From sjblatt@ocf.Berkeley.EDU Sat Sep 25 03:10:55 1993 Received: from tornado.Berkeley.EDU by ponyexpress.princeton.edu (5.65c/1.113/newPE) id AA07157; Sat, 25 Sep 1993 03:10:51 -0400 Received: by tornado.berkeley.edu (5.65c/CHAOS) id AA08562; Sat, 25 Sep 1993 00:10:35 -0700 Date: Fri, 24 Sep 1993 16:35:25 From: Steven Blatt Subject: Christianity To: bdcaplan@phoenix Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: R Hello, Bryan. Hope you like Princeton. I think that, in addition to laziness, one reason I've procrastinated replying to your Christianity letters is that thinking about the subject makes me realize how inadequate is my knowledge of the relevant history, of the Bible, and of the various Christian theologians and theologies. I am certainly in no position to render a verdict on Christianity. Not because I don't think it productive to tackle this type of Big Question, but because my level of knowledge simply isn't yet up to the task. However, I find that reading about history is much more interesting and enjoyable when one keeps such Big Questions in the back of the mind. For example, we read a lot of American Puritans for my American Intellectual History Class. This might have been boring and frustrating reading, owing to the Puritan's archaic language and forms of argument, but I found the reading quite interesting in light of the bigger issue about Christianity. I mentioned to you when I saw you last that I'm now sensitive to suspect passages in Christian writing which I would before have unthinkingly glossed over--dictums regarding pride and faith etc. Some of their stuff is really awful--e.g., Edwards sermon "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God." And yet...out of this stock emerged America. The Puritans were intolerant, but, for others in their Puritan communities, their doctrine that God's grace could extend to anyone helped to break down barriers of aristocratic status privilege and encourage a sense of human equality--despite your "doubt that Calvinists were a positive force in any sense." Now, their doctrine that salvation was the purely arbitrary result of God's choice, uninfluenced by any personal qualities or actions of the individual, is certainly perverse. (For all her extremism, name-calling, hyperbole, and reliance on strenuous assertion, I doubt that before reading Rand I would have been sensitive to the full perverseness of even such an egregious doctrine as the Puritan/Calvinist doctrine of salvation--"You can and you can't,/You will and you won't,/Your're damned if you do,/And you're damned if you don't.") But classical liberals especially must take account of the possibility of positive effects, far outside the visions of the Puritans, of Puritanism; and the remark extends to Christians and Christianity in general. On the other hand, I've also been reading The Vital Few, by Jonathan Hughes, about American entrepreneurs. It begins with a section on "ideological" entrepreneurs and suggests that the important underpinnings of American liberalism came not from the Puritan theocracies, much less from the Southern aristocratic slave states, but from Quaker Pennsylvania and in particular from William Penn. Complexities on complexities. (I note that you have a kind word for the Quakers too. Were the Quaker virtues--however reasonable--derived from reason?) Your first letter begins with some general considerations on the project of evaluating Christianity's historic role. "I consider Christianity only in comparison to what was most likely to replace it. While this is reasonable to some degree, it might be that all of the alternatives were bad, so Christianity deserves condemnation (albeit a milder one) even if it did have a net positive influence. I suppose that this criticism would be most reasonable if one had a new and positive alternative to all of the major cultural forces through history--at least that would show that one wasn't expecting the impossible." I think it better to stick with your first, comparative criterion. If what we care about is the welfare of real people, how can we condemn something that made them better off than they otherwise would likely have been, simply because it didn't make them as well off as we might imagine them being? Although it is very difficult to guess what would have happened if Christianity had not arisen, it is very easy to imagine that it might not have--that Jesus might never have been born, or that his apostles and Paul might not have propagated his creed (or a creed in his name). In such a case, it is high unlikely the West would ever have adopted a moral system with roots in Judaism and the Old Testament. Nor would Islam have arisen (which I understand had a very enlightened and valuable period--including preserving Greek wisdom--during the Christian Dark Ages). Is there any reason to believe that paganism would not have continued to prevail? (If so, it would not necessarily be a productive paganism such as Greece's.) Fascinating. I assume the alternative you allude to is the rule of reason. In making an historical