Subject: personal: direct reason

From: Mark Sulkowski <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 20:36:12 -0500 (EST)

From: Bryan Douglas Caplan <[email-masked]>
>I'm glad we're taking this to e-mail, since it seems to have gotten a little
>technical.

	A *little* technical?  :)

>  And by the way, hello.

	Hi there.  Pleasure to talk with you.

>1. How does direct reason differ from garden variety intuition? [......]
>2. How does direct reason differ from divine revelation? [......]

	Okay, this info was interesting but just so you know you were
responding to Mark Slagle, a different chap.

	I was asking you if you had responded to a previous post of mine.
Mr. Slagle may have been responding to that response of yours.  (This
is getting a little confusing.)

	Anyway, I'm not SURE that you wrote this response.  All I know
is that my account filled up earlier this week and I might have missed
it.  I pointed out to you that your concept of direct reason was
unclear to me.  I believe I asked for some clarification.  Sending it
to me through email is fine with me.

	And now onto your response to Slagle.

>1. How does direct reason differ from garden variety intuition?  Well,
>garden-variety intuition is one species of direct reason, I suppose.

	You suppose?  Then perhaps you aren't very clear on what direct
reason is either.  What are you clear on about it?

>Also, garden-variety intuition is probably less self-critical and
>thoughtful than our better direct reasonings are; that is, garden-variet
>intuition is probably our knee-jerk reaction, whereas something known
>well through direct reason is reached after reflection and careful thought.

	Is this "self-critical and thoughtful" aspect of successfully
applying direct reason _part_of_ the faculty of direct reason, or is it
something else (perhaps the most conscious and volitional level of our
choice and ability to think)?  Since I am still unclear on what you
imagine direct thinking to be, this question may seem off-target to you.

>2. How does direct reason differ from divine revelation?  Well, I presume
>that you don't believe in divine revelation, and neither do I.

	Okay.

>Well, I think that looking
>at a philosopher like Aquinas will shed a little light on this.  
>Basically, philosophers who believed in revelation also frequently
>believed in "the natural light of reason," which is probably yet
>another synonym for direct reason.

	Possibly...  I'm no scholar of Aquinas, but "the natural light
of reason" does not strike me as necessarily having anything to do with
your direct reason.  Aquinas may simply have had a good appreciation
for the ability of people to think and learn about what they observe.

	I don't know of any statement of his that other forms of
reasoning are incomplete without direct reasoning (or "the natural
light of reason").

>But what is it that's really bugging you about direct reason? I suspect
>that it is the popular but mistaken notion that everything must be
>"proven."

	Maybe...  I don't demand that things be proven without a doubt.
We may always suffer some form of doubt about our beliefs.  I just want
an _explanation_ for a specific conclusion other than just "it's obvious!"
Perhaps there are "obvious" beliefs.  I place a high degree of confidence
on beliefs based on observations under reasonable conditions of observation.

	For example, if I am reasonably convinced that I am awake and not
delusional, and I cross a street, and I see quite clearly and sharply
that a car is moving towards me with deadly speed, then that is certainly
enough observational evidence to convince me to jump out of the way.

	I'm not sure how big a role concepts play here.  The feeling of
danger may be geared into a very quick and "low level" evaluation of
the motion of objects.  This feeling of danger might carry a feeling
of "obviousness".

	Perhaps the concept actually forms afterwards. "That car could
have killed me!"  However, at this point any "obviousness" of the nature
of the situation is of a different sort.  Now that I have the time to
more fully and critically evaluate the situation, I can bring to bear
certain ideas like "fast moving, heavy, solid objects can seriously
damage human health".  I can think about other people who actually are
hurt seriously by such objects.  I can _explain_ why I think that it
is obvious that I could have been hurt.  I am not left crying "but it's
obvious and apparent" as if that explained everything.

	Let me know how my hypothetical situation relates to direct reason,
if at all.

>But of course that can't be true, because first of all it
>leads to an infinite regress, since you would then have to prove your
>proofs, prove the proofs of your proofs, and so on.  And second of all
>it is impossible because a proof only yields truth if its premises are
>true, and hence on pain of circularity some premises must be known without
>proof.

	We need some axioms, yes.  And this is a serious question.

>Or perhaps its because of the related notion that intuition is unreliable
>and must be "formalized."

	Well...backed up with something.

>Haven't you ever made an argument and found that another person just couldn't
>"get it?"

	No never.  :)  Yes, of course.

>If you clearly saw that the argument was valid, did it matter that the
>other person couldn't see it? 

	Actually, yes.  I'd want to know what his premises/observations are.
Maybe mine are wrong or incomplete.

>That's what I think about direct reason.  I see that some things are true
>objectively.  And if other people don't see it, why should that shake my
>confidence?
>           --Bryan

	Unfortunately, this still doesn't do much to help me understand
what direct reason is.  I realize that you are trying to solve the problem
of finding end-points to proof.  But the existence of a problem does not
demand that there already be a solution.  Perhaps we as humans are doomed
to some uncertainty about these most basic assumptions/axioms/end-points.
Consider it job security for philosophers.

	Maybe the situation is better than this and observation can play
a big role in providing a foundation for our beliefs.  We then need to
understand how we get from Perceptions -> Concepts.  This may require
a greater understanding of the workings of our brain.

	Perhaps that is what your direct reason is -- hardwired logic
or concept manipulation?  Still, it would be nice to doublecheck the
usefulness of that somehow.  ;)

Mark       | "Simplicity and truth of character are not produced by the
Andrew     | constraint of laws, nor by the authority of the state, and
Sulkowski  | absolutely no one can be forced or legislated into a state
           | of blessedness; the means required are faithful and brotherly
Sec/Treas  | admonition, sound education, and, above all, free use of the
  NFLP     | individual judgment."  -- Spinoza