Subject: Christianity

From: Steven Blatt <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 1993 16:35:25

Hello, Bryan.  Hope you like Princeton.
     
     I think that, in addition to laziness, one reason I've procrastinated
replying to your Christianity letters is that thinking about the subject
makes me realize how inadequate is my knowledge of the relevant history,
of the Bible, and of the various Christian theologians and theologies.  I
am certainly in no position to render a verdict on Christianity.  Not
because I don't think it productive to tackle this type of Big Question,
but because my level of knowledge simply isn't yet up to the task. 
However, I find that reading about history is much more interesting and
enjoyable when one keeps such Big Questions in the back of the mind.  For
example, we read a lot of American Puritans for my American Intellectual
History Class.  This might have been boring and frustrating reading, owing
to the Puritan's archaic language and forms of argument, but I found the
reading quite interesting in light of the bigger issue about Christianity. 
I mentioned to you when I saw you last that I'm now sensitive to suspect
passages in Christian writing which I would before have unthinkingly
glossed over--dictums regarding pride and faith etc.  Some of their stuff
is really awful--e.g., Edwards sermon "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry
God." And yet...out of this stock emerged America.  The Puritans were
intolerant, but, for others in their Puritan communities, their doctrine
that God's grace could extend to anyone helped to break down barriers of
aristocratic status privilege and encourage a sense of human
equality--despite your "doubt that Calvinists were a positive force in any
sense." Now, their doctrine that salvation was the purely arbitrary result
of God's choice, uninfluenced by any personal qualities or actions of the
individual, is certainly perverse.  (For all her extremism, name-calling,
hyperbole, and reliance on strenuous assertion, I doubt that before
reading Rand I would have been sensitive to the full perverseness of even
such an egregious doctrine as the Puritan/Calvinist doctrine of
salvation--"You can and you can't,/You will and you won't,/Your're damned
if you do,/And you're damned if you don't.") But classical liberals
especially must take account of the possibility of positive effects, far
outside the visions of the Puritans, of Puritanism; and the remark extends
to Christians and Christianity in general.  On the other hand, I've also
been reading The Vital Few, by Jonathan Hughes, about American
entrepreneurs.  It begins with a section on "ideological" entrepreneurs
and suggests that the important underpinnings of American liberalism came
not from the Puritan theocracies, much less from the Southern aristocratic
slave states, but from Quaker Pennsylvania and in particular from William
Penn.  Complexities on complexities.  (I note that you have a kind word
for the Quakers too.  Were the Quaker virtues--however reasonable--derived
from reason?)

     Your first letter begins with some general considerations on the
project of evaluating Christianity's historic role.  "I consider
Christianity only in comparison to what was most likely to replace it. 
While this is reasonable to some degree, it might be that all of the
alternatives were bad, so Christianity deserves condemnation (albeit a
milder one) even if it did have a net positive influence.  I suppose that
this criticism would be most reasonable if one had a new and positive
alternative to all of the major cultural forces through history--at least
that would show that one wasn't expecting the impossible." I think it
better to stick with your first, comparative criterion.  If what we care
about is the welfare of real people, how can we condemn something that
made them better off than they otherwise would likely have been, simply
because it didn't make them as well off as we might imagine them being? 
Although it is very difficult to guess what would have happened if
Christianity had not arisen, it is very easy to imagine that it might not
have--that Jesus might never have been born, or that his apostles and Paul
might not have propagated his creed (or a creed in his name).  In such a
case, it is high unlikely the West would ever have adopted a moral system
with roots in Judaism and the Old Testament.  Nor would Islam have arisen
(which I understand had a very enlightened and valuable period--including
preserving Greek wisdom--during the Christian Dark Ages).  Is there any
reason to believe that paganism would not have continued to prevail?  (If
so, it would not necessarily be a productive paganism such as Greece's.)
Fascinating.
     I assume the alternative you allude to is the rule of reason.  In
making an historical judgment, it is not enough to say that people would
have been better off relying on reason than on Christianity, therefore
Christianity was baneful.  You must show that the likely alternative to
Christianity was the rule of reason (or some other preferable system).  We
would be better off if we could sprout wings and fly, but that is no
reason to condemn airplanes.  I know that you don't assert that a rule of
reason is possible, but I think it's implied in much of your argument.  If
you believe it is possible, then all your criticisms of Christianity are
superfluous--obviously, however good Christianity was, a society actually
ruled by reason (perhaps not a felicitous phrasing) would be better--and
you need merely demonstrate that such a rule of reason is possible. 