judgment, it is not enough to say that people would have been better off relying on reason than on Christianity, therefore Christianity was baneful. You must show that the likely alternative to Christianity was the rule of reason (or some other preferable system). We would be better off if we could sprout wings and fly, but that is no reason to condemn airplanes. I know that you don't assert that a rule of reason is possible, but I think it's implied in much of your argument. If you believe it is possible, then all your criticisms of Christianity are superfluous--obviously, however good Christianity was, a society actually ruled by reason (perhaps not a felicitous phrasing) would be better--and you need merely demonstrate that such a rule of reason is possible. 1. Has Christianity elevated moral character? You say, firstly, no, because, by its method of inculcation, it discourages truth-seeking. O.K. (Empirically: are non-Christians deeper thinkers and truth-seekers than Christians?) No, secondly, because it damages self-esteem by condemning pride and encouraging guilt. The Christian warnings against pride seem innocuous since we all know the pitfalls of arrogance; but reading Edwards, who stresses with relish that man is a NOTHING, I can sympathize with your point. Empirically: Do Christians have lower self-esteem than non-Christians? My experience says no. But I don't think either pride or guilt, high or low self esteem, are intrinsically virtues or sins. Virtue lies, as you say, in believing the truth--and in believing it for right reasons. Christians' high self-esteem is not virtuous if it arise from self-congratulation on being among the elect. I think the concept of original sin is valuable in so far as it underlines man's imperfection. Universal guilt, however, certainly seems an unfortunate way to emphasize this truth. No, thirdly, because it encourages sexual hang-ups. Perhaps you'll like this limerick from Asimov Laughs Again. Moralists think sex is a sin, But Nature suggests we begin; She arranged it no doubt That a fellow juts out In the place were a damsel juts in. I can't defend the rationale behind the Christian attitude to sex, but I can conceive of the logical possibility of this attitude having a net beneficial effect. As you say, Christianity discourages sex regardless of the consideration of responsibleness. You assume that adults, free from this irrational prohibition, will likely regulate their passion according to reason. Why? The question is especially salient when we are considering Christianity as a force not in the present but in history, when the means for rationally contracepting (?) were more limited. This brings me to a qualm about relying on reason to produce good behavior. I've mentioned to you before that there are two problems for action: (1) knowing what to do; (2) mustering the will to do it. Regarding (1) the mere fact that man has the capacity for reason does not demonstrate that this capacity is adequate for any particular intellectual challenge. People could be sexually rational, but that doesn't mean they will. Regarding (2) it is possible to do something one knows one shouldn't. I do it frequently. Especially in the case of sex, I think there are reasonable reasons to doubt that mere knowledge of what is right will be generally sufficient to produce correct rational behavior. To use Thomas Sowell's terminology, knowledge and effective knowledge are distinct. One can disregard knowledge, but effective knowledge contains an incentive for being acted on. He cites prices. But he also cites, more appositely for our present concerns, pain. Conceivably, man could have evolved a sixth sense of "being in harm". Such a man would feel no pain on putting his hand in a fire; rather, he would receive the sense impression "my hand is being harmed." Reason would then dictate removing one's hand from the fire. Such a sense would have advantages over pain, even disregarding the evolutionarily insignificant one that we might be happier: if reason said that the harm sense was incorrect, it would be easily disregarded; whereas, with pain, we are motivated to avoid situations we know are good for us (e.g., getting a tooth filled). That pain rather than the harm sense was selected indicates that reason is not sufficient even to the task of removing oneself from immediate harm. Maybe you are right, and people would be sexually responsible absent irrational prescriptions. It's an empirical question. No, fourthly, because Christianity condemns self-interest. This seems innocuous because we are all aware of the evils of greed. Here again, Christianity fails to encourage rational distinctions. And here again, condemnation of Christianity presupposes that people are likely to make such rational distinctions absent Christianity. In this case, you presuppose that the rational perception that greed is bad is sufficient to forestall greediness. Regarding throwing the first stone, here's another Asimov joke: a mob has gathered around an adultress and is preparing to stone her to death. Jesus arrives