who
couldn't otherwise afford them. In return for such a donation, they
receive the privilege of trading with the other members of the group, a
privilege not otherwise available.
The first question is whether such a voluntary association would satisfy
redistributive requirements. If the organization was large enough, it
surely would. Assuming that the voluntary association is large enough,
would forced slavery necessarily result? It would not for the people in
the voluntary association, for it is *voluntary*. Neither would those
outside the voluntary association be subject to any interesting kind of
forced slavery. This latter group would have two options: join the
voluntary association or don't. If they do, the only question is whether
they were *forced* to do so. Again, the voluntary nature of the
organization assures that they were not. Imagine that only one person
refused to join the voluntary association, and that that person needed
emergency surgery. Without joining, that person will die. Yet if we want
to say that this amounts to a kind of forced slavery, that the choice
between joining the "voluntary" association and death is no real choice at
all, we also have to say that the members of the voluntary association (or
perhaps just the surgeons) are doing something incompatible with justice.
If the voluntary association *is* submitting the lone holdout to forced
slavery, it is not interesting forced slavery, for in a system of
voluntary exchanges like Caplan describes, we surely want to keep the
right *not* to exchange. If the holdout chooses not to join, the same
argument obtains. If the voluntary association, in letting him die, is
submitting him to forced slavery (or, more accurately, killing him), it is
not an interesting crime. We cannot claim that the voluntary association
has done wrong without denying the people in it to organize on the basis
outlined above, which we surely don't want to do.
The likelihood of such a voluntary association ever forming is admittedly
very low. However, in the pure service economy I suspect that
redistribution would never be a problem because the very wealthy, the
surgeons, say, would have to work so little that they would be bored and
gladly perform operations for the poor. So I don't feel compelled to base
my argument on what is likely, for Caplan's is not--indeed, the pure
service economy itself could never exist. My point is simply that
Caplan's argument that redistribution entails slavery in the forced
service economy fails. If a large enough voluntary association could
accomplish the kind of institutionalized redistribution that Rawls, say,
would favor, and it seems to me that it could, no interesting form of
slavery would exist and Caplan's argument fails.
Ben Fischer
bdfische@mailbox.syr.edu
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From: lsanger@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (ASP-Disc)
Subject: Re: a response to the problem of distributive justice in a pure service
economy
Status: R
From: "Bryan D. Caplan" <bdcaplan@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>
Well, I don't disagree with Ben Fischer argument. Why would I?
He imagines voluntary institutions which pressure people into
helping others; and these functions exert a redistributive function.
But, as Ben points out, no one either in or out of the institutions is
being forced, so were have voluntary redistribution.
Very well. Then my argument only demonstrates the moral illegitmacy
of redistributive organizations which were _not_ formed voluntarily.
Since this describes every government which ever existed (need I
mention Lysander Spooner's _No Treason_?), my argument only shows that
all of the redistribution which exists in reality is wrong. Which
is all that I ever intended to show.
In fact, if we slightly modify Ben's example, we will see my intuition
in all its moral starkness. Imagine that Ben's association is formed
by threatening to kill people who don't join. Once 50% of the
population is enrolled, the leaders of the group only threaten to
occasionally beat up non-joiners; another 40% of the population joins.
The remaining 10% are then told that if they don't join, the 90%
remaining will boycott them. Is _this_ acceptable? I doubt it.
But this process describes the actual formation of states far better
than any contract theory ever could, so it is _this_ hypothetical,
not Ben's benign one, which should inform our judgments of
redistributive practices of actual governments.
--Bryan
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From: lsanger@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (ASP-Disc)
Subject: Re: a response to the problem of distributive justice in a pure service
economy
Status: R
From: darader@isp.nwu.edu (David Rader)
Ben,
Although your reply to the idea of forced slavery in a pure service
economy does permit the possibility of redistribution through charity,
it does not address the main point of the argument, namely:
If a government forces redistribution against someone's will,
is that just?
Admittedly, in a republic, the government is elected by presumably
a majority of the populace. And therefore any rules made by the governemtn
have the effect of being made by the majority of the electorate (hey, this
is an idealized situation - ignore politics and special interests). But,
is tyranny by the majority any more excused for taxation than it is for
racism, or (excuse the spelling) aparthied?
If every person within society choses to willing donate part of
her labor for charitable causes, as you have outlined, that is fine. It is
the individual's right to do so. But, what if, as your great association
was forming, another formed right along side it, and whose members pledged
themselves to help each other (ie trade and perform services for one
another) conditional on the an individual member donating to charity, if
he felt like it. If this association grew large enough to be self-supporting,
then it would very easily allow any member of society to chose to donate,
or chose not to donate, as her individual right.