     1.  Has Christianity elevated moral character?
     You say, firstly, no, because, by its method of inculcation, it
discourages truth-seeking.  O.K.  (Empirically:  are non-Christians deeper
thinkers and truth-seekers than Christians?)
     No, secondly, because it damages self-esteem by condemning pride and
encouraging guilt.  The Christian warnings against pride seem innocuous
since we all know the pitfalls of arrogance; but reading Edwards, who
stresses with relish that man is a NOTHING, I can sympathize with your
point.  Empirically:  Do Christians have lower self-esteem than
non-Christians?  My experience says no.  But I don't think either pride or
guilt, high or low self esteem, are intrinsically virtues or sins.  Virtue
lies, as you say, in believing the truth--and in believing it for right
reasons.  Christians' high self-esteem is not virtuous if it arise from
self-congratulation on being among the elect.
     I think the concept of original sin is valuable in so far as it
underlines man's imperfection.  Universal guilt, however, certainly seems
an unfortunate way to emphasize this truth.
     No, thirdly, because it encourages sexual hang-ups.  Perhaps you'll
like this limerick from Asimov Laughs Again.
		Moralists think sex is a sin,
		But Nature suggests we begin;
			She arranged it no doubt
			That a fellow juts out
		In the place were a damsel juts in.
     I can't defend the rationale behind the Christian attitude to sex,
but I can conceive of the logical possibility of this attitude having a
net beneficial effect.  As you say, Christianity discourages sex
regardless of the consideration of responsibleness.  You assume that
adults, free from this irrational prohibition, will likely regulate their
passion according to reason.  Why?  The question is especially salient
when we are considering Christianity as a force not in the present but in
history, when the means for rationally contracepting (?) were more
limited.
     This brings me to a qualm about relying on reason to produce good
behavior.  I've mentioned to you before that there are two problems for
action: (1) knowing what to do; (2) mustering the will to do it. 
Regarding (1) the mere fact that man has the capacity for reason does not
demonstrate that this capacity is adequate for any particular intellectual
challenge.  People could be sexually rational, but that doesn't mean they
will.  Regarding (2) it is possible to do something one knows one
shouldn't.  I do it frequently.  Especially in the case of sex, I think
there are reasonable reasons to doubt that mere knowledge of what is right
will be generally sufficient to produce correct rational behavior.  To use
Thomas Sowell's terminology, knowledge and effective knowledge are
distinct.  One can disregard knowledge, but effective knowledge contains
an incentive for being acted on.  He cites prices.  But he also cites,
more appositely for our present concerns, pain.  Conceivably, man could
have evolved a sixth sense of "being in harm".  Such a man would feel no
pain on putting his hand in a fire; rather, he would receive the sense
impression "my hand is being harmed." Reason would then dictate removing
one's hand from the fire.  Such a sense would have advantages over pain,
even disregarding the evolutionarily insignificant one that we might be
happier:  if reason said that the harm sense was incorrect, it would be
easily disregarded; whereas, with pain, we are motivated to avoid
situations we know are good for us (e.g., getting a tooth filled).  That
pain rather than the harm sense was selected indicates that reason is not
sufficient even to the task of removing oneself from immediate harm.
     Maybe you are right, and people would be sexually responsible absent
irrational prescriptions.  It's an empirical question.
     No, fourthly, because Christianity condemns self-interest.  This seems
innocuous because we are all aware of the evils of greed.  Here again,
Christianity fails to encourage rational distinctions.  And here again,
condemnation of Christianity presupposes that people are likely to make
such rational distinctions absent Christianity.  In this case, you presuppose
that the rational perception that greed is bad is sufficient to forestall
greediness.
     Regarding throwing the first stone, here's another Asimov joke:  a
mob has gathered around an adultress and is preparing to stone her to
death.  Jesus arrives on the scene and rebukes them, calling upon him who
is blameless to cast the first stone.  The mob, shamed, is beginning to
vacate the area when a large stone flies through the air and fells the
adultress.  A frown creases Jesus' brow; he turns to the offending member
of the crowd and says, "Sometimes you piss me off, Mom."
    Since Christianity is a moral code for the individual, it seems unfair to
criticize it for not producing a correct form of political economy (i.e.,
by ignoring production as an element in reducing poverty.  By the way,
would you say that the key to reducing poverty is not so much increasing
production as it is increasing the poor's (poors'?) productivity?).
     You comment that Marxism took Christianity's errors about poverty and
ran with them.  This seems to have been a common pattern for Marxism, as
it seems Marx also took the worst aspects of classical economics (labor
concept of value, law of subsistence wages,...); while the common sense of
the classicals limited the bad effects of these errors, when combined with
Marx's passion for system and consistency they led to disaster.  Just a
speculation since I haven't read much Marx.  (But did Marx really ignore
the importance of economic growth?  Sowell--I rely too much on what Sowell
says Marx says because Sowell says it so much more clearly and concisely
than Marx--says that Marx was very sensitive to the constraints which
technology and the state of the economy placed on the historical
possibilities for human advancement; and that Marx simply thought that, as
an empirical matter, we were now in a position where the economic product
was big enough to satisfy all needs.  Similarly, I don't quite see how
Marx relied on blurring the distinction between the deserving and
nondeserving poor.)