on the scene and rebukes them, calling upon him who is blameless to cast the first stone. The mob, shamed, is beginning to vacate the area when a large stone flies through the air and fells the adultress. A frown creases Jesus' brow; he turns to the offending member of the crowd and says, "Sometimes you piss me off, Mom." Since Christianity is a moral code for the individual, it seems unfair to criticize it for not producing a correct form of political economy (i.e., by ignoring production as an element in reducing poverty. By the way, would you say that the key to reducing poverty is not so much increasing production as it is increasing the poor's (poors'?) productivity?). You comment that Marxism took Christianity's errors about poverty and ran with them. This seems to have been a common pattern for Marxism, as it seems Marx also took the worst aspects of classical economics (labor concept of value, law of subsistence wages,...); while the common sense of the classicals limited the bad effects of these errors, when combined with Marx's passion for system and consistency they led to disaster. Just a speculation since I haven't read much Marx. (But did Marx really ignore the importance of economic growth? Sowell--I rely too much on what Sowell says Marx says because Sowell says it so much more clearly and concisely than Marx--says that Marx was very sensitive to the constraints which technology and the state of the economy placed on the historical possibilities for human advancement; and that Marx simply thought that, as an empirical matter, we were now in a position where the economic product was big enough to satisfy all needs. Similarly, I don't quite see how Marx relied on blurring the distinction between the deserving and nondeserving poor.) 2. Did Christianity encourage respect for individual rights, the law, and other basic building blocks of civilization? Here the question is, did Christianity encourage respect for individual rights, the law, and other basic building blocks of civilization more than what would likely have been the alternative in the aftermath of the decline of the Roman Empire? But this is such a hard question I don't know how to go about answering it. (Also, it might be argued that Christianity contributed to Rome's decline. My historical ignorance precludes' my evaluating the possibilities.) Christians abused power in the name of Christianity when they had it. But power corrupts universally. In the absence of Christianity, would there have been some other form of totalitarianism during the Middle Ages? I can't begin to say. You ask the proper empirical question, whether the rule of and respect for law was strengthened by Christianity. My vague impression is that Rome dissolved as a result of successive, bloody civil wars, till no one gave enough of a damn to expel the barbarians one more time. (Somewhat like the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in which none of the now nominal communists gave enough of a damn to preserve their system.) What was the role of Christianity with respect to these civil wars? (That is, a defender of Christianity would say that by establishing a united Christendom the Church was a force for peace.) This is merely stumbling in the dark because of my ignorance of the circumstances of Rome's decline, but if you really want to demonstrate Christianity's political banefulness you would have to take account of those circumstances, whatever they actually were. Regarding Christianity and tolerance, what present-day world religion is more tolerant than Christianity? (Not a rhetorical question--for all I know there may be many.) Regarding religious wars, have Christians fought more religious wars than others? (Again, not rhetorical.) Why do you say that Christianity supports the status quo? If so, how does this connect with your Christianity/totalitarianism thesis? Regarding private property--I can't see much inherent support in Christianity for private property. But it is true that it was Christendom which of all the world initiated the modern revolution in property rights which launched the agricultural and industrial revolutions. In judging Christianity's historical role we need to decide whether there was a causal relationship between Christianity and the property rights revolution, even if there was no logical one. 3. Has Christianity made people happy(er)? You give theoretical arguments for why Christianity makes people unhappy. Empirically: are Christians unhappy? I remember you said that to the extent they are, they are probably ignoring Christianity. Well: are people who take Christianity seriously happy? You might say that those who are are misinterpreting Christianity. But who are you to say what Christianity is? Seriously. If someone calling himself a Christian takes something he calls Christianity seriously and takes solace in taking it seriously, then if you, whom no one including yourself would call a Christian, don't call him a Christian or what he's taking seriously Christianity then what do you call him and it? The Christian tradition