I am sure you would have no problem with this. But, would the other
association? Would the humanitarians who wish to coerce other members of
society into donating some of their personal labor to charity think it was
okay if some people did not? Most importantly: if (as I assume would happen)
most of the segregation between associations was based upon personal
donating choices (ie most of those who chose to donate would join the
forced donation group, and those who did not want to donate would join the
"your choice" group) would the two sides fight each other in order to
determine which chosen path was "correct"? Would they try to legislate
the legality of their view, in order to force the other members of
society to conform?
You may scoff at the idea, but consider any of a number of
national issues today, in which the choice is personal, and the effect is
societal. Both sides wage huge legal and legislature battles to try to
force the other side to conform. To name a few: gun control, abortion,
prayer in school, farming, and environmental concerns. In each of these
cases, the pro and anti sides are polarized, and very hostile towards
each other. The battles have evolved from "is it right to ... " into
"should someone be legally allowed to ..." And, because many people
who respect an individual's choice fight to protect that choice, as
opposed to fighting in favor of a specific action, it is very difficult
to determine which members of each "association" feel that an action
is right.
The problem, as I see it, with each of these cases, is not
that individual members of society feel that one action is or is not
morally right. The problem is that one side of each argument has
chosen to try to force every member of society abide by that side's
moral code. Morality is most likely not a universal truth. And
certainly, no moral system that has been proposed is universally
accepted. Forcing your own system upon other people is wrong,
according to my personal view.
And, in that way, any kind of forced action, be it
donations to charity, the refusal to allow abortions, the taking
of guns, or the stopping of voluntary prayer sessions in school
is wrong. Sorry, Ben, but I just don't think you can escape the
fact that forcing members of society to give away their possessions
against their will is unjust. Certainly not by saying that in one
situation there could spring up a voluntary charity organization.
dave
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Subject: Re: a response to the problem of distributive justice in a pure service
economy
Status: R
From: Mike <HUEMER@zodiac.rutgers.edu>
To David Rader:
I can't resist answering this one, although I'm sure Bryan could answer
it just as well.
I agree with your central point, which is that you shouldn't force people
to give to charity. But the justification you offer at the end of your
message renders your position incoherent. You say the reason we should
not force people to give to charity (i.e., the reason it is *unjust* to
so force people) is that "morality is most likely not a universal truth"
and it's wrong to force people to abide by one's own morality, in your
personal opinion.
You seem to be overlooking the fact that the view you just offered, like
the view Bryan was defending, is a moral judgement. Therefore, it is
obscure how you can defend its truth by claiming that moral judgements
aren't really true. Furthermore, I presume you would say that it was
permissible to use force to prevent people from comitting random
murders. Yet wouldn't this be 'forcing our morality' on the would-be
murderers?
If you say that it is categorically wrong to use force against people,
then that must mean that it is also wrong to use force to prevent people
from using force; and so it winds up that people should be permitted to
use force after all.
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From: lsanger@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (ASP-Disc)
Subject: redistribution as charity
Status: R
From: Ben Fischer <bdfische@mailbox.syr.edu>
Perhaps I didn't make all the implications of my argument clear. Suppose
that a government decides that anyone who wants to stop paying taxes, etc.,
can simply give up their citizenship and set up tiny principalities
constituted of the land that they own. But the old government is surely
well within its rights in denying these new principalities the right to
travel on their land. Well, it is clear that the residents of this
principality, presumably only a family, would starve relatively quickly,
unless they owned a farm. In that case, the government wouldn't be
*forcing* anyone to participate in their system of redistribution (and
other undesirable things, I suppose), but if the redistribution that does
exist is charity, it's of a strange kind. Essentially the government
would have presented its citizens with the choice of death or
redistribution-entailing citizenship, but the conditions under which death
would be "imposed" are perfectly reasonable. The government would just be
exercising its right over the property it owns. In this way I avoid the
question of whether redistribution is good public policy, but the denial
of its morality entails a denial of the government's right to use its
property in any way it chooses.
My point is that you cannot deny the right of the government to enforce
redistributive policies without also denying them the right to use their
property in any way they see fit. In a way, the U.S. goes beyond the call
of duty, for the choice isn't redistribution or death, but simply
redistribution or jail for income-tax evasion. This is another version of
Socrates' contract argument. If the government gives you the opportunity
to make another choice (and surely it's reasonable to make allowances for
age here), you are bound the strictures it sets on you, even death. I can
see no way that redistribution necessarily entails slavery of any kind,
if there is a contract which you aren't forced to sign.
Of course, the situation changes markedly in non-democratic systems.
Ben Fischer
bdfische@mailbox.syr.edu