     2.  Did Christianity encourage respect for individual rights, the
law, and other basic building blocks of civilization?
     Here the question is, did Christianity encourage respect for
individual rights, the law, and other basic building blocks
of civilization more than what would likely have been the alternative in
the aftermath of the decline of the Roman Empire?  But this is such a hard
question I don't know how to go about answering it.  (Also, it might be
argued that Christianity contributed to Rome's decline.  My historical
ignorance precludes' my evaluating the possibilities.)
     Christians abused power in the name of Christianity when they had
it.  But power corrupts universally.  In the absence of Christianity,
would there have been some other form of totalitarianism during the Middle
Ages?  I can't begin to say.
     You ask the proper empirical question, whether the rule of and
respect for law was strengthened by Christianity.  My vague impression is
that Rome dissolved as a result of successive, bloody civil wars, till no
one gave enough of a damn to expel the barbarians one more time. 
(Somewhat like the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in which none of the
now nominal communists gave enough of a damn to preserve their system.)
What was the role of Christianity with respect to these civil wars?  (That
is, a defender of Christianity would say that by establishing a united
Christendom the Church was a force for peace.) This is merely stumbling in
the dark because of my ignorance of the circumstances of Rome's decline,
but if you really want to demonstrate Christianity's political banefulness
you would have to take account of those circumstances, whatever they
actually were.
     Regarding Christianity and tolerance, what present-day world
religion is more tolerant than Christianity?  (Not a rhetorical
question--for all I know there may be many.)
     Regarding religious wars, have Christians fought more religious
wars than others?  (Again, not rhetorical.)
     Why do you say that Christianity supports the status quo?  If so, how
does this connect with your Christianity/totalitarianism thesis?
     Regarding private property--I can't see much inherent support in
Christianity for private property.  But it is true that it was Christendom
which of all the world initiated the modern revolution in property rights
which launched the agricultural and industrial revolutions.  In judging
Christianity's historical role we need to decide whether there was a
causal relationship between Christianity and the property rights
revolution, even if there was no logical one. 