has inconsistent and even conflicting elements and different people value different elements of that tradition in different ways. But if the tradition did not exist, it would not be available for people to make such selections from it. (Though of course something better might.) Many people say Christianity brings joy to their life. A classical liberal should hesitate before disbelieving such testimony of individual preference. Has the decline of Christianity caused the decline of the family by encouraging the search for personal happiness? I don't know. But I don't think your arguments succeed in demonstrating that the idea is absurd on the face of it. (1) Because it assumes family life is less happy than the alternative. No, it doesn't. I don't know about what your particular LA Times column was arguing, but there are valid possibilities: perhaps, absent Christianity, people are unable correctly to perceive wherein happiness lies. (Taking happiness in its strict sense of the good life, the idea is not implausible.) Perhaps, absent the moral sanction of Christianity, they tend to pursue immediate pleasure at the price of future happiness. Perhaps they are less likely to value the good of family members as elements of their own personal happiness.... (2) Non-Christian societies--such as Asia's--have stable families. But Asia also has strong religion. Irreligious Europe has, I belieive, weak families. (Perhaps I'm misinformed. Don't know the details. Would be interesting. I understand that much of western Europe is essentially atheist. Good proving ground for some of your ideas regarding the prospects for the rule of reason. If indeed I'm correctly stating your ideas about it.) The decline of Christianity may be the cause of weak American families even if mass conversion to Shinto would revive them. (3) The argument (a) concedes that Christianity discourages pursuit of personal happiness, (b) which concession should be fatal to the case for Christianity. Concerning (a) perhaps the columnist was using happiness in its common sense of immediate pleasure; or implying that the decline of Christianity makes people value others' happiness less (makes us less happy about others' happiness). Even if he wasn't, those are both valid possibilities. Concerning (b) perhaps the rational pursuit of happiness tends to lead, through the imperfection of man's reason and will, to unhappiness; while reliance on Christianity does indeed lead to personal happiness although that is not one's motivation in adhering to it. Ah--I see that you do indeed advocate the rule of reason, at least regarding sex and marriage; and since those are two of the areas where reason is least obvious to be efficacious, I presume you would advocate the rule of reason pretty universally. Well, considering your specific argument: the decline of the Christian sexual taboos but continuing influence of its discouragement of rational thinking regarding sex and marriage combine to cause the decline of the family. Plausible. Note that you here really do concede that the decline of Christianity has fostered the decline of the family. The question is, is "unsquemish critical thinking and forethought about the consequences of sex" combined--it is vital to add--with action conforming to such rational thought a feasible possibility, not just for particular individuals but for society as a whole? Again: if it is feasible, then you are wasting your time showing that Christianity isn't necessary for stable families, because even if it does promote stable families obviously such a rule of reason is superior. You yourself note: "I think that marriage is an area where many people are especially prone to unrealistic expectations and act on their emotions." You also say that Christianity makes this tendency even worse. But the question is, absent Christianity (or some set of moral prescriptions accepted on authority and not subjected to scrutiny by individual reason) will reason actually overcome these natural tendencies in human action--or, more fairly, will reason actually overcome these natural tendencies to a sufficient degree to produce an outcome superior to that produced under Christianity? I don't know enough about the history of ideas to judge between your claims and Johnson's regarding the sources of our moral values. Do you think the implicit acceptance of collective responsibility in the doctrine of original sin predisposed Catholics to assigning collective responsibility elsewhere? What do you think was the practical effect of the Protestant sects' rejection of free will--it seems that many men of action were members of such sects. (Always, in making our historical judgment, we must judge not by logical but by causal relationships. The question--for our purposes here, to come to a "verdict on the historical role of Christianity"--is not, does the doctrine of pre-determination logically imply personal helplessness, but, does the acceptance of the doctrine actually lead to such a result or to some other bad outcome.) Again, did the "who are we" mentality actually