     3.  Has Christianity made people happy(er)?
     You give theoretical arguments for why Christianity makes people
unhappy.  Empirically:  are Christians unhappy?  I remember you said that
to the extent they are, they are probably ignoring Christianity.  Well: 
are people who take Christianity seriously happy?  You might say that
those who are are misinterpreting Christianity.  But who are you to say
what Christianity is?  Seriously.  If someone calling himself a Christian
takes something he calls Christianity seriously and takes solace in taking
it seriously, then if you, whom no one including yourself would call a
Christian, don't call him a Christian or what he's taking seriously
Christianity then what do you call him and it?  The Christian tradition
has inconsistent and even conflicting elements and different people value
different elements of that tradition in different ways.  But if the
tradition did not exist, it would not be available for people to make such
selections from it.  (Though of course something better might.) Many
people say Christianity brings joy to their life.  A classical liberal
should hesitate before disbelieving such testimony of individual
preference.
     Has the decline of Christianity caused the decline of the family by
encouraging the search for personal happiness?  I don't know.  But I don't
think your arguments succeed in demonstrating that the idea is absurd on
the face of it.  (1) Because it assumes family life is less happy than the
alternative.  No, it doesn't.  I don't know about what your particular LA
Times column was arguing, but there are valid possibilities:  perhaps,
absent Christianity, people are unable correctly to perceive wherein
happiness lies.  (Taking happiness in its strict sense of the good life,
the idea is not implausible.) Perhaps, absent the moral sanction of
Christianity, they tend to pursue immediate pleasure at the price of
future happiness.  Perhaps they are less likely to value the good of
family members as elements of their own personal happiness.... (2)
Non-Christian societies--such as Asia's--have stable families.  But Asia
also has strong religion.  Irreligious Europe has, I belieive, weak
families.  (Perhaps I'm misinformed.  Don't know the details.  Would be
interesting.  I understand that much of western Europe is essentially
atheist.  Good proving ground for some of your ideas regarding the
prospects for the rule of reason.  If indeed I'm correctly stating your
ideas about it.) The decline of Christianity may be the cause of weak
American families even if mass conversion to Shinto would revive them. 
(3) The argument (a) concedes that Christianity discourages pursuit of
personal happiness, (b) which concession should be fatal to the case for
Christianity.  Concerning (a) perhaps the columnist was using happiness in
its common sense of immediate pleasure; or implying that the decline of
Christianity makes people value others' happiness less (makes us less
happy about others' happiness).  Even if he wasn't, those are both valid
possibilities.  Concerning (b) perhaps the rational pursuit of happiness
tends to lead, through the imperfection of man's reason and will, to
unhappiness; while reliance on Christianity does indeed lead to personal
happiness although that is not one's motivation in adhering to it.
     Ah--I see that you do indeed advocate the rule of reason, at least
regarding sex and marriage; and since those are two of the areas where
reason is least obvious to be efficacious, I presume you would advocate
the rule of reason pretty universally.  Well, considering your specific
argument:  the decline of the Christian sexual taboos but continuing
influence of its discouragement of rational thinking regarding sex and
marriage combine to cause the decline of the family.  Plausible.  Note
that you here really do concede that the decline of Christianity has
fostered the decline of the family.  The question is, is "unsquemish
critical thinking and forethought about the consequences of sex"
combined--it is vital to add--with action conforming to such rational
thought a feasible possibility, not just for particular individuals but
for society as a whole?  Again:  if it is feasible, then you are wasting
your time showing that Christianity isn't necessary for stable families,
because even if it does promote stable families obviously such a rule of
reason is superior.  You yourself note:  "I think that marriage is an area
where many people are especially prone to unrealistic expectations and act
on their emotions." You also say that Christianity makes this tendency
even worse.  But the question is, absent Christianity (or some set of
moral prescriptions accepted on authority and not subjected to scrutiny by
individual reason) will reason actually overcome these natural tendencies
in human action--or, more fairly, will reason actually overcome these
natural tendencies to a sufficient degree to produce an outcome superior
to that produced under Christianity? 

     I don't know enough about the history of ideas to judge between your
claims and Johnson's regarding the sources of our moral values.  Do you
think the implicit acceptance of collective responsibility in the doctrine
of original sin predisposed Catholics to assigning collective
responsibility elsewhere?  What do you think was the practical effect of
the Protestant sects' rejection of free will--it seems that many men of
action were members of such sects.  (Always, in making our historical
judgment, we must judge not by logical but by causal relationships.  The
question--for our purposes here, to come to a "verdict on the historical
role of Christianity"--is not, does the doctrine of pre-determination
logically imply personal helplessness, but, does the acceptance of the
doctrine actually lead to such a result or to some other bad outcome.)
Again, did the "who are we" mentality actually keep Christians from
valuing personal responsibility?  Yes, the Old Testament contains many
awful moral precedents; did these lead to emulation by Christians?  The
Romans may have been more tolerant than the Christians, but Jesus will
tell you that their humaneness left something to be desired.  Has the idea
that people are all sinners led Christians to value human life less than
other people?  None of these questions are rhetorical.  I can think of
some examples of people justifying immorality based on Bible precedents. 
For example, slavery.  But, as in the case of slavery, it is hard to know
whether Christianity was more of a baneful or beneficial actor. 
Nonchristians have long held slaves.  (Sowell talks about the particularly
awful Arab slave system.) But it was Christendom which eradicated slavery
from the earth (as Sowell emphasizes).  Yes, Enlightenment ideas (how
important was Christianity as a seed bed for these ideas?) played a role,
but there was a strong emphasis on the Bible as well (as in the civil
rights movement).  How do we tote up the record? 

     Now for alternatives:  Graeco-Roman culture and Christianity. 
Let's assume Graeco-Roman culture was superior to Christian.  Here again
the question arises, did Christianity displace or replace the Roman
empire.  If it merely replaced it, then your alternative is not an
alternative at all.
     And the Enlightenment.  The first question, which I've mentioned but
have nothing to contribute to, is how much the Englightenment depended on
Christianity.  The second is, was the Enlightenment great or what?  You
say the Rousseauean totalitarians were a deviation, really just secular
Christians, from the main liberal strain of the Enlightenment.  You set
this view in opposition to Burke's.  Well, I've read through most of
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France for my history seminar in
Knowledge, Politics, and Democracy, and I've started Conor Cruise
O'Brien's biography of him (The Great Melody).  Although I can't remember
reading anything of Burke's which takes Enlightenment figures specifically
to task, I can say what sense I get of his attitude to the Enlightenment
(and that of many conservatives).  (This may not be an entirely correct
reading of Burke, but perhaps it's worth consideration anyway.) Burke does
not simply point out "totalitarian factions." He indicates totalitarian
and other dangerous implications of some Enlightenment ideas.  Just as
Hayek pointed out totalitarian implications of many democratic socialists'
ideals while explicitly clearing them of any totalitarian intentions. 
Burke believed that the attempt to remold society based upon theory was
dangerous, even if the goals of the theory were progressive.  Thus, any
liberal intentions of the French Revolutionaries would be thwarted by
outcomes they had never intended; Burke predicts that a military strong
man will be the result.  I believe that the apparent prescience of Burke's
Reflections by itself justifies serious consideration of his arguments,
which is why I've started the biography.  I've also started reading a book
about the French Revolution--Citizens, by Simon Schama--to see how real
Burke's apparent insight was.  (I should also read Paine's and
Wollstonecraft's responses, I know; we read her Vindication of the Rights
of Women for the seminar--not much to argue with in the way of
conclusions, but her mode of reaching those conclusions is not always
convincing, being largely composed of appeals to what "reason" tells us
about God and his intentions and out-of-fashion appeals to peculiar--to me--
Enlightenment ideals of reason and virtue.) I remember you mentioned in
conversation Burke's comment that he was not afraid to say "in this
enlightened age" that he prized his prejudices, and that the more
antiquated those prejudices, the more he prized them.  (I must admit I
admire his audacity.) I believe that this is a rational argument; Burke is
trying to provide rational arguments for not subjecting certain
beliefs--prejudices, traditions, customs, habits--to rational
scrutiny--and, though he may be wrong, his argument is NOT
self-contradictory:  Burke gives REASONS for believing that he is more
likely to arrive at the truth (in some matters) by accepting his
prejudices (pre-judgments) than by attempting to directly, rationally
determine the truth.  This is not an absurd argument, when taken as
applying only to some and not to all matters (nor, I think, is it
contradictory to rely on reason to determine on which matters one should
rely on prejudice, tradition, and custom and on which matters one should
rely on reason).  Furthermore, for some matters it is obviously correct. 
We rely on tradition and received wisdom all the time, because we have
reasons to believe that on some matters tradition is unlikely to lead us
astray.  I accept many moral precepts, mathematical procedures, habits of
lifestyle, manners of speaking, rules of etiquette , and on and on and on,
which I am not prepared to defend on a rational basis, though I don't
doubt that most could be so defended.  By using the term prejudice Burke
prejudiced himself with modern readers since it is now so attached to the
idea of racial prejudice.  To be sure, racial prejudice is an error
perpetuated by avoidance of rational scrutiny.  Any kind of belief not
subject to direct rational scrutiny may be in error.  So may the result of
rational cogitation.  It is an empirical question which method of
truth-seeking is most likely to be successful in any particular
circumstance.  Before the Enlightenment, many more ideas were accepted
without scrutiny than it was rational to so accept.  Burke is simply
saying that the Enlightenment is relying more heavily on direct reason
than is reasonable.  (I really don't think that's contradictory.) Perhaps
Burke relied too much on tradition than was reasonable.  (James Mill says
that any evil need merely come into existence to gain Burke's approval.)
     Was the Terror and the rise of Napoleon really "the dark cultural
legacy of Christianity"?  (Or perhaps you have a more favorable view of
the French Revolution?  Or believe it owed little to Enlightenment ideas in
its origins?)
     The conservatives I've read--those who are partial to the free
market--don't apply "blanket condemnation" of
the Enlightenment.  For example, Irving Kristol (ok, a neoconservative;
but even more conservative free-market conservatives approve of Smith etc.)
follows Hayek and distinguishes a Scottish from the French Enlightenment. 
Perhaps an overrough dichotomy, but the point is that conservatives do
look for good guys in the Enlightenment.
     The question is the status of the Enlightenment and Enlightenment
ideas and ideals as a replacement for Christianity.  (1) Are Enlightenment
ideas the way to go?  This depends, again, on your (hopefully rational)
estimate of the capacity of direct reason to guide men to the good life. 
(2) Are the Enlightenment and Christianity incompatible--can they only be
alternatives, never complements?  America shows that they can exist
side-by-side.  America has been a Christian (not, of course, a
"Judaeo-Christian," whatever that means) nation from its conception.  What
do you mean when you say that in the early United States "a secular
outlook spread deep into the attitudes of the people"?  That they
separated religion from politics--yes--or that they disregarded
Christianity--I doubt it.  Your example from early America shows that
Christianity should not be an established religion, and I totally agree. 
It doesn't show that society should not be Christian.  (3) Regarding our
historical investigation--if Christianity had never been, would the
Enlightenment have been hastened or postponed?  I don't know.  I do know
that it was Christendom that produced the Enlightenment. 