keep Christians from valuing personal responsibility? Yes, the Old Testament contains many awful moral precedents; did these lead to emulation by Christians? The Romans may have been more tolerant than the Christians, but Jesus will tell you that their humaneness left something to be desired. Has the idea that people are all sinners led Christians to value human life less than other people? None of these questions are rhetorical. I can think of some examples of people justifying immorality based on Bible precedents. For example, slavery. But, as in the case of slavery, it is hard to know whether Christianity was more of a baneful or beneficial actor. Nonchristians have long held slaves. (Sowell talks about the particularly awful Arab slave system.) But it was Christendom which eradicated slavery from the earth (as Sowell emphasizes). Yes, Enlightenment ideas (how important was Christianity as a seed bed for these ideas?) played a role, but there was a strong emphasis on the Bible as well (as in the civil rights movement). How do we tote up the record? Now for alternatives: Graeco-Roman culture and Christianity. Let's assume Graeco-Roman culture was superior to Christian. Here again the question arises, did Christianity displace or replace the Roman empire. If it merely replaced it, then your alternative is not an alternative at all. And the Enlightenment. The first question, which I've mentioned but have nothing to contribute to, is how much the Englightenment depended on Christianity. The second is, was the Enlightenment great or what? You say the Rousseauean totalitarians were a deviation, really just secular Christians, from the main liberal strain of the Enlightenment. You set this view in opposition to Burke's. Well, I've read through most of Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France for my history seminar in Knowledge, Politics, and Democracy, and I've started Conor Cruise O'Brien's biography of him (The Great Melody). Although I can't remember reading anything of Burke's which takes Enlightenment figures specifically to task, I can say what sense I get of his attitude to the Enlightenment (and that of many conservatives). (This may not be an entirely correct reading of Burke, but perhaps it's worth consideration anyway.) Burke does not simply point out "totalitarian factions." He indicates totalitarian and other dangerous implications of some Enlightenment ideas. Just as Hayek pointed out totalitarian implications of many democratic socialists' ideals while explicitly clearing them of any totalitarian intentions. Burke believed that the attempt to remold society based upon theory was dangerous, even if the goals of the theory were progressive. Thus, any liberal intentions of the French Revolutionaries would be thwarted by outcomes they had never intended; Burke predicts that a military strong man will be the result. I believe that the apparent prescience of Burke's Reflections by itself justifies serious consideration of his arguments, which is why I've started the biography. I've also started reading a book about the French Revolution--Citizens, by Simon Schama--to see how real Burke's apparent insight was. (I should also read Paine's and Wollstonecraft's responses, I know; we read her Vindication of the Rights of Women for the seminar--not much to argue with in the way of conclusions, but her mode of reaching those conclusions is not always convincing, being largely composed of appeals to what "reason" tells us about God and his intentions and out-of-fashion appeals to peculiar--to me-- Enlightenment ideals of reason and virtue.) I remember you mentioned in conversation Burke's comment that he was not afraid to say "in this enlightened age" that he prized his prejudices, and that the more antiquated those prejudices, the more he prized them. (I must admit I admire his audacity.) I believe that this is a rational argument; Burke is trying to provide rational arguments for not subjecting certain beliefs--prejudices, traditions, customs, habits--to rational scrutiny--and, though he may be wrong, his argument is NOT self-contradictory: Burke gives REASONS for believing that he is more likely to arrive at the truth (in some matters) by accepting his prejudices (pre-judgments) than by attempting to directly, rationally determine the truth. This is not an absurd argument, when taken as applying only to some and not to all matters (nor, I think, is it contradictory to rely on reason to determine on which matters one should rely on prejudice, tradition, and custom and on which matters one should rely on reason). Furthermore, for some matters it is obviously correct. We rely on tradition and received wisdom all the time, because we have reasons to believe that on some matters tradition is unlikely to lead us astray. I accept many moral precepts, mathematical procedures, habits of lifestyle, manners of speaking, rules of etiquette , and on and on and on, which I am not prepared to defend on a rational basis, though I don't doubt that most could be so defended. By using the term prejudice Burke prejudiced himself with modern readers since it is now so attached to the idea of racial prejudice. To be sure, racial prejudice is an error perpetuated by avoidance of rational scrutiny. Any kind of belief not subject to direct rational scrutiny may be in error. So may the result of rational cogitation. It is an empirical question which method of truth-seeking is most likely to be successful in any particular circumstance. Before the Enlightenment, many more ideas were accepted without scrutiny than it was rational to so accept. Burke is simply saying that the Enlightenment is relying more heavily on direct reason than is reasonable. (I really don't think that's contradictory.) Perhaps Burke relied too much on tradition than was reasonable. (James Mill says that any evil need merely come into existence to gain Burke's approval.) Was the Terror and the rise of Napoleon really "the dark cultural legacy of Christianity"? (Or perhaps you have a more favorable view of the French Revolution? Or believe it owed little to Enlightenment ideas in its origins?) The conservatives I've read--those who are partial to the free market--don't apply "blanket condemnation" of the Enlightenment. For example, Irving Kristol (ok, a neoconservative; but even more conservative free-market conservatives approve of Smith etc.) follows Hayek and distinguishes a Scottish from the French Enlightenment. Perhaps an overrough dichotomy, but the point is that conservatives do look for good guys in the Enlightenment. The question is the status of the Enlightenment and Enlightenment ideas and ideals as a replacement for Christianity. (1) Are Enlightenment ideas the way to go? This depends, again, on your (hopefully rational) estimate of the capacity of direct reason to guide men to the good life. (2) Are the Enlightenment and Christianity incompatible--can they only be alternatives, never complements? America shows that they can exist side-by-side. America has been a Christian (not, of course, a "Judaeo-Christian," whatever that means) nation from its conception. What do you mean when you say that in the early United States "a secular outlook spread deep into the attitudes of the people"? That they separated religion from politics--yes--or that they disregarded Christianity--I doubt it. Your example from early America shows that Christianity should not be an established religion, and I totally agree. It doesn't show that society should not be Christian. (3) Regarding our historical investigation--if Christianity had never been, would the Enlightenment have been hastened or postponed? I don't know. I do know that it was Christendom that produced the Enlightenment. Regarding modern Christianity. You concede rather easily "that extreme Christianity is pretty trivial in our day and age." I recently listened to a Firing Line debate about whether the Christian Right was dangerous or no. I couldn't decide. Why do you think no? "Mainly, the irrationality, emotionalism, and unwillingness to think critically about important questions--all of which I blame on Christianity--remain." I assume you mean to say you blame some examples of these ills on Christianity. Empirically: are Christians more irrational, emotional, and uncritical than nonChristians? Your argument against Christianity as a precooked philosophy boils down to your conviction that Christianity is incorrect. I share that conviction, but I also believe that all other religions are incorrect, so there's no room for special condemnation of Christianity here. As I told you, I had a friend who took Christianity "really seriously." I'll admit--he was weird. But it's not true that he was "not much fun to be around." Otherwise, I wouldn't have been friends with him. Furthermore, his family gave my own much needed aid in our times of trouble, and you can bet that they did so with the dicta of their interpretation of Christianity foremost in their minds. Finally, you claim that modern totalitarianism grows organically out of Christianity. A serious charge, and worthy of consideration (just as is the claim that the Enlightenment grows organically out of Christianity, or that totalitarianism grows organically out of the Enlightenment). Here Rod's comments are apposite, and you attempt to rebut his rebuttal. I don't have much to contribute here. (a) Enforced belief. I thought the whole point of the "don't cast the first stone" bit was that only a sinless God is entitled to punish sin. But perhaps I'm wrong; I'll have to look it up. I don't believe I am wrong, however; and if not, then there is your "explicit disclaimer of intent to persecute" and this element is reduced from enforced to merely dogmatic belief. (b) Oligarchy. Here you mostly concede that this aspect of totalitarianism can't be derived from the founding text. But that historical Christianity featured oligarchy. So did many other societies, and oligarchy is not inherently totalitarian. (c) Does the New Testament denounce personal happiness in favor of grandiose schemes for the world's salvation? Rod says no. You give examples where the Bible says or implies those who are happy now will regret it in hell. And that those who are not happy now will get their reward in heaven. But the purpose is otherworldly salvation. A distinction with a large difference. Christianity, if anything, opposes the attempt to establish the earthly utopia. (d) On free scientific inquiry, what you condemn is the "dogmatic spirit of mind." But that is a feature of religion in general, not just Christianity. Well, maybe Christianity is especially dogmatic. Totalitarianism does feed on dogma; but dogma is not inherently totalitarian, and it's not in short supply either--Marx wasn't dogmatic because of Christianity; he was dogmatic because he was Marx. (e) You concede on feudalism, with the proviso that Christian dogmatism contributed to it. (f) You concede on holy wars and repression, again with a proviso regarding dogmatism. So where does all this leave your charge that modern totalitarianism grows organically out of Christianity, that "totalitarianism does indeed seem implicit in even the Gospels," that "modern totalitarianism is a cultural legacy of Christianity," that "Christianity logically led to the establishment of a total society" (not all equivalent, but all serious)? Your case boils down to (1) Christianity was dogmatic; totalitarianism relies on dogma. (2) The New Testament appeals to underdogs; so, often, does totalitarianism. (3) "Historical Christianity certainly became totalitarian as soon as it got the reins of power." (Would Johnson agree with this charge?) Based merely on (1) and (2), your charge that totalitarianism is implicit in the Gospels obviously fails. As for what Christianity logically leads to, the logic seems to depend a lot on historical circumstance, considering the many nontotalitarian manifestations of Christianity. One might say Christianity logically leads to Enlightenment, or monarchy, or almost anything. Perhaps Marx, Hitler, etc. were influenced by the example of the Catholic Church (you give no evidence). Or perhaps they were influenced by the example of Napoleon, a "logical" development of the Enlightenment. Your argument boils down to the fact that one of Christianity's major manifestations was totalitarian, and that's not enough to sustain your serious charge that totalitarianism and Christianity are organically related. It is enough to damage the claims sometimes made for Christianity as being necessarily a force which resists totalitarianism; but even for these claims, it merely removes the element of timelessness--I think it's still plausible that modern Christianity has had an anti-totalitarian role, though the record is certainly, to put it charitably, mixed. Most of Rod's comments are directed to challenging your assessment of the essence of Christianity, a topic you both are more qualified to judge than am I. Your Socratic interrogation of Jesus is wonderful. Final thought--perhaps I am too dogmatic about judging Christianity only by its results and not by its inherent moral worth. After all, it is conceivable that even Nazism could, in the cosmic long term, have a net beneficial effect on mankind. Now--am I saying your interpretation is wrong or that it is one-sided? Neither. I don't know whether it's right or wrong. I do know it is insufficiently argued for. What you really need to do is demonstrate the practicality of the rule of reason; then you don't need to argue about Christianity's precise characteristics, since the rule of reason is presumptively better. Whew. Well, I've been working on this letter for 7 hours straight, so it's time to wrap things up. This email may be hard to read since I'm writing without proofreading my syntax etc.; sorry. What's new with me: I'm president of Toastmasters. I'm attending BLU meetings, but we haven't yet attracted anyone outside our own circle. I'm taking Eichengreen's World Economic Hisory, U.S. Intellectual History, and the seminar in Knowledge, Politics and Democracy. I'm reading, besides the books already mentioned, What is Mathematics?; Anarchy, State, and Utopia (awesome); Gargantua and Pantagruel (not very funny, I'm afraid); Henry Hazlitt on Keynes' General Theory (of course, he's very good on many things; but it depresses me how far off Hazlitt economics is from what I've been studying in class, and I haven't yet been able to really scutinize his argument). I'm reading the Founding Fathers for the U.S. intellectual history class now, and Foucoult's Discipline and Punish for the seminar. Eichengreen says British industrial decline is a result of being the first to industrialize; Britain was adapted to the first and not the second phase of industrialization; it couldn't adjust because it was locked in--either everyone shifted at once or it wouldn't happen at all; and laissez faire ideology prevented the government from coordinating an economy-wide shift to the German model. I haven't chosen a topic for my honors thesis yet. It's Yom Kippur, and, for the first time in my life, I am fasting in observance. Tomorrow, perhaps, I shall repent my sins. Go figure. Your friend, Steven