     Regarding modern Christianity.  You concede rather easily "that
extreme Christianity is pretty trivial in our day and age." I recently
listened to a Firing Line debate about whether the Christian Right was
dangerous or no.  I couldn't decide.  Why do you think no?
     "Mainly, the irrationality, emotionalism, and unwillingness to think
critically about important questions--all of which I blame on
Christianity--remain." I assume you mean to say you blame some examples of
these ills on Christianity.  Empirically:  are Christians more irrational,
emotional, and uncritical than nonChristians?
     Your argument against Christianity as a precooked philosophy boils
down to your conviction that Christianity is incorrect.  I share that
conviction, but I also believe that all other religions are incorrect, so
there's no room for special condemnation of Christianity here.
    As I told you, I had a friend who took Christianity "really
seriously." I'll admit--he was weird.  But it's not true that he was "not
much fun to be around." Otherwise, I wouldn't have been friends with him. 
Furthermore, his family gave my own much needed aid in our times of
trouble, and you can bet that they did so with the dicta of their
interpretation of Christianity foremost in their minds. 

     Finally, you claim that modern totalitarianism grows organically out
of Christianity.  A serious charge, and worthy of consideration (just as
is the claim that the Enlightenment grows organically out of Christianity,
or that totalitarianism grows organically out of the Enlightenment).  Here
Rod's comments are apposite, and you attempt to rebut his rebuttal.  I
don't have much to contribute here.  (a) Enforced belief.  I thought the
whole point of the "don't cast the first stone" bit was that only a
sinless God is entitled to punish sin.  But perhaps I'm wrong; I'll have
to look it up.  I don't believe I am wrong, however; and if not, then
there is your "explicit disclaimer of intent to persecute" and this
element is reduced from enforced to merely dogmatic belief.  (b)
Oligarchy.  Here you mostly concede that this aspect of totalitarianism
can't be derived from the founding text.  But that historical Christianity
featured oligarchy.  So did many other societies, and oligarchy is not
inherently totalitarian.  (c) Does the New Testament denounce personal
happiness in favor of grandiose schemes for the world's salvation?  Rod
says no.  You give examples where the Bible says or implies those who are
happy now will regret it in hell.  And that those who are not happy now
will get their reward in heaven.  But the purpose is otherworldly
salvation.  A distinction with a large difference.  Christianity, if
anything, opposes the attempt to establish the earthly utopia.  (d) On
free scientific inquiry, what you condemn is the "dogmatic spirit of
mind." But that is a feature of religion in general, not just
Christianity.  Well, maybe Christianity is especially dogmatic. 
Totalitarianism does feed on dogma; but dogma is not inherently
totalitarian, and it's not in short supply either--Marx wasn't dogmatic
because of Christianity; he was dogmatic because he was Marx.  (e) You
concede on feudalism, with the proviso that Christian dogmatism
contributed to it.  (f) You concede on holy wars and repression, again
with a proviso regarding dogmatism.
     So where does all this leave your charge that modern totalitarianism
grows organically out of Christianity, that "totalitarianism does indeed
seem implicit in even the Gospels," that "modern totalitarianism is a
cultural legacy of Christianity," that "Christianity logically led to the
establishment of a total society" (not all equivalent, but all serious)? 
Your case boils down to (1) Christianity was dogmatic; totalitarianism
relies on dogma.  (2) The New Testament appeals to underdogs; so, often,
does totalitarianism.  (3) "Historical Christianity certainly became
totalitarian as soon as it got the reins of power." (Would Johnson agree
with this charge?) Based merely on (1) and (2), your charge that
totalitarianism is implicit in the Gospels obviously fails.  As for what
Christianity logically leads to, the logic seems to depend a lot on
historical circumstance, considering the many nontotalitarian
manifestations of Christianity.  One might say Christianity logically
leads to Enlightenment, or monarchy, or almost anything.  Perhaps Marx,
Hitler, etc. were influenced by the example of the Catholic Church (you
give no evidence).  Or perhaps they were influenced by the example of
Napoleon, a "logical" development of the Enlightenment.  Your argument
boils down to the fact that one of Christianity's major manifestations was
totalitarian, and that's not enough to sustain your serious charge that
totalitarianism and Christianity are organically related.  It is enough to
damage the claims sometimes made for Christianity as being necessarily a
force which resists totalitarianism; but even for these claims, it merely
removes the element of timelessness--I think it's still plausible that
modern Christianity has had an anti-totalitarian role, though the record
is certainly, to put it charitably, mixed. 

     Most of Rod's comments are directed to challenging your assessment
of the essence of Christianity, a topic you both are more qualified to
judge than am I.

     Your Socratic interrogation of Jesus is wonderful.

     Final thought--perhaps I am too dogmatic about judging Christianity
only by its results and not by its inherent moral worth.  After all, it is
conceivable that even Nazism could, in the cosmic long term, have a net
beneficial effect on mankind. 
   
     Now--am I saying your interpretation is wrong or that it is
one-sided?  Neither.  I don't know whether it's right or wrong.  I do know
it is insufficiently argued for.  What you really need to do is
demonstrate the practicality of the rule of reason; then you don't need
to argue about Christianity's precise characteristics, since the rule of
reason is presumptively better.

     Whew.  Well, I've been working on this letter for 7 hours straight,
so it's time to wrap things up.  This email may be hard to read since I'm
writing without proofreading my syntax etc.; sorry.  What's new with me: 
I'm president of Toastmasters.  I'm attending BLU meetings, but we haven't
yet attracted anyone outside our own circle.  I'm taking Eichengreen's
World Economic Hisory, U.S. Intellectual History, and the seminar in
Knowledge, Politics and Democracy.  I'm reading, besides the books already
mentioned, What is Mathematics?; Anarchy, State, and Utopia (awesome);
Gargantua and Pantagruel (not very funny, I'm afraid); Henry Hazlitt on
Keynes' General Theory (of course, he's very good on many things; but it
depresses me how far off Hazlitt economics is from what I've been studying
in class, and I haven't yet been able to really scutinize his argument). 
I'm reading the Founding Fathers for the U.S. intellectual history class
now, and Foucoult's Discipline and Punish for the seminar.  Eichengreen
says British industrial decline is a result of being the first to
industrialize; Britain was adapted to the first and not the second phase
of industrialization; it couldn't adjust because it was locked in--either
everyone shifted at once or it wouldn't happen at all; and laissez faire
ideology prevented the government from coordinating an economy-wide shift
to the German model.  I haven't chosen a topic for my honors thesis yet. 

	It's Yom Kippur, and, for the first time in my life, I am
fasting in observance.  Tomorrow, perhaps, I shall repent my sins.  Go figure.

Your friend